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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an investigation into the relation 
between humor and authority based on the distinction first 
articulated theoretically by Freud between tendentious and 
non-tendentious cases of humor. The first chapter is a 
fairly detailed introduction to the historical and 
theoretical issues that have preoccupied studies of humor. 
Though my study makes occasional use of linguistic insights 
on humor, my critical thrust is not on a linguistic analysis 
of humor, but to demonstrate how humor may be used 
successfully or unsuccessfully as an alternate idiom to 
aggression. The second chapter discusses the relationship 
of aggression to authority fundamental to the conflictual 
model of humor in the works of the seventeenth century 
writer Sir Thomas Browne. Browne's texts demonstrate in an 
incipient form the ground-zero of disarming tendentious 
humor. The third chapter discusses the two different modes 
in which humor may act as a corrective to authority from the 
inside in two colonial texts: Sir william Jones's 
translation of the Sanskrit drama Sakuntala and Rudyard 
Kipling's Kim. The fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate 
that Dorothy Parker uses self-deprecating and melancholic 
humor in her short stories as a device to create self -
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awareness in her characters which leads them to experience 
liberating laughter. The fifth chapter discusses the almost 
total appropriation of the language of aggression by 
subversive humor in the radio-plays of The Firesign Theatre 
which insinuates itself inside the structures of authority 
and attempts to destroy it from the inside. The radioplays 
of The Firesign Theatre represent a highly evolved and 
sophisticated structure of humor that does not leave safety 
valves of any manner to save the institutions that they 
challenge. The overall impulse governing my study is to 
discover as many models to combat aggression successfully 
with as little harm done to one's self and others.
vii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: Some Serious Thoughts on Humor
As with many other good things in Western thought, music and 
poetry for instance, humor was also first discussed by the 
Greek philosophers- Though we do not find generic 
classifications of the laughable into humor, joke, wit, 
comedy, parody, and satire in Philebus. Plato isolated for 
us for the first time a theoretical perspective on the 
mental state that we might call amusement, the common 
denominator to all categories of the laughable. Plato in 
his dialogue with Protarchus in Philebus censures humor on 
the ground that there is no such category as "innocent" 
laughter. Plato defines the category of the "ridiculous," 
the traditionally designated object of humor as a perception 
tho.t produces a mixture of pain and pleasure in the eyes of 
the beholder, regardless of the object’s relation to the 
beholder:
Then our argument shows that when we laugh at what is 
ridiculous in our friends, our pleasure, in mixing with 
malice, mixes with pain, for we have agreed that malice 
is a pain of the soul, and that laughter is pleasant.
1
2
and on these occasions we both feel malice and laugh. 
(The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor 13)
Plato's student, Aristotle, revised Plato's definition of 
the ridiculous and dislodged laughter from its metaphysical 
relations with the soul that had interested Plato. We have 
to wait for Soren Kierkegaard, George Santayana and Sigmund 
Freud to revisit Plato's original theory of laughter as 
partly painful. Aristotle's emphasis was on mimesis and 
genre; in his extant definition of comedy (Umberto Eco based 
The Name of the Rose on the missing original fragment) he 
theorized that the "ridiculous" (qelos) is a painless mask: 
Comedy, as we have said, is an imitation of people 
who are worse than the average. Their badness, 
however, is not of every kind. The ridiculous, 
rather, is a species of the ugly; it may be 
defined as a mistake or unseemliness that is not 
painful or destructive. The comic mask, for 
example, is unseemly and distorted but does not 
cause pain. (The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor 
14}
Cicero following Aristotle maintained that "the seat and 
province of the laughable, so to speak, lies in the kind of 
offensiveness as deformity, for the sayings that are laughed 
at the most are those which refer to something offensive in 
an inoffensive manner" (The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor
3
17). Cicero's observation that proper laughable sayings 
refer to "something offensive in an inoffensive manner" 
marks the rhetorical mode in the study of humor.
Longinus, in an improvement of or an alteration of 
Aristotle’s generic classification drew examples from drama, 
epic, lyric, history, rhetoric and theology to theorize 
about the sublime, an aesthetic category purged of all 
aggressive emotions:
For as I keep on saying, actions and feelings which 
come close to sweeping us off our feet serve as an 
excuse and a lenitive for any kind of daring 
phraseology. This is why, even when they reach the 
point of being actually incredible, the shafts of 
comedy also seem plausible from their very 
laughability, as in "The field he had was smaller than 
a letter." For laughter, too, is an emotion related as 
it is to pleasure. (Classical literary Criticism 149- 
50)
Longinus's is a lone voice among the ancient philosophers 
writing about humor as a potentially transcendent and 
aesthetically pleasing emotion. Subsequent studies of 
.iumor, with the above-noted exceptions of Kierkegaard,
Santayana and Freud, have all followed the Aristotelian 
paradigm which maintains that the object of laughter, the
4
ridiculous, produces no pain in the eyes of the beholder.
For instance, Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan:
Sudden glory, [sic] is the passion that makes those 
grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some 
sudden acts of their own, that pleases them; or by the 
apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by 
comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.
(The.Philosophy of fravghter an£JHufflQ£ 19)
Hobbes articulates explicitly for us the power distribution 
in a context of laughter; the one who laughs is more 
powerful than the one who is being laughed at, and feels 
morally superior in doing so, since the object of laughter, 
the ridiculous, evokes no sympathy in them. The philosopher 
Descartes, Hobbes's contemporary, similarly claimed as the 
source of humor the state of superior feeling that another’s 
disaster brings to our ego. He included joy and wonder as 
sources of humor as well, but what he ei. ~d treating 
extensively in The Passion of the Soul is laughter 
occasioned by scorn and ridicule, reducing the scope of 
laughter in wonder and joy, tilting the balance in favor of 
aggression. Descartes, moreover, gave a new definition to 
the Aristotelian notion of the ridiculous; Aristotle told us 
that we laugh at what is ridiculous, ugly, or otherwise 
aberrant. According to Descartes, such objects of
5
imperfections are in themselves carriers of malicious 
mockery:
And vie notice that people with very obvious defects 
such as those who are lame, blind of an eye, hunched- 
backed, or who have received some public insult, are 
especially given to mockery; for, desiring to see all 
others held in as low estimation as themselves, they 
are truly rejoiced at the evils which befall them, and 
they hold them deserving of these. (The Philosophy of
24}
Descartes’ definition of the ridiculous as laughing at what 
laughs at it might seem like a perspective! shift tor the 
better, with the underdog getting the upper-hand, but it is 
not; it only enhances the notion of aggression aimed at 
producing an imbalance of power between the participants in 
the humorous situation.
The relation between the one who laughs and the one 
being laughed at, in other words, the deployment of the 
concept of the ridiculous, may be likened to the social 
relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys 
-the master and the slave. The ridiculous as a laughable 
category is dependent on the masters suppressing the 
subjectivity of the slaves, which is the only way in which 
such laughter can possess an appeal. The lowest kind of 
laughter is one where the self-consciousness of the slaves
6
is not visible at all, they offer no resistance to being 
laughed at, and no attempt is made from their side to 
transform, their relation to their oppressors. For this 
transformation to take place, acknowledging the ground of 
pain in laughter is essential which Plato recognized and 
Aristotle dismissed. Hegel in the Phenomeno1oav of the 
Spirit explained the role and. the responsibility of the 
slave to change the social conditions of his existence:
Generally speaking, it is the Slave, and only he, who 
can realize a progress, who can go beyond the given 
and--in particular-- the given that he himself is. On 
the one hand, as I. just said, possessing the idea of 
Freedom and not being free, he is led to tranform the 
given (social) conditions of his existence-- that is, to 
realize a historical progress. Furthermore--and this is 
the important point--this progress has a meaning for 
him which it does not and cannot have for the Master. 
(Kojeve 50)
My attempt in. this dissertation is to revive Plato's 
original theory that laughter is a partly painful index of 
social relations, since laughter is a human, social 
phenomenon, and as such, manifests the Hegelian dialectic in 
its operation.
Among eighteenth.-century philosophers writing about 
humor, Kant focuses on the mode of perception rather than
the object. Humor as the sudden perception of an 
incongruity has found favor with many succeeding 
philosophers, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard to some extent, and 
as one category of humor, for Freud. Kant refers to the 
humorous joke in the second book of the Critique of 
Judgement:
In the case of jokes (the art of which, just like 
music, should rather be reckoned as pleasant than 
beautiful), the play begins with the thoughts which 
together occupy the body, so far as they admit of 
sensible expression; and as the understanding stops 
/suddenly short at this presentiment, in which it does 
not find what it expected, we feel the effect of this 
slackening in the body by the oscillation of the 
organs, which promotes the restoration of equilibrium 
and has a favorable influence upon health. (Critique of 
Maeisni 177)
Laughter is the sudden transformation of a strained 
expectation into nothing, and to illustrate this point, Kant 
tells the following joke of an Indian at the table of an 
Englishman in Surat who when he saw a bottle of ale opened 
and all the beer turned into froth and overflowing, 
testified to his great astonishment with many exclamations. 
When the Englishman asked him, "what is there in this to 
astonish you so much?" the Indian answered, "I am not at
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all astonished that it should flow out, but I do wonder how 
you ever got it in" (Critique 178) . Hobbes might theorize 
that we laugh at the stupidity of the Indian, whereas Kant 
would conclude that we laugh at this joke because our 
expectation was strained for a time and then was suddenly 
dissipated into nothing. This free play of thought, 
however, should harmonize with bodily movement and it is 
this harmony that will produce the feeling of well-being 
that laughter effects. Humorous exposition, Kant writes, is 
"the talent of being able voluntarily to put oneself into a 
certain mental disposition, in which everything is judged 
quite differently from the ordinary method (reversed, in 
fact), and yet in accordance with certain rational 
principles in such a frame of mind" (Critique 181).
Kierkegaard portrayed incongruity as the necessary 
foundation upon which life is sustained; to Kierkegaard, 
this definition of incongruity stems from his preoccupation 
with the religious individual (the only category of human 
beings that interests him) who cannot be known for what he 
is by anyone else. This gap or contradiction is comical, 
since it conceals rather than reveals, or reveals only 
obliquely. "The comical is present in every stage in life 
(only that the relative positions are different), for 
wherever there is life, there is contradiction, and wherever 
there is coiitradiction, the comical is present . . . .  and
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wherever one is justified in ignoring the pain, because it 
is non-essential" (Concluding Unscientific Postscript 459). 
Kierkegaard refutes Aristotle's theory that the ridiculous 
is a painless mask on the grounds that "even if the 
distorted countenance does not cause pain, it is 
nevertheless painful to be destined thus to arouse laughter 
as soon as one shows one's face" (Concluding 459). 
Kierkegaard postulates that the comical is always a 
relation, not merely the perception of the ridiculous in 
something or someone, but the perception of a contradiction 
which involves the acknowledgement of a relation between the 
subject and the object, and that as a relation, it adheres 
closely to ethical expectations as in any other forms of 
human interaction. Kierkegaard formulates his corrective to 
Aristotle on such ethical grounds:
Of the comical there is certainly enough everywhere, 
and at every time, if a man only has an eye for it; one 
could continue indefinitely, unless through being clear 
about where to laugh, one also understood where not to 
laugh. . . . Recklessness and frivolity as productive
energies produce the loud laughter of indeterminacy and 
sensuous irritability, which is extremely different 
from the laughter that accompanies the great 
translucency of the comical. If one desires to learn 
in a good school, one should for a time renounce
10
laughing at what arouses antipathetic passion, where 
turgid forces may easily carry a man away; exercising 
oneself rather in perceiving the comical in this or 
that for which one has partiality, where the sympathy 
and the interest, aye the partiality create the 
disciplinary opposition against inconsiderateness. 
(Concluding 462)
In theoretically positing an opposite category to "loud 
laughter" Kierkegaard stakes out the territory that I wish 
to explore in this dissertation. My task is to listen for 
this "quiet laughter" born out of a "disciplinary opposition 
against inconsiderateness." The set of power relations 
produced by "quiet laughter" is necessarily different from 
that produced by that of loud laughter. Kierkegaard used 
the comical as a spiritual device to express his hidden 
relation to God (he called humor his "incognito"), but he 
demonstrates how humor might be used as a strategy to 
preserve and exalt one's sense of self, instead of allowing 
external authority to destroy it. Kierkegaard articulates 
for us most clearly, along with Longinus, Santayana, and 
Freud, the potential for humor to create a point of view 
from scratch that is ethical, secure, grounded in mental 
sanity and avoiding the neuroses of repression and
aggression.
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The "comical" covered the whole parameter of humor for 
Kierkegaard, but George Santayana's theoretical approach to 
laughter distinguished between laughter occasioned by the 
comic, wit, humor, and the grotesque and in each case staked 
out, more thoroughly and in greater detail, a different set 
of relations between the participants in the particular 
context of laughter. Incongruity, which had explained the 
humorous experience for Kant and Kierkegaard, does not 
constitute the whole explanation of humor for Santayana. In 
The Sense of Beauty, Santayana unequivocally revives the 
paradoxical relationship between pain and laughter which we 
saw was first noted by Plato. For Santayana, it is not 
possible to ignore pain in any context of laughter. Indeed 
pain is essential to it. Comic laughter, the least aware, 
does not connect us with suffering nor does it make us 
credit our awareness of evil in a sympathetic manner:
Fun is a good thing, but only when it spoils nothing 
better. The best place for absurdity is in the midst of 
what is already absurd--then we have the play of fancy 
without the sense of ineptitude. Things amuse us in 
the mouth of a fool that would not amuse us in that of 
a gentleman; a fact which shows how little incongruity 
and degradation have to do with our pleasure in the 
comic. In fact, there is a kind of congruity and 
method even in fooling. The incongruous and the
12
degraded displease us even there, as by their nature 
they must at all times. The shock which they bring may 
sometimes be the occasion of a subsequent pleasure, by 
attracting our attention, or by stimulating passions, 
such as scorn, or cruelty, or self-satisfaction (for 
there is a good deal of malice in our love of fun); but 
the incongruity and degradation, as such always remain 
unpleasant. (The Sense of Beauty 249)
Santayana isolates the most liberating form of laughter 
possible for human beings, laughter that does not leave any 
residue of aggression, scorn, or brutalization of our own 
sense of self which tends to accept the transference of such 
emotions from the spectacle of laughter produced before it. 
The delight produced by wit offers a valid form of pleasure, 
in which incongruity is yoked quickly and effortlessly with 
the perception of similarities between ostensibly different 
forms. But wit in thus scrambling the different 
compartments of life to make amusing comparisons often 
"belittles one thing and dignifies another; and its 
comparisons are as often as flattering as ironical" (The 
Sense of Beauty 251). Santayana always brings us back to 
the ground-zero of framing aesthetic perceptions against the 
human value system, and wit, though more complicated than 
the comic, has something reductive about it:
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Hence the understanding, when not suffused with some 
glow of sympathetic emotion or some touch of mysticism, 
gives but a dry, crude image of the world. The quality 
of wit inspires more admiration than confidence. It is 
a merit we should miss little in any one we love.
(The_ Sense of Beauty 252)
Santayana regarded the malicious or destructive character of 
intelligence as not fundamental, since "all that can be 
changed by the exercise of intelligence is our sense of the 
unity and homogeneity of the world" (The Sense of Beauty 
251]. When intelligence and reason are mixed with generous 
emotion, even that of sentiment, Santayana argues that wit 
leaves the dry bed of repartees and satire: "the mood is 
transmuted; the mind takes an upward flight, with a sense of 
liberation from the convention it dissolves, and of freer 
motion in the vagueness beyond. The disintegration of our 
ideal here leads to mysticism, and because of this effort 
towards transcendence, the brilliancy becomes sublime"
(Sense 253). Santayana refreshes in our memory the 
Longinian category of laughter as a sublime emotion.
The sense of liberation that kind perception of 
incongruities brings with them results in a paradox because 
its effect on us is exalting rather than belittling or 
aggressive. Humor, according to Santayana, provides the
14
clearest example of this degree of paradoxical liberation 
through laughter:
The essence of what we call humor is that amusing 
weaknesses should be combined with an amicable 
humanity. Whether it be in the way of ingenuity, or 
oddity, or drollery, the humorous person must have an 
absurd side, or be placed in an absurd situation. . . 
And the explanation of the paradox is the same . . .  in 
humor, the painful suggestions are felt as such, and 
need to be overbalanced by agreeable elements. These 
come from both directions, from the aesthetic and the 
sympathetic reaction . . . The juxtaposition of these 
two pleasures produces just that tension and 
complication in wuich the humorous consists. We are 
satirical, and we are friendly at the same time. The 
consciousness of the friendship gives a regretful and 
tender touch to the satire, and the sting of satire 
makes the friendship a trifle humble and sad. (Sense 
254-55)
Santayana, like Kierkegaard, regrounds our understanding of 
humor as a relation between two or more entities. We might 
summarize their conclusions thus:
1. Loud laughter will result in a set of relations with a 
different dynamics than quiet laughter.
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2. Laughter leaves a psychological effect on th speaker as 
well as the listener(s).
3. Laughter seldom is without purpose.
In the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud .s the only 
theoretician who extracted the submerged and often ignored 
dialectical model of power-relations inherent in the 
production and reception of laughter. Freud analysed and 
contrasted all manifestations of the mental state of 
amusement, such as humor, jokes, wit, the comic, smut, and 
is the only theorist who postulated unequivocally a 
qualitative value to humor as an exalted, defense mechanism 
of the human mind. Freud propose his original theory of 
humor in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905) 
in which he considered humor posited on the "hydraulic" 
theory of psychic energy popular in the nineteenth century. 
Freud, like Santayana, distinguished between jokes and wit, 
the comic and humor, and in each case, he identified a 
different deployment of our psychic energy. He found that 
in each case, we summon up psychic energy for a specific 
task, which is then discovered not to be needed, and thus 
"saved" or "economised" and released in the form of muscular 
movement known as laughter. Comic saves us energy of 
thought; jokes and wit, the energy used to repress hostile, 
sexual, aggressive feelings; and humor, the energy of 
wasting and negative emotions like fear and pity.
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Freud thus foregrounded, once again, the unpleasant 
fact of hostile and negative emotions as a permanent fixture 
in any context of laughter. Freud distinguished between two 
kinds of jokes: (1) tendentious jokes, which are told for a 
purpose, usually an aggressive one, (2) non-tendentious 
jokes or innocent jokes in which the joke is an end in 
itself and serves no particular end, Freud observed that, 
"only jokes that have a purpose run the risk of meeting with 
people who do not want to listen to them" (Jokes and Their 
Relation to che Unconscious 90). The German adjective 
"tendenzios," from the German substantive "Tendenz," has 
become the naturalized English word "tendentious," which 
Freud uses to refer to jokes with a purpose and which are 
likely to provoke cr elicit conflict.
Freud admitted that from the point of view of throwing 
theoretical light on the nature of jokes, "innocent and 
trivial jokes are likely to put the problem of jokes before 
us in its purest form, since with them we avoid the danger 
of being confused by their purpose or having our judgement 
misled by their good sense" (Jokes 94). Regarding our 
defense of innocent jokes, Freud observes that, "the joking 
activity should not, after all, be described as pointless or 
aimless, since it has the unmistakable aim of evoking 
pleasure in its hearers. I doubt if we are in a position to
undertake anything without having an intention in view"
17
(Jokes 95). Freud’s methodology, ”joke-work," with its keen 
analysis of devices to repress or distort meaning in. a joke, 
methods such as displacement, substitution, allusion, 
combination, is similar to his "dream-work" developed in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, Dreams were useful to Freud in 
his clinical treatment of severely disturbed patients 
precisely because of their power to reveal and conceal 
simultaneously the sufferings inflicted from unconscious 
motives within the self. Like Hegel's definition of the 
philosopher as the man who seeks to gain full self- 
consciousness which will result in a coherent explanation of 
all things in nature ana history, Freud's primary concern 
was not the knowledge of anything external to the self, but 
an understanding and awareness of our own doings; hence; his 
keen theoretical interest on why we laugh. Freud's 
characteristic statement *'I doubt if we are in a position to 
undertake anything without having an intention in view" is 
reminiscent of his theoretical postulate in The 
interpretation of. Dreams;
Dreams are not to be likened to the unregulated sounds 
that rise from a musical instrument struck by the blow 
of some external force instead of a player's hand . . . 
they are not meaningless, they are not absurd; they do 
not imply that one portion of our store of ideas is 
asleep while another portion is beginning to wake. On
the contrary, they are psychical phenomena of complete 
validity--fulfillments of wishes; they can be inserted 
into the chain of intelligible waking mental acts; they 
are constructed by a highly complicated activity of the 
mind, (The Interpretation of Dreams 122)
Freud observes that tendentious jokes serve two purposes: 
one, a hostile joke, serving the purpose of aggressiveness, 
satire or defense; two, an obscene joke serving the purpose 
of exposure. Freud describes the dynamics of "smut" (zote) 
or a sexual joke thus:
It is a further relevant fact that smut is directed to 
a particular person, by whom one is sexually excited 
and who, on hearing it, is expected to become aware of 
the speaker’s excitement and as a result to become 
sexually excited in turn. Instead of this excitement 
the other person may be led to feel shame or 
embarrassment, which is only a reaction against the 
excitement and, in a roundabout way, is an admission of 
if. Smut is thus originally directed towards women and 
may be equated with attempts at seduction. If a man in 
a company of men enjoys telling or listening to smut, 
the original situation, which owing to social 
inhibitions cannot be realized, is at the same time 
imagined. A person who laughs at smut that he hears is
18
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laughing as though he were the spectator of an act of 
sexual aggression. (Jokes 97)
Jane Gallop in "Why Does Freud Giggle When the Women Leave 
the Room?" attempts to probe Freud's disguised, contemptuous 
view of male homosexuality through a reductive reading of 
the above smut scenario in which she claims that the smut 
allows man to enter a man's homosocial realm through the 
absence of the woman:
Men exchange women for heterosexual purposes, but the 
real intercourse is that exchange between men. The 
heterosexual object is irretrievably lost in the 
circuits, and the man is consoled by the homology. But 
the pleasure in the joke, in the homology, the 
temptation of the analogy points to the homosexual, the 
anal , . . (Thinking Through the Body 37)
Gallop's specific disagreement with Freud is essential to 
our inquiry, since it foregrounds, once again, the patina of 
aggression involved in the relation produced by a joke. 
Gallop finds Freud's observation about the loss of tne woman 
in a smut scenario to be an instance of Freud's patriarchal 
ideology in which "identification with the father equals 
patriarchal power; desire for the father equals castration, 
humiliation" (Thinking 38). But it is possible to argue 
that in Jokes. the anal stage fascinates Freud as a sexual
20
phase, as the source of 1 shame" that is a necessary part of 
smut's plan of aggression:
The sexual material which forms the content of smut 
includes more than what is peculiar to each sex; it 
also includes what is common to both sexes and to which 
the feeling of shame extends--that is to say, what is 
excremental in the most comprehensive sense. This is, 
however, the sense covered by sexuality in childhood, 
an age at which there is, as it were, a cloaca within 
which what is sexual and what is excremental are barely 
or not at all distinguished. Throughout the whole range 
of the psychology of neuroses, what is sexual inlcudes 
what is excremental, and is understood in the old, 
infantile sense. (Jokes 98)
Gallop attempts to make Freud's theory of aggressive 
laughter reductive, less universal, by compartmentalising 
its victims --women, homosexuals, lower-class etc. Gallop 
does not radically challenge Freud's theory of aggression by 
defending homosexuality in an "egalitarian" manner. Freud's 
exposition of smut’s power to humiliate its object may be 
seen to hold true regardless of gender or sexual behavior. 
Freud's comments on regressing to the anal stage qualifies 
it as a pathological regression when done intentionally for 
the purpose of reducing the adult ego to its infantile 
stage, in which case the dislocation produces humiliation,
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aggression, and pain to the ego. Freud uses the smutty 
jokes as expressions of pathological relations where one 
character is definitely demoted in power in relation to the 
other.
We might summarize Freud's findings about laughter
thus:
1. Laughter is seldom without a purpose.
2. The purposes of laughter are usually for two modes of 
aggression--hostile or obscene.
Freud in a later essay entitled "Humor" (1928) revised 
some of his earlier findings about humor, not in a 
theoretical leap, but in an expansion of the central idea. 
The relation produced by tendentious laughter is essentially 
aggressive and leads to neuroses and repression and eventual 
destruction of the ego. Humor, on the other hand, Freud 
observes, is tendentious laughter that does not leave the 
ground of mental sanity and counters aggression without 
destruction done to the ego of the subject. Not everyone 
possesses the humorous point of view, Freud notes; it is the 
triumph of the pleasure-principle, "the ego’s victorious 
assertion of its own invulnerability. It refuses to be hurt 
by the arrows of reality or to be compelled to suffer" 
(Collected Papers 217):
These last two characteristics, the denial of the claim 
of reality and the triumph of the pleasure principle.
cause humor to approximate to the regressive or 
reactionary processes which engage our attention so 
largely in psychopathology. By its repudiation of the 
possibility of suffering, it takes its place in the 
great series of methods devised by the mind of man for 
evading the compulsion to suffer -a series which begins 
with neurosis and culminates in delusions, and includes 
intoxication, self-induced states of abstraction and 
ecstasy. Owing to this connection, humor possesses a 
dignity which is wholly lacking, for instance, in wit, 
for the aim of wit is either simply to afford 
gratification, or, in so doing, to provide an outlet 
for aggressive tendencies. (Collected Papers 217)
Humor is rebellious and is the loftiest of mind's defensive 
devices, according to Freud. The humorous point of view, in 
Freud's terminology, incorporates a strong super-ego 
pacifying the ego intimidated by conflict. Freud's analogy 
is of course that of the parent and the child, but without 
distorting the analogy for ideological purposes, we might 
conclude that the humorous point of view requires the 
creation of a benign authority within ourselves that 
protects us or vaccinates us against destructive authority 
from the outside.
My use of Freud's model of tendentious laughter, humor 
and its relation to destructive authority, is to identify
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models of non-violent attacks on authority. My primary 
objective is to extract ways in which humor may be used in a 
pointed but non-destructive manner to challenge, transform 
or destroy authority with minimum harm done to others or 
one's self. Though my study makes occasional use of 
linguistic insights on humor, for instance, the semantic and 
syntactic rules governing certain jokes, my emphasis is not 
on a linguistic analysis of humor. I attempt to demonstrate 
how humor may be used successfully or unsuccessfully as an 
alternate idiom to aggression.
My reading of Sir Thomas Browne's Pseudodoxia Eoidemica 
and Reliaio Medici attempts to show how humor is used in 
these texts to diffuse aggression against authority by 
absorbing it into the matrix of challenge and transforming 
it into a non-violent point of view in the process.
Browne's texts demonstrate in incipient form what I would 
term "whackiness" or ground-zero of disarming tendentious 
humor. It is instructive to learn Browne's strategies to 
combat false authority,
The first part of the third chapter discusses the 
structural transformation that the character of the clown in 
Kalidasa's Sanskrit drama Sakuntala undergoes in Sir William 
Jones's colonial English translation. The clown's humor is 
a style that is permitted by authority and hence is not 
threatening to the l a tv .* quo of authority. In the gap
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between the clown's characterization in the original and 
Jones's characterization in the translation we may perceive 
two different modes in which humor may act as a corrective 
to authority from the inside.
The second part of the chapter is a discussion of the 
function of the idiom of jest in another colonial text, 
Rudyard Kipling's Kim. Kipling experiments with humor as 
the language of a world-view that offers an alternate model 
to the master-slave dialectic characteristic of the colonial 
enterprise. Kipling’s answer to the Hegelian dialectic is 
the master-disciple or lover-beloved bond.
My fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate that self- 
deprecating humor need not always necessarily be taken as a 
sign of compromise or defeat. My primary examples are the 
short stories and poetry of Dorothy Parker which have been 
traditionally censured as simultaneously self-deprecating 
and hostile towards others. In my examination of these 
texts, I contend that Parker positions herself outside the 
parameters set for women by patriarchy. She uses humor as a 
distancing tool to subvert men's unfair expectations about 
women. Parker's stories demonstrate the possibilities and 
dead-ends governing most cases of subversive humor.
The radio plays of The Firesign Theatre represent a 
highly evolved and sophisticated structure of humor that 
does not leave open safety valves of any manner to save the
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institutions that they challenge. In these plays we may 
locate an almost total appropriation of the language of 
aggression by subversive humor that insinuates itself inside 
the structures of authority and attempts to destroy 
authority from the inside. Technology, radio, computers, 
etc., are thus artfully appropriate t- pes for this ultimate 
subversion from the inside.
I have chosen Sir Thomas Browne as a starting point for 
my research for two reasons. One textual: his use of humor 
demonstrates in the quietest manner possible, how to contend 
the authority of past masters --here, medieval science-- 
acknowledging the conflict, working to change it without 
violence, and establish himself as an authority on an equal 
footing with his adversaries. Two, formal: Browne's 
historical relation to his opponents, that is the relation 
of seventeenth-century empirical science to medieval 
science, is similar to the relation of ■adio to television 
explored in my last chapter ou non-violent humor in the 
plays of the Firesign Theatre. We might call them both 
odtires on learning. Of course, Browne takes a look backward 
whereas the Firesign Theatre looks forward.
The intermediate chapter on Sir William Jones's 
translation of Sakuntala and Rudyard Kipling's Kim adds 
another complex layer to the polarisation of and monopoly on 
learning. In these colonial texts, monopoly over learning is
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an index of the deeper, more pervasive, oppressive binary of 
the colonizer and the colonized. In Kim we find Kim 
subverting his master role among the Indians to substitute 
the master-slave dialectic with the mutually giving one of 
the master-disciple or lover-beloved bond.
The chapter on Dorothy Parker's humor reverses this 
transcendent status of love; in Parker, hetero-sexual 
romance is the arena for hostile humor. The thread that 
connects the four chapters is the explicit, self-conscious 
and paradoxical intent present in all of them to resist 
authority, to change their social situation, and yet to 
avoid direct, deliberate attack against their oppressors.
It is this paradoxical search for a mode of rebellion that 
will avoid the ultimate brutalization of the self that more 
direct forms of violent change might inflict on a society 
chat fascinates me and is the subject of this dissertation.
"Towards Non-Tendentious Humor and Non-Violent 
Rebellion" appropriates Freud's concept of tendentious humor 
in its original sense, that is, humor with a purpose. In 
each of the texts analysed here, however, we find a paradox 
governing the production of non-tendentious humor. Non- 
tendentious humor does not mean the absence of conflict.
The humorous point of view is born as the self in conflict 
with authority absorbs, transforms, or waits for aggressive 
authority to self destruct itself, so that it appears to be
on a path towards approaching "humor," the exalted, 
introspective, defensive device of the human mind that Freud 
posited as an alternate to aggressive humor.
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CHAPTER TWO
Ancients in the Lab: Curing the Pseudcdoxia Epidemica
Sir Thomas Browne lived and wrote during the turbulent times 
of England's Civil War but there is nothing in Browne's 
published writings to remind us of these social and 
political disturbances. By training and profession a 
physician, he lived and practiced in Norwich all his life, 
writing over the course of his life a volume on the birds 
and fishes of Norfolk. Keen, scientific observation of 
animals, birds, plants, minerals and vegetables abound in 
Notes and Letters on the Natural History of Norfolk, More
aggagiali^L.on.the on the Binds and Fishes. (19 02) as well as
his domestic correspondence, but it is in Pseudodoxia
SB-idemicgt: or Enquiries into very many received Tenets,.and
BBffiQinly.PXQS.um.ed.Truths. (1646) that we find Browne the
naturalist and scientist paying his most devoted and copious 
attention to all forms of life.
Pseudodoxia Epidemica or Vulgar Errors is an elaborate 
enquiry into the many "errors" or "superstitions” regarding 
nature, religion, language, and other compartments of 
knowledge. Many of the errors that Browne attempts to
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correct are still active in our times (eg: Is the tenth wave 
greater than the other nine? Browne says no.), but we don’t 
read Browne these days to verify these errors; at least, 
that is not the entire reason why we read him. Browne's 
prose delightfully demonstrates a method of disputation and 
we follow the train of his arguments for the sake of 
following his mind as it takes up one dovibtful claim after 
another, made by serious-minded ancient and medieval 
scholars, then disprove them in a humorous manner. Browne's 
relation to the authority of these medieval scholars was one 
of genial skepticism. Though Browne himself expressed his 
doubts and disagreements with the ancients in a non-hostile 
manner, Pseudodoxia was vehemently attacked five years after 
its publication by Alexander Ross, defender of Aristotle and 
orthodox knowledge, in Arcana Microcosmi: or the hid Secrets
of Man's Body disclosed , ___ With.a refutation., of..Dx__BrQwas
Vulgar Errors: And the Ancient.Opinions vindicated on the
grounds that its empiricism endangered sacred knowledge.
Ross published a second and enlarged edition a year later 
where he refuted The Lord Bacon's Natural__Historv as well as 
Dr Harvey's Book Pe Generatione, thus making his real target 
visible to us--the rise of empirical science in the 
seventeenth century. It is ironic that the defenders of the 
ancients regarded Pseudodoxia as a threat to their system of
belief, because Browne's strategy of attack carefully
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disguised the fact that it was an attack. This essay 
explores Browne's strategy of contention with the ancients, 
a non-aggressive challenge where hostility is kept at bay by 
the judicious, use of purposeful humor.
Browne’s humor was not immediately remarked, upon by his 
readers (though his good temper was), particularly those 
from the eighteenth century which had perfected the art of 
aggressive humor. For instance, compare Pseudodoxia. with 
Jonathan Swift's satire on learning,
(1704.) , with, its military metaphor, and. we can hear the 
differences in the volume and tone between the two forms of 
challenges. Aggressive humor has no better record-keeper 
chan Swift; the battle between the Ancients and the Moderns 
is fought with "ink, . .the great missive weapon . . . which 
conveyed through, a sort of engine called a quill, infinite 
numbers of these axe darted at the enemy, by the valiant on 
each, side, with equal skill and violence, as if it were an
engagement of porcupines” (Swift GULllilESE-L,s.Haaslfl-janfl
other Writings 361) . Swift makes the Moderns the targets of 
his satire for a. certain belligerent approach to 
argumentation, a presumptuous contempt evident in them 
towards their older counterparts in the field of 
intellectual enquiry. In the fable of the spider and the 
bee, the spider who represents the Moderns embodies this 
ill-mannered approach well: "At this the spider, having
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swelled himself into the size and posture of a disputant, 
began his argument in the true spirit of controversy, with a 
resolution to be heartily scurrilous and angry, to urge on 
his own reasons, without the least regard to the answers or 
objections of his opposite, and fully predetermined in his 
mind against all conviction" (Gullivers Travels 366).
Browne is a defender of the Moderns that Swift ridicules; 
but Browne negotiates with the Ancients with humor which 
reduces the seriousness of the challenge that he extends 
towards them. Swift's text is incomplete: we are not told 
who won the war between the Ancients and the Moderns, but in 
Pseudodoxia, Browne and seventeenth century empirical 
science wins. Though the resultant relationship between 
Browne and the Ancients clearly favors Browne, it achieves 
that victory v/ithout ridiculing the Ancients in a violent 
manner.
Dr. Johnson was one of many eighteenth century readers 
not impressed with Browne's humor. In his Life of Browne he 
uses the testimony of Dr. John Lightfoote who knew Browne 
"two-thirds of his life," to project this picture of 
Browne’s equanimity:
He was never seen to be transported with mirth, or 
dejected with sadness; always cheerful, but rarely 
merry, at any sensible rate; seldom heard to break a 
jest; and when he did, he would be apt to blush at the
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levity of it: his gravity was natural without 
affectation. (Browne Major Works 503)
Browne's equivocal temperament is further attested by his 
biographer Edmund Gosse who said outright "he had no sense 
of humour" though he grudgingly admitted his "wit," "It is 
doubtful whether in the whole body of his writings," wrote 
Gosse, "there is a single phrase written for the purpose or 
expectation of raising a laugh" (Gosse Sir Thomas Browne 
183). William Hazlitt and Thomas De Quincey were two other 
nineteenth-century writers who were of the same persuasion. 
Hazlitt did not include Browne in his Lectures on the Comic 
Writers Etc of Britain: instead, in his Essays on the
Dramatic Literatyre of the Age,..Q.f,_E 1.iz^b-g-Lh he praised
Browne for his rhetorical excellence, his "passion for the 
abstruse and the imaginary," his childhood temper of the 
curiosity which "superannuated" all his other faculties, his 
"most intense consciousness of contradictions and non­
entities" (The Complete Works 333-35). Hazlitt qualified 
Browne's style as the great "sublime of indifference," and 
notes how Browne seizes abstractions and "decks them out in 
the pride and pedantry of words as if they were the attire 
of his proper person: the categories hang about his neck 
like the gold chain of knighthood, and he ’walks gowned’ in 
the intricate folds and swelling drapery of dark sayings and 
impenetrable riddles!" (The Complete Works 335).
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De Quincey too was seduced by the dazzling density of 
Browne’s style, and in an essay entitled "Rhetoric" he paid 
his tribute to Browne in this verbose eulogy of 
Hydriotaphia. imitative of Browne's style, but in which 
there is no room for Brownian humor:
What a melodious ascent as of a prelude to some 
impassioned requiem breathing from the pomps of earth, 
and from the sanctities of the grave! What a fluctus 
decumanus of rhetoric! Time expounded, not by 
generations or centuries, but by the vast periods of 
conquests and dynasties; by cycles of Pharoahs and 
Ptolemis, Antiochi and Arsacides! And these vast 
successions of time distinguished and figured by the 
uproars which revolve at their inaugurations; by the 
drums and tramplings rolling overhead upon the chambers 
of forgotten dead--the trepidation of time and 
mortality vexing, at secular intervals, the everlasting 
sabbaths of the grave! (De Quincey Collected Writings 
104-5)
Browne himself regarded the greatness attributed to the 
fluctus decumanus or tenth wave to be scientifically 
inaccurate and dismissed it quietly in Pseudodoxia 
Eoidemica: "nor can it be made out by observation either 
upon the shore or the Ocean, as we have with diligence 
observed both" (Browne The Works of Sir Thomas Browne 535).
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The fluctus decumanus of rhetoric which enchanted De Quincey 
seems to be more a reflection of De Quincey's enthusiasm for 
an admired writer than any inherent exuberance in Browne 
himself, as the sample we just quoted would prove to us.
An alert reader who noticed the light-hearted point of 
view in Browne was the ubiquitous Samuel Pepys, who wrote in 
his Diarv in 1664:
At the Coffee-house, where I sat with Sir G. Ascue and 
Sir Wiliam Petty, who in discourse is, methinks, one of 
the most rational men that ever I heard speak with a 
tongue, having all his notions the most distinct and 
clear, and, among other things (saying, that in all his 
life these three books were the most esteemed and 
generally cried up for wit in the world--"Religio 
Medici," "Osborne's Advice to a Son," and "Hudibras").
. • (The Diarv of Samuel Pepvs 480)
The guarded, understated tone of the qualifier, "one of the 
most rational men that ever I heard speak with a tongue, 
having all his notions the most distinct and clear," could 
very well be Pepys' testimony to Browne's own quiet style of 
humor.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge was a more eloquent believer in 
Browne's humor. In 1804 he wrote Sara Hutchinson that Sir 
Thomas Browne was "among his first favorites. . . .he is a
quiet and Sublime Enthusiast with a strong tinge of the
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Fantast, the Humorist constantly mingling with & flashing 
across the Philosopher. . . " (Coleridge on the Seventeenth 
Century 448). Coleridge was particularly charmed by that 
farewell passage in The Garden of Cvrus. and he copied it in 
its entirety to Sara:
But it is time for me to be in bed; in the words of Sir 
Thomas, which will serve you, my darling Sara! as a 
fair specimen of his manner. "But the Quincunx of 
Heaven (the Hyades or 5 Stars about the Horizon, at 
midnight at that time) runs low, and tis time we close 
the five Ports of knowledge! We are unwilling to spin 
out our waking Thoughts into the Phantasms of Sleep, 
which often continueth praecogitations, making Cables 
of Cobwebs, and wilderness of handsome Groves. To keep 
our eyes open longer were to act cur Antipodes. The 
Huntsmen are up in America, and they have already past 
their first Sleep in Persia." (Seventeenth Century 449) 
Coleridge interjects his transcription here to add his own 
thoughts, and in the intimacy of this correspondence we hear 
why he is so enraptured with Browne:
T h i n k  you, m y  d e a r  Sara! that there e v e r  w a s  s u c h  a 
r e a s o n  g i v e n  b e f o r e  for g o i n g  to b e d  at m i d n i g h t ,  to 
wit, that if w e  d i d  not, w e  s h o u l d  b e  a c t i n g  the p a r t  
of o u r  A N T I P O D E S !! A n d  then, "The H u n t s m e n  ar e  up in 
A m e r i c a " - -what Life, w h a t  Fancy! D o e s  the w h i m s i c a l
36
Knight give us thus a dish of strong green Tea, & call
it an Opiate? (Seventeenth Century 449)
We might call the "Fancy" that caught Coleridge's ear, 
Browne's unique line of reasoning which is at once whimsical 
but indisputable; a manner of proof that incorporates 
science, logic and imagination in equal parts. As with Da 
Quincey, Coleridge's copy of Browne is marked up with 
passionate outbursts of approbation; evidently Coleridge 
likened himself to Browne--"I have never read a book, in 
which I felt greater similarity to my own make of mind-- 
active in enquiry, & yet with an appetite to believe,--in 
short, an affectionate & elevated Visionary!" His final 
verdict, however self-serving, expresses his admiration 
quite succinctly: "it is a most delicious Book" (Seventeenth 
4 3 9 )  .
If Coleridge was enchanted with Browne's fancy, Sir 
Leslie Stephen isolated Browne's humor for us, and in doing 
so, staked out the territory that we want to explore: "He is 
a humorist to the core. . . The numerous class which insists 
upon a joke being as unequivocal as a pistol-shot, and a 
serious statement as grave as a Blue-book, should therefore 
keep clear of Sir Thomas Browne" (Hours in a Library 269 - 
72). "Humour," Stephen says, is "the faculty which always 
keeps us in mind of the absurdity which is the shadow of 
sublimity," and Browne’s "most congenial readers are those
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who take a simple delight in following out any quaint train 
of reflections, careless whether it may culminate in a smile 
or sigh, or in some thoughts in which the two elements of 
the sad and the ludicruous are inextricably blended" (Hours 
272) .
My use of Browne is to listen to the humorous voice 
that Pepys's friend, Coleridge, and Stephen heard, a faint 
voice easy to miss, but which nevertheless colors his 
thought and style. In Browne we are at the threshold of a 
certain type of humor that we may tentatively characterize 
as "degree-zero" of non-aggressive humor. We are not 
listening for jokes as "unequivocal as pistol-shots," but 
for that quality of expression that led Coleridge to find in 
him "the Humorist mingling with & flashing across the 
Philosopher" and in which Leslie Stephen saw the union of 
the sublime and the absurd. I don't contend that the 
pleasure of reading Browne is similar to that of reading 
other (louder) authors like Pope, Swift, Congreve, or even 
Addison and Steele. Browne’s humor highlights a particular 
kind of moral vision that offers a philosophical variation 
to the traditional structure on which humor, comedy, 
laughter, etc. are erected -- namely, the master-slave 
dialectic broached in my introduction as implicit in 
Aristotle's definition of the "ridiculous" as the engine of 
comedy, and elaborated by Freud. The moral vision Browne
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demonstrates for us explicitly rejects the easy road of 
direct aggression; nor does he make himself vulnerable or 
helpless. Swift's Ancient authors on top of Parnassus 
challenge the Moderns to raise themselves upto the Ancient 
heights as an alternative to war. Browne had already 
achieved that half a century earlier. He meets his 
adversaries on equal ground; indeed, the first part of the 
first book of Pseudodoxia deals exclusively with 
intellectual cowardice and supinity evident in the blind 
submission to authority:
Sixthly, We urge authorities in points that need not, 
and introduce the testimony of ancient writers, to 
confirm things evidently believed, and whereto no 
reasonable hearer but would assent without them. . 
.Antonius Guevara, that elegant Spaniard, in his book 
entituled, The Dial of Princes, beginneth his epistle 
thus: Apollonius Thyanaeus, disputing with the scholars 
of Hiarchus said, that among all the affectations of 
nature, nothing was more natural than the desire all 
have to preserve life. Which, being a confessed truth, 
and a verity acknowledged by all, it was a superfluous 
affectation to derive its authority from Apollonius, or 
seek confirmation therof as far as India, and the 
learned scholars of Hiarchus. (Browne The 'Works of Sir
Thomas Browne 46}.
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The phrase "that elegant Spaniard" to describe Antonius 
Guevara tells us that it is within Browne's power to 
tendentiously ridicule his target. But he stabilizes 
himself on the level of common sense, after having exposed 
the unnecesssary practice in an effective understatement. 
In the third Book of Pseudodoxia. Browne targets Aristotle 
for misleading us about the behavior of the elephant. 
Regarding the popular superstition that elephants have no 
joints, Browne writes:
The first shall be of the elephant, whereof there 
generally passeth an opinion it hath no joints: and 
this absurdity is seconded with another, that, being 
unable to lie down, it sleepeth against a tree; which 
the hunters observing, do saw it almost asunder; 
whereon the beast relying, by the fall of the tree 
falls also down itself, and is able to rise no more. 
(Browne The Works 157)
Browne relates the error as it is reported, with minimum 
editorial intrusion. Even when he traces the error to 
Aristotle, he chastises Aristotle in a gentle manner:
Which conceit is not the daughter of later times, but 
an old and grey-headed error, even in the days of 
Aristotle, as he aelivereth in his book De Incessu 
Animalium, and stands successively related by several
other authors; by Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Ambrose,
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Cassiodore, Solinus, and many more. (Browne The Works 
157)
An error made by Aristotle is "an old and grey-headed 
error," an accusation that is as respectful as it is 
uncompromising. In this relation, Browne does not belittle 
himself, nor does he belittle Aristotle. Browne allows the 
error to expose itself:
For first, they affirm it hath no joints, and yet 
concede it walks and moves about; whereby they conceive 
there may be a progression or advancement made in 
motion, without inflexion of parts. Now, all 
progression or animal locomotion being (as Aristotle 
teacheth) performed tractu et pulsu, that is, by 
drawing on or impelling forward some part which was 
before in station, or at quiet,--where there are no 
joints or flexures, neither can there be actions. 
(Browne The Works 157)
Aristotle is held responsible to his erring observations, 
but obliquely, literally, since Browne positions it as if it 
were an afterthought, within parenthesis. Aristotle's error 
is exposed as such in Aristotle's own terms, according to 
his own definition. We don't hear any aggression from 
Browne, the interlocutor, who acts as a choreographer who 
picks and chooses among his actors, his evidence, the 
ancient authors, and arranges a scene as demonstrative as a
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tableau. The scene will convey its meaning, in this case, 
the error, without any vehement thrust of energy from 
Browne.
We might summarise the first rule for Browne's fair 
battle thus: The adversaries are relatively equal in 
knowledge. The strategy of dispute is through demonstrating 
complete knowledge of the enemy territory, finding its most 
vulnerable points, and arranging them in such a way that the 
error undoes itself as if by its own energy.
The ridiculous as a category of the laughable does not 
play a significant part in Browne's humorous challenges to 
his adversaries. Aristotle's definition of the "ridiculous" 
carefully emphasized that it was a painless mask, a blunder 
or ugliness that does not cause pain or disaster (see 
Introduction). The most significant philosophical challenge 
to this definition of humor, we saw, came from Soren 
Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard's question was simple, yet very 
important: who defined what is ridiculous? Is there a 
category called the "ridiculous" in nature? In his 
Concluding .Unscientific Postscripts he suggests that the 
ridiculous is not a "something" but always a relation that 
involves a contradiction, and hence an index of perception, 
but one that is free from, pain (Concluding 4595. Kierkegaard 
saw humor as legitimately belonging to the province of 
religion because of its ubiquity as a human phenomenon. To
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study humor in a good school, he notes, one must turn away 
from laughter as an "antipathetic passion," to objects that 
arouse our "partiality" and "sympathy," which would create 
“the disciplinary opposition against inconsiderateness" so 
that the "great translucency of the comical” would become 
visible to us {Concluding 462) . In Kierkegaard as well as in 
Browne, we find the option for a system of humor that is 
non-aggressive, which demands from the comical a necessary 
correspondence with an ethical framework.
The ethical is a religious category in Browne, so that 
any charitable acts in the human society are monitored by 
God and any trangression in the human society is a 
trangression against God. It is this ethical/religious 
monitoring of laughter that makes the ridiculous a suspect 
source of humor for Browne. Not only does Browne reject the 
concept of the ridiculous, but also he tracks the division 
of power in the human world to its first schism--God versus 
Devil. Browne’s good school of humor opens with Reliaio
Medici, or ihe Religion of.a.EfaY&isian (1642) which
established Browne's reputation in England and overseas as a 
great scholar and wit. Browne's quiet voice that eventually 
became the signature style of his humor in Pseudodoxia first 
makes its appearance in this work.
Reliaio Medici pursues the Manichean division between 
God and Devil and arranges a disputation in which this
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hostility is shown to be fundamentally contrary to the 
teachings of Christ. Browne's self-conscious intent to 
dissolve this conflict is integral to his design to 
establish an alternate paradigm to the master-slave 
conflict. Browne's Devil, consequently, does not challenge 
God's authority, and Browne's God does not exact oppressive 
submission from Devil, Dr, Johnson observed that Reliaio 
Medici was much read and much criticized because of "the 
novelty of paradoxes, the dignity of sentiment, the quick 
succession of images, the multitude of abstruse allusions, 
the subtlety of disquisitions, and the strength of language" 
(Browne Major Works 486). In spite of such general praise 
and Browne's solemn affirmation that his was "the honorable 
stile of a Christian" he was accused of being an atheist, 
probably because of the novel manner in which he chose to 
affirm his Christian faith. He refused to take sides in 
religious disputes; in Reliaio Medici he admits that he is 
"naturally inclined to that, which misguided zeales termes 
superstition" (63), that he cannot hear an Ave Maria without 
lifting his heart in prayer, that he is guilty of the error 
of praying for the dead and of thinking that even the most 
damned might be saved, like the Devil, for instance, that 
the "Hieroglyphicks and allegories of Egyptians" please him 
more than the metaphysical definitions of Divines, and that
he "cannot dreame that there should be at the last day any
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uch Judiciall proceeding, or calling to the Earre, as 
ndeed the Scripture seemes to imply" (Browne Manor Works 
17). it is understandable that he did not endear himself to 
he Anglican church.
Browne reforms the traditional antagonism by treating 
he devil and hell as aspects of the human mind, much like 
hat William Blake would do a century and a half later in 
he Songs of Innocence and Experience or more in The 
arriacre of Heaven and Hell. Though Browne says that he 
ates nobody as intensely as he hates the devil, he quickly 
eminds us that the "heart of man is the place the devill 
wels in, " pointing to himself as a perfect example of 
tatement. Browne’s intent is to direct us towa- -is constant 
ntrospection, to identify the internal climate that fosters 
ppression:
Surely though wee place Hell under earth, the Devils 
walke and purlue is about it; men speake too popularly 
who place it in those flaming mountaines, which to 
grosser apprehensions represent Hell. The heart of man 
is the place the devill dwels in; I feele sometimes a 
hell within my selfe, Lucifer keeps his court in my 
brest, Leoion is revived in me. There are as many hels 
as Anaxagoras conceited worlds: there was more than one 
hell in Magdalen. when there were seven devils; for 
every devil is a hell unto himselfe: he holds enough of
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torture in his owne ubi. and needs not the misery of 
circumference to afflict him, and thus a distracted 
conscience here is a shadow or introduction unto hell 
hereafter; Who can but pity the merciful intention of 
those hands that doe destroy themselves? the devill 
were it in his power would do the like. . . . (Browne 
Major Works 125)
The Devil, in other words, is but a distracted conscience. 
Although the conclusion that the devil is to be pitied and 
not hated or feared (and does he also condone suicide 
here?), might sound heretical to an absolute doctrine of 
Christianity, it is characteristic of Browne's ameliorating 
vision, "a soft and flexible sense" that makes a convincing 
argument to dismantle an ancient and cherished opposition, 
that of the arch-enemies, God and Devil.
The importance of dismantling the Manichean opposition 
to Christianity cannot be emphasized enough, and it has a 
direct bearing on our subject of humor and laughter. The 
Venerable Jorge in Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose calls 
laughter the "Devil's plot" and commits several murders to 
hide Aristotle's lost treatise on comedy from ever falling 
into the hands of the public, because it sanctions laughter. 
He announces his reasons:
Laughter frees the villein from fear of the Devil, 
because in the feast of fools the Devil also appears
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poor and foolish, and therefore controllable. But this 
book could teach that freeing oneself of the fear of 
the Devil is wisdom. When he laughs, as the wine 
gurgles in his throat, the villein feels he is master, 
because he has overturned his position with respect to 
his lord. . . . The prudence of our fathers made its 
choice: if laughter is the delight of the plebians, the 
license of the plebians must be restrained and 
humiliated, and intimidated by sternness. (Eco The Name 
of the Rose 476)
3co is a medievalist and * novelist, and the political 
reasons for suppressing laughter to maintain the status-quo 
of the social structure are upfront in Jorge's speech. 
Laughter is a form of power that can be liberating, hence it 
is to be suppressed. Manichean oppositions, between God and 
Devil, Good and Evil, are designed to keep those ignorant 
and less powerful inside the dialectic under check and 
constant terror. Browne's strategy to dismantle this 
opposition adopts Kierkegaard's "disciplinary opposition 
against inconsiderateness" rather than Aristotle's painless 
lauahter at the ridiculous. But is it possible to correct an 
error without subverting the base or undermining the dignity 
of the adversary, a humiliation which might lead to the 
hydra-like regeneration of the oppressive dialectic; That 
seems to be the task of the humorist in Browne.
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Browne's first step is to upgrade his devil as a "poor 
fool," to make him not an adversary of equal strength to 
God, but an upstart rebel who, if he could, would prefer to 
end the tortures of rebelling against God. In a disarming 
confession in the Reliaio Medici Browne admits to the sin of 
believing that "God would not persist in his Vengeance for 
ever, but after a definite time of his wrath, he would 
release the Damned souls from torture: Which error I fell 
into upon a serious contemplation of the great Attribute of 
God, his Mercie" (Browne Mai or Works 67). The seventeenth- 
century cleric Jeremy Taylor called it "at worst a wrong 
error upon the right side of charity" (Browne Major Works 
67), while Coleridge in his characteristic enthusiasm 
exclaimed, "To call this opinion an error! Merciful God! 
how thy creatures blaspheme thee!" (Seventeenth Century 
440). That even the devil would be pardoned--this is a row 
and fine thought, which combines an imaginative sympathy 
with the ineluctability of the devil’s fate to be always the 
rival of God and goodness, with the thought that the devil, 
were it in his power, would put an end to this nonsense. 
Browne holds the Church responsible for the defamation of 
the devil in such unredeemable terms: "The Foundations of 
Religion are already established, and the principles of 
Salvation subscribed unto by all, there remaines not many 
controversies wortxi a passion. . . (Browne Ms.ior Works 138) .
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But whether worth it or not, Browne's treatment of the 
devil, that other cornerstone of Christian faith, is a 
passionate rethinking of the traditional devil-story. In 
Reliqio Medici, Browne's unstated purpose is to bring us 
back to the ground of self-observation and study; the fire 
and brimstone images of medieval devils are superstitions 
that are to be tamed by rational thought.
Browne regarded good and evil in dialectical terms is 
evident from his observation that both Democritus who 
thought "to laugh the times into goodnesse," and Heraclitus 
who bewailed them offend Charity, since both seek to abolish 
vice not knowing that "they that endeavour to abolish vice 
destroy also vertue, for contraries, though they destroy one 
another, are yet the life of one another" (Browne Manor 
Works 140). What bridges the dialectical opposites for 
Browne are on the one hand, his unequivocal belief in the 
goodness of God, and, two, human love that follows in the 
footsteps of God's love, and three, his skeptical mind to 
which all acts of human enquiry whether social, political, 
scientific, or philosophical are necessarily open-ended, 
indeterminate and vulnerable to continuous emendation. The 
indeterminacy of human knowledge creates a point of view 
which views errors with a dispassionate eye. Material 
errors, which Browne exposes as such, however, are symptoms 
of a more deep-rooted misunderstanding of Nature, both its
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physical as well as philosophical underpinnings. Thus a 
discussion of errors always brings us back to the system of 
thought that generated that error. Browne goes to the root 
of the problem; in Pseudcdoxia Epidemica, they are antiquity 
and medieval science.
B r o w n e ' s  m e t h o d  of r e c t i f i c a t i o n  targ e t s  the e r r o r  at 
its b a s i c  level of e x p r e s s i o n  t h r o u g h  language: thus 
a p p r o x i m a t e  r e a d i n g  skills, m a k i n g  u n q u a l i f i e d  s t a t e m e n t s ,  
m i s t a k i n g  the f i g u r a t i v e  for the literal, a r e  s e r i o u s  
o f f e n s e s  in a scholar. In R e l i a i o  M e d i c i  the f a i l u r e  of 
r e a s o n  p o s e d  a far g r e a t e r  h u m a n  p r o b l e m  to B r o w n e  r a t h e r  
tha n  the " d o w n e - r i g h t  b l o w e s  of the Devill":
’Tis not onely the mischiefe of diseases, and the 
villanie of poysons that make an end of us, we vainly 
accuse the fury of Gunnes, and the new inventions of 
death; 'tis in the power of every hand to destroy us, 
and we are beholding unto every one wee meete hee doth 
not kill us. There is therefore but one comfort left, 
that though it be in the power of the weekest arme to 
take away life, it is not in the strongest to deprive 
us of death: God would not exempt himselfe from that, 
the misery of immortality in the flesh, he undertooke 
not that was in it immortall. (Browne Major Works 115) 
The profound felicity of Browne's thought and expression is 
striking; so is the strange logic in the appeal "wee are
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beholding unto every one wee meete hee doth not kill us"-- 
the dry understatement that we would prefer not to be 
killed. But on second reading, is it understatement or an 
existential caution? Is Browne making the master-slave 
relationship so ubiquitous here that it no longer matters?
In this dialectic, we are responsible for the master or 
slave relations that we create with each other. But its 
pervasiveness in the human realm is precisely what Browne is 
centering on: it is the human condition that even God, once 
he was born human, could not transcend, at least not all the 
time. Browne reminds us once again of our respo’.isibility of 
our destiny when he states with profound simplicity, an 
existential caution, "'tis in the power of every hand to 
destroy us, and we are beholding unto every one wee meete 
hee doth not kill us."
This dissolution of antagonism (and Browne attempts to 
dissolve the paradigmatic antagonism of western Christian 
theology, through a repenting Devil and a forgiving God) is 
important to our pursuit of non-aggressive humor because of 
two reasons. One: Browne creates a system -where the 
different generating tensions of the phenomenal world are 
levelled to a harmonious realm answerable to each other and 
to God so that any transgression amongst creatures is a 
transgression against God in which case we are confronted 
with a definitional challenge for the term, "ridiculous."
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Two, humor seems to be the inevitable emotional and 
intellectual point of view that would serve the double 
purpose of avoiding violence to self as well as ics 
adversaries.
The errors disproved in Pseudodoxia demonstrate 
explicitly this point of view with its "disciplinary 
opposition to inconsiderateness." Browne breaks us into the 
enquiry, phrasing it in the form of a dispute, with the 
introduction of the error and its disproof usually carried 
out within the space of a paragraph. The disputes 
themselves are unique; they are very often about opinions 
that are so taken for granted (thus once again making erring 
ubiquitous) that we rarely think of them as "erring" against 
us in any deliberate manner. The following is a typical 
error:
That Lapis Lazuli hath in it a purgative faculty 
we know; that Bezoar is antidotal, Lapis Judaicus 
diuretical, Coral Antepileptical, we will not 
deny. That Cornelius, Jaspis, Heliotropes, and 
Blood-stones, may be of vertue to those intentions 
they are implied, experience and visible effects 
may make us grant. But that an Amethyst prevents 
inebriation, that an Emerald will break if worn in 
copulation. That a Diamond laid under the pillow, 
will betray the incontinency of a wife. That a
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Saphire is preservative against inchantments; that 
the fume of an Agath will avert a tempest, or a 
wearing of a Cryoprase make one out of love with 
Gold; as some have delivered, we are yet, I 
confess, to believe, and in that infidelity are 
likely to end our days. (Browne The Works 139}
The two remarkable features in this passage are the 
fluctuations in the pacing and the inversion of the 
predicates ("we know," and "we will grant”} from their 
normal syntactic positions. The variation in pacing is 
integral to Browne's style of kind dismissal and merits 
close textual attention. The claim of each stone is 
predicated upon the clause "we know," "we will not deny," 
and "will make us grant" but in each case these predications 
are inverted, so that they seems to throw into relief what is 
essentially subordinate to them. The inversions quieten the 
voice. Syntactically and semantical1y they are rhetorical 
mirrors to each other and as such function to emphasize the 
quality of understatement in the enumerator's voice. It is 
a voice that is obviously not excited by the rare potencies 
in these stones. But it says so in a civilized manner. In 
fact in the second sentence he does not even list their 
amazing virtues by name; he hurries to concede to their 
claims on the basis of experience and visible effects and 
dismisses them easily enough by saying that they "may be of
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vertue to those intentions they are implied, experience and 
visible effects will make us grant."
We may tentatively call the rhythm of the passage 
dramatic. Browne reverses the order of the sentence so that 
the dependent clauses with the stones as subjects are put in 
the emphatic position. This makes perfect sense since he is 
engaged in enumerating the truth claims of each stone. But 
already in the first sentence we detect a sudden quickening 
of the rhythm when he substitutes the leisurely pace of the 
first period with the thrifty swiftness of. predicating all 
three clauses in the second period {“that Bezoar is
Antidotal, Lapis.Judalcus diuretical, Coral Antepiieptical")
to "we will not deny.* in the second sentence, the pace 
quickens even more: he strings four stones one after the 
other without even bothering to enumerate their claims: they 
are collectively dismissed under the general attribute that 
they "may be of vertue to those intentions they are 
implied.” Suddenly in the rn.idd.le then, from that rapid 
skimming over of truth-claims, he leaves the fast-track and 
begins anew, as if in fits and starts. The sentence about 
the amethyst is strictly speaking not a. complete sentence 
although he ends it with a. period. “But that an Amethyst 
prevents inebriation, that an Emerald will break if worn in 
copulation.* And "That a. Diamond, hid under the pillow, will 
betray the ir.continency of a wife." The claims hang as if
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suspended in air, without anything to anchor themselves 
onto. And we are soon told why that is so. But the sudden 
s3owing of pace is quite dramatic: we are invited to feast 
ourselves on an error of great promise. The periodic syntax 
of the last sentence mirrors that of the first, with the 
string of phrases delaying its main predication, but that 
external form is all that it shares with the first sentence. 
For these claims about the diamond, the saphire, and the 
amethyst, Browne asserts, with parenthetical protest, "we 
are yet, I confess, to believe," and then adds his own 
editorial "and in that infidelity are likely to end our 
days." It is noteworthy that Browne dismisses these errors 
with absolute confidence, though he does not submit us with 
any proofs. The confident ego does not belittle the 
adversary. It merely announces that it is unwilling to 
believe what has been presented before it. It is a 
demonstrative statement with no attempt made at explanation.
There is doubtless an element of tendentiousness in 
Browne's discourse here, especially in the attributed power 
of diamonds to test the incontinency of a wife: a certain 
teasing of our logic, like the rabbit who cried to the fox 
who was threatening to eat him, "Oh do whatever you want to 
do with me! But please don't throw me in the briar-patch!" 
Browne is offering us a similar scicky situation here; does 
anyone really want to test his wife's fidelity?
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The structure of the disputation itself can be 
separated neatly into two halves: one consistently positive, 
and tne other consistently negative in presenting the point 
of view of the narrator. But beyond that the voice yields no 
information about itself; we are not told why or why not 
these claims are either true or false; we are faced with a 
scene projected by an invisible eye: items unaccompanied by 
backdrop or footnotes are left to explain their fantastic 
claims, and they are unable to. Browne uses a minimal point 
of view in this case: I saw; I believe; I do not believe. 
This is a point of view that is attempting to be truthful 
and absurd at the same time; truthful because it mirrors the 
arbitrariness of all subjective truths, and absurd because 
Browne does not really care to discuss "truth."
There are other instances in Pseudodoxia Eoidemica 
where Browne becomes a more overt participant in the scene. 
Reporting on the recent taste for magnets and magnetic 
experiments he discloses this attractive lore:
The conceit is excellent, and if the effect would 
follow, somewhat divine; whereby we might communicate 
like spirits and confer on earth with Menippus in the 
moon. And this is pretended from the sympathy of two 
Needles touched with the same Loadstone, and placed in 
the center of two Abecedery circles or rings, with 
letters described roundabout them, one friend keeping
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one, and another the other, and agreeing upon an hour 
wherein they will communicate. For then, saith 
tradition, at what distance of place soever, when one 
needle shall be removed unto any letter; the other by a 
wonderful sympathy will move unto the same. But herein 
I confess my experience can find no truth; for having 
expressly framed two circles of Wood, and according to 
the number of Latine letters divided each into twenty 
three parts, placing therein two stiles or Needles 
composed of the same steel, touched with the same 
Loadstone, and at the same point: of these two, 
whenever I removed the one, although but at the 
distance of half a span, the other would stand like 
Hercules' pillar, and if the Earth stand still, have 
surely no motion at all. (Browne The works 114)
"The conceit is excellent, and if the effect would follow, 
somewhat divine" is a good example of a delayed, tendentious 
opening; it sets the skeptical note of the passage, with the 
disarming request that he is quite willing to believe in 
this claim if only it were true. Browne's choice of diction 
is more overtly resonant of humor: the word "pretended" is 
particularly appropriate as it bolsters the air of disbelief 
suggested in the first sentence; it guides our focus to the 
fake scene itself, which he then describes immediately. 
Browne's voice recedes here to re-emerge as the voice of
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tradition: he almost wants the story of the sympathetic 
magnetic needles and the seventeenth-century fax machine to 
be true; he calls the participants "friends," as if such 
emotional affinity would effect the miracle, even if the 
experiment fails.
Browne's argument follows a strictly subordinating 
structure here, emphasizing procedure and cause and effect, 
linking the clauses and sentences through such subordinating 
conjunctions as "if," "whereby," "for then," "when," 
"although" etc. His disprcv-ng of the claim follows an 
almost mirroring repetition of the procedures quoted by 
tradition:
But herein I confess my experience can find no truth; 
for having expressly framed two circles of Wood, and 
according to the number of Latine letters divided each 
into twenty three parts, placing therein two stiles or 
Needles composed of the same steel, touched with the 
same Loadstone, and at the same point. . . (114)
The phrasing of such thorough precision is humorous with its 
insistent repetition of the word "same": "same steel," "same 
Loadstone," "same point." So is the meticulous display of 
the apparatus: there is an exaggerated concern with 
following the procedure emphasized in the two circles of 
wood "expressly framed," and all twenty-three latin letters 
arranged exactly to evoke the magic. The humor lies in the
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disproportion in intensity between the pre- and post- 
experiment states so artfully delayed in a long sentence:
"of these two, whensoever I removed the one, although but at 
the distance of half a span, the other would stand like 
Hercules' pillars, and if the Earth stand still, have surely 
no motion at all." We have been waiting for this punchline 
from the very beginning when we first read that "the conceit 
is excellent, if the effect would follow." It is again 
disp.roportion that makes the comparison of the two small 
needles to Hercules' pillars comical. It is an absurd 
comparison in terms of size, but an appropriate one 
metonymically: Hercules' pillars represent an immovable, 
adamant obstacle, and Browne's comparison precisely 
expresses that: that the experiment was perfect but for one 
crucial problem--the results did not follow. In a related 
report on magnets, he recounts his disbelief at the popular 
belief that if pieces of flesh are interchanged from the 
bicipital arms of two men and all the alphabets inscribed 
therein, at an appointed time the two men may communicate 
for a long time, across whatever distance, by magnetic 
needles prepared as above (Browne The works 115). Browne 
tried that as well and it failed to take off.
Browne's strategy in both of the above examples is to 
accumulate evidence of the error, making it seem more and 
more absurd, and then with a gracious tone of disbelief
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dismiss it in one short phrase or sentence. The delay or 
lag i^ integral to the general atmosphere of non-contention 
that Browne carefully cultivates; his purpose is to list the 
errors without any comments and then let them expose 
themselves as errors by their preposterous claims. We learn 
from letters to his son Dr. Edward Browne as well as his own 
records of his experiments with the birds and fishes of 
Norfolk that Browne was well-versed in the art of scientific 
discourse. But we seldom find evidence of that rigorous 
style in Pseudodoxia. Pseudodoxia Epidemica. instead, 
demonstrates a contentious style that succeeds in defeating 
its target without any aggression, loudness or malice.
Browne's strategy to contend established authority in 
Pseudodoxia marks the ground-zero of a liberating humor; 
liberating, because it does not leave any residue of 
aggression or victimhood transferred to us, the readers. 
Representing liberating humor is the task for a philosopher, 
since the philosopher attempts to correct the error at its 
foundation, and aggressive laughter without liberation is 
the mark of a fake philosophy. The philosopher's voyage is 
always inward; we follow Browne as he travels far in history 
and to interpretations of religion to gather evidence for a 
rethinking of the master-slave dialectic in the God-Devil 
relationship. The significance of Pseudodoxia for a thesis 
on humor springs from Browne's confident evocation of a
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moral vision, which is paradoxically not slippery about what 
is and is not ethical. Particular errors that he discusses 
are treated as subservient to or representative of deeper 
misunderstandings about the nature of Nature and human life. 
Browne's persona in this contention is that of a preceptor; 
the errors are precisely that--errors --which may be 
corrected if we are so inclined. Browne's philosophy to 
counter false systems of beliefs that foster oppression 
places that responsibility firmly in the human world and 
upon human interactions. Browne strives towards a 
comprehensive demonstration of the possibility of the ideal 
of equality when he argues for equal relations among humans 
as the mark of our equal relation to God. To possess this 
ideal is to embrace a paradox, since it necessarily demands 
the recognition and rectification of an ethically weak or 
wrong system of belief. What Pseudodoxia demonstrates for 
us, given this paradox, is a method of challenge that is 
undaunted by its task or its target, undertakes to do it 
joyfully and confidently, and rectifies the system rather
than destroys it.
CHAPTER THREE
Colonials in the Arena: Jones and Kipling in India
Sir Thomas Browne won a non-violent victory over the 
ancients in the dispute over learning, but Sir William 
Jones's translation of the Sanskrit epic Sakuntala (1789) 
into English demonstrates a simple-minded victory, an 
incomplete, unbalanced, and dialectically regressive and 
decaying relationship between Sanskrit and English, and by 
extension, Indian and British cultures. Defining the 
relation of the translation to the original, Walter Benjamin 
wrote that the task of the translator, "consists in finding 
that intended effect (Intention) upon the language into 
which he is translating which produces in it the echo of the 
original" (Benjamin Illuminations 76). Intention in a work 
of art or a language, Benjamin theorized, was not what the 
author wanted to communicate, but was the mode in which we 
perceived the life of the language or art as determined by 
its historical relations. Benjamin had an exalted, ultimate 
and ideationally directed understanding of the mode of 
translation. Translation ultimately serves the purpose of 
expressing the reciprocal relationship between two languages
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which, inspite of differences in words, sentences and 
structure, supplement each other in their underlying 
intentions, which makes translation possible in the first 
place. Jones' translation serves the purpose of 
communicating the meaning of the play more than it does the 
intended effect of the p3ay upon the history of the language 
itself. In his letter to Sir Joseph Banks Jones asserted 
that "the translation is as literal as possible; but I am 
not sure, that my own errors or inattention may not have 
occasioned mistakes" (Pachori Sir William Jones 89).
Benjamin might not censor Jones fox* failing in a literal 
translation of the original if he had succeeded in 
reproducing the intention of the original. The 
disappearance of "the echo of the original" in Jones's 
translation may be credited partly to Jones's attempt to 
capture the meaning of the original, which he sought to 
reproduce first by an interlinear Latin translation and then 
by its literal rendering into English. Benjamin theorized 
that the literal reproduction of meaning will never uncover 
the intention of the original; the translator*'s real task is 
an objective recognition of its form:
Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together 
must match one another in the smallest details, 
although they need not be like one another. In the 
same way a translation, instead of resembling the
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meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail 
incorporate the original's mode of signification, thus 
making both the original and the translation 
recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just 
as fragments of a vessel. (Illuminations 78)
Benjamin's "greater language" is a philosopher's category of 
a "tensionless" ultimate language of truth, which is guided 
by the "great motif of integrating many tongues into one 
true language at work" (Illumine ions 77). Jones's 
translation is tensionless, but not as the ultimate product 
of strife that Benjamin interprets it to be; rather, it 
seeks to be tensionless by concealing conflict, and does not 
attend to the nature of relations between characters, its 
mode of signification, in the original. This inattention to 
the nature of power relations in the play distorts the 
play's point of view on the king's authority and its gradual 
domestication through introspection.
In the colonizer's favorite fiction, the master is 
never challenged or pushed towards introspection, and there 
is no attempt made on the part of the master to reform 
himself; correspondingly, the slave suffers, serves and 
nurtures, but does not transform the master or himself in 
any way. Jones's translation follows this fiction as if the 
binary of the colonizer and the colonized transferred its 
own adamant stance of authority and submission onto the
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play's framework so that the master, here the king, remains 
essentially unchanged in character. The role of the clown 
which in the original embodied the humorous approach of a 
kind but exacting preceptor is transformed in Jones’s 
translation into that of a humorless nurse-maid to .he king.
We may attribute Jones's distrust of laughter to 
Jorge’s reasoning in The Name of the Rose--that laughter is 
a form of power and hence not to be in the possession of 
slaves. The presence of humor in colonial narratives 
frequently challenges the binary of force and submission 
that characterizes the enterprise of colonialism. Ethnic 
slurs and racist jokes, similar in purpose to that of the 
colonizer's fiction, succeed in arousing laughter, because 
they rigidly preserve this binary by sharply suppressing the 
experiential component in the lives of the masters and the 
slaves. Humor in such slurs and insults moreover create 
stereotypes of the colonizing as well as the colonized 
cultures. But evidence from colonial narratives such as 
Rudyard Kipling's Kim, or E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India 
shows that one way in which colonial writers attempt to 
merge the separate trajectories of the political interests 
of the colonized versus the colonizer is to choose a 
narrative style that highlights the subjectivity of 
individual experience. This exercise does not necessarily 
downplay the ideological conflict between masters and slaves
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but makes characters active partners in undoing the 
apparently predestined violence of the master - slave 
conflict. We see a qualitative change for the better in the 
dynamics of the master-slave interactioii, from both the 
master's and the slave's points of view. It is this 
mutually transforming dialecuical strife that is absent in 
Jones's translation.
Humor seems to be the inevitable idiomatic device for 
the reduction of conflict in such paradoxically transcendent 
narratives as Kim, the paradox being contained in the 
aforementioned antithetical stand to the master-slave 
dialectic. Frequently in these stcries the oppressor 
resists meeting an .intellectual or ideological challenge cn 
an intellectual or ideological ground. Consequently. in 
narratives such as Kim, there is an inevitable falling-short 
or rising-above of the occasion, which could be seen as a 
generic quality of romance; in any case, an incongruous 
reaction resembling the mechanism of humor, as opposed to 
the expression of direct hostility among the ideologically 
divided characters. In the first part of this chapter, I 
examine the incommensurable gap between Kalidasa's Sakuntala 
and Jones’s translation in their representation of the 
relations between characters. The former attempts to 
transcend the effect of the role of authority in the
character of the king through his growing introspection; the
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latter, demonstrates a blindness towards this element of 
introspection leaving the king essentially unchanged in his 
relation with himself. In the second part of this chapter,
I contrast Jones's translation with another early twentieth- 
century colonial text wrj tten at the beginning of the end of 
British power in India, Rudyard Kipling's Kim (1901). In 
Kim , Kipling attempts to develop an alternative relationship 
between masters and slaves, one that eschews striving for 
authority in favor of the strife to be free of authority.
The two texts demonstrate two different ways to tame 
authority through humor. In the former, humor permitted by 
authority acts as a corrective to authority; in the latter, 
humor runs counter to authority, but transcends its power to 
brutalize the slaves into replicating the paradigm set by 
the masters. Both texts are indices of the historical 
relation between India and Britain at two different moments 
during the colonial period.
In 1789, the year of the French Revolution, Sir William 
Jones, newly arrived in Calcutta to take his post as a Judge 
of the Supreme Court, translated Sakuntala into English for 
the first time. In the preface to his translation, Jones 
informs us that he undertook the study and translation of 
Sanskrit drama with the desire to know "the real state of 
this empire before the conquest of it by the Savages of the 
North" (William Jones Reader 90). Jones's descriptive
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pithet "Savages of the North" refers of course to the 
uslim invasion of India in 1000 A.D, the second of the 
hree major invasions that rippled across the Indian 
ubcontinent, the first being that of the Aryans who brought 
he Vedas and Sanskrit sometime between 3000 and 2000 BCE; 
nd the most recent being Jones's own people, the British, 
ho introduced English and Protestant Christianity in the 
eventeenth century. Jcnes writes:
I was very solicituous, on my arrival in Bengal, to 
procure access to those books, either by the help of 
translations, if they had been translated, or by 
learning the language in which they were originally 
composed, and which I had yet a stronger inducement to 
learn from its connection with the administration of 
justice to the Hindus. (Pachori William Jones Reader 
90)
i his 1993 edition of Jones's selected writings, Satya S. 
ichori notes that "by this translation, Jones ushered in 
i Age of Indian Renaissance and added Indian drama to world 
Lterature" (William Jones Reader 89). Goethe acknowledged 
le influence cf Sakuntala in designing the prologue to 
iust. In a letter to Jacobi he praised the play thus: 
Wouldst thou the blossoms of spring, as well as the
fruits of the autumn,
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Wouldst thou what charms and delights, wouldst 
thou what plenteously feeds,
Wouldst thou include both Heaven and earth in one 
designation,
All that is needed is done, when I Sakontala name. 
(Goethe Collected Works 270)
Goethe's poem elevates Sakontala into a landscape of sublime 
beauty consistent with the Romanticist apotheosis of Nature, 
but Jones himself tended to regard most of the details of 
the forest setting as extraneous to the drama proper: the 
machinery of the drama is clearly allegorical, Jones argues, 
and the verdurous plenitude it evokes must have pleased the 
Indian courts when it was first represented only because 
“the Indian empire was then in full vigour, and the national 
vanity must have been highly flattered by the magnificent 
introduction of those kings and heroes in whom the Hindus 
gloried; the scenery must have been splendid and beautiful.
. ." (William Jones Reader 91). In other words, to Jones
nature mirrored the power of king and court, a power, he 
reminds us, that no longer exists. The intent of Jones' 
translation is to fossilize the original language, deny it a 
life of its own, rather than rejuvenate it.
The plot of Sakuntala is similar to Shakespeare's 
mature comedies. King Dushyanta chances to meet the 
beautiful Sakuntala, surrogate daughter of the sage Kanva
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while hunting in the forest. He pursues her and they get 
married secretly. Dushyanta promises to send for Sakuntala 
as soon as he returns to the palace and leaves his royal 
ring with her as the sign of his promise to her. While 
waiting for Dushyanta, Sakuntala, however, neglects to 
attend to the sage Durvasavu who puts the curse on her that 
he who she was thinking about would forget her just as she 
forgot to attend to him. So when the pregnant Sakuntala, 
after a long and futile wait comes to Dushyanta's court, she 
is rejected by the king who fails to recognise her as a 
result of the curse. The humiliated Sakuntala is rescued by 
her mother, a celestial nymph, who takes her away.
Dushyanta grows melancholy as time passes due to an 
inexplainable sorrow. Dushyanta and Sakuntala eventually 
find each other and the story ends with their happy reunion. 
The solar dynasty that ruled India in the ancient times 
commences with their son, Bharath, after whom India is 
called Bharath in vernacular languages.
In Jones's interpretation of the story the king is an 
adamant monarch who exacts his subjects's submission through 
ineluctable acts of force. in the Sanskrit text, however, 
the king is adamant and powerful, but his authority is 
portrayed as vulnerable, and his vulnerability surfaces 
primarily in his relationship to his jester, Madhavya.
Humor is a narrative device here that makes the reader watch
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the unraveling of the play's commentary on power from an 
ironic distance. This level of ironic subversion of 
authority is absent in Jones's translation. Consequently, 
Sakuntala becomes a serious play, in Jones's translation, to 
the almost total exclusion of the non-serious. Example: 
the English title, Sakontala: Or the Fatal Rina. The word 
"fatal" in Jones's time signified, then as now, something 
that was fraught with destiny, often ominous, and producing 
irreversible ruin. Further, Jones suggested editing the 
original text considerably, with emendations which would 
directly affect the humorous content of the play: "the piece 
might easily be reduced to five acts of moderate length, by 
throwing the third act into the second, and the sixth into 
the fifth; for it must be confessed that the whole of 
Dushmanta's conversation with his buffoon, and [sic] great 
part of his courtship in the hermitage, might be omitted 
without any injury to the drama" (William Jones Reader 91).
Jones's hypothetical scheme of elimination aimed at 
reducing the role of humor and resulted in transforming the 
role of the jester in the play. The jester's humor is 
admittedly at the expense of the conflict in the king's 
life, but it is also a laughter permitted by authority.
There is a paradox implicit in this laughter; the nature of 
the relationship between the king and the jester is that of 
a master and his slave. In this framework, to laugh at the
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folly or misfortune of the king is an act of aggression on 
the jester's part. On the other hand, the officially 
foolish character in a play, the Fool, is the least slave­
like of all characters --his aggression is unreprimanded by 
authority. There is a paradox of power surrounding the 
Fool, a paradox in which to act against authority results in 
endearment rather than censure, which leads the melancholy 
and always-in- trouble Jaques in As You Like It to exclaim, 
"0 that I were a fool" (Shakespeare As You Like It 
II.VII.41). Madhavya uses this freedom to be ruthlessly 
straightforward to dispense with deccrum and expose the 
vulnerabilities of the king, a method at once subtle and 
tendentious, and which lays the groundwork for the 
increasing conflict and introspection in the king.
The conflict in the plot is built around the confusion 
of identity that surrounds the king--the king as role versus 
king as person. For instance, in act one, Dushyanta seeks 
Madhavya’s assistance to work his way surreptitiously into 
Kanva's hermitage in order to meet Sakuntala. Madhavya's 
advice verbalizes the conflict: "Hola! bid the hermits bring 
my sixth part of their grain. Say this, and enter the grove 
without scruple" (william Jones Reader. 101) . The 
implication here is that Dushyanta should use his authority 
as king to enter the hermitage because the hermits are his 
subjects like everyone else. Madhavya's advice, however
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well-disposed towards the king, has nevertheless a vanity 
about it that is particularly suited for comedy and which 
reduces the effect of verbal aggression. He mimics the 
king's voice instead of merely advising him, the mimicry 
adding a tendentious levity to his message. At the same 
time, it draws our attention to the fact that even though he 
is king, Dushyanta is for once undecided about using his 
authority because he feels a moral hesitation in doing so. 
Kalidasa builds this vain streak in the jester's character 
as a check against charges of tendentiousness so that the 
fool's ethical counsel is always left a little suspect. The 
fool is a gluttonous, comfort - loving Brahmin, a 
characterization that already casts him in a comic light, 
since Brahmins are traditionally the most austere caste 
among Hindus. But Madhavya is necessary to bring out the 
human hesitations in the king at this point in the play.
Madhavya’s levity, however, embodies an ironic 
seriousness that acts as a contrast to the self-indulgent 
seriousness of the king, which borders on melancholy. Jones 
himself was aware of this ambiguous aesthetic of Sakuntala. 
In a letter to George John Spencer, he described Sakuntala 
as being "neither tragedy nor comedy," but like "one of 
Shakespeare's fairy plays" (Sir William Jones 115). It is 
unclear which specific plays of Shakespeare provoked this 
comparison, but it seems fair to assume that in all
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probability it rested on the increasingly light and tenuous 
world of Shakespeare's post-A Midsummer Night's Dream 
comedies and perhaps his later tragi-comedies. Sakuntala 
shares with these texts a thematic emphasis on the 
vulnerability of melancholy to parody. Dushyanta combines 
in him both the romant/c self-absorption of Duke Orsino in 
Twelfth Night, as well as Jaques in As You Like It. "who can 
suck melancholy out of a song, like a weasel sucks eggs" (As 
You Like It ii. V. 11-13)
For instance, consider nature and love seen through 
Dushyanta's eyes. Reassuring Sakuntala's friends, Dushyanta 
makes the following proclamation: pariaraha bahutve api dve 
pratishte kulasya me/ samudrarasana cha urvi sakhi cha 
vuvavorivum (Kalidasa Collected Works 571). My translation 
reads, "I might consort with many women, but there shall be 
only two worthy of my name--this sea-girt earth, and your 
sweet friend." Jones translates the speech thus, "What need 
is there of many words? Let there be ever so many women in 
my palace, I will have only two objects of perfect regard; 
the seagirt earth, which I govern, and your sweet friend, 
whom I love" (William Jones Reader 105) . Sakuntala and the 
earth have equal value and are equally exalted because he 
rules one and loves the other. The Sanskrit phrase 
"pratishte kulasya me" ("[I] will consecrate in my lineage")
carries all the arrogance of the king's point of view, which
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is flattened in Jones's freely glossed translation. It is 
this point of view that demonstrates the unchecked authority 
that is parodied and tampered with by the jester. Another 
example of the kingly point of view occurs in act two, where 
Dushyanta describes Sakuntala as unparallelled in beauty. 
Madhavya retorts, "Oh! certainly, whatever a king admires 
must be superlatively charming" (William Jones Reader 101), 
implying that, as king, he can be completely wrong in his 
perceptions and yet be acknowledged right, if he plays the 
role of the king.
What reduces the king's tension in his role-playing is 
that his kingliness is seemingly honored by Madhavya. 
Example: in the interlude between acts one and two, he 
complains to the audience that the king has gone native in 
the forest, wearing "a garland of flowers" for his diadem. 
The second act opens with Dushyanta walking into Madhavya's 
vicinity soliloquizing aloud about the beautiful Sakuntala, 
only to see Madhavya leaning motionless against a staff 
pretending to be worn out by the physical exertion involved 
in making a living in the forest. The exchange that follows 
between the king and the jester illustrates the limits of 
power that the jester attempts to transgress. Jones 
translates:
Madh. [Bending downward, as before.] Great Prince! my
hands are unable to move; and it is with my lips only
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that I can mutter a blessing on you. May the king be 
victorious! (William Jones Reader 99)
T h e  p h r a s e  "it is w i t h  m y  lips only" d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  b e t w e e n  
w h a t  is a n d  w h a t  o u g h t  to be. H e  s h o u l d  b e  b o w i n g  to h e  
king, b u t  h e  cannot, as h e  is too stiff w i t h  a c h e s  a n d  
pa i n s .  H e  ca n  h e n c e f o r t h  s a l u t e  the k i n g  o n l y  w i t h  h i s  
w o r d s  a n d  not w i t h  the a c c o m p a n y i n g  g e s t u r e s  of s u b m i s s i o n .  
T h e  n o t e  of i n c o n g r u i t y  s t r u c k  h e r e  b e t w e e n  w h a t  is a n d  w h a t  
o u g h t  to b e  is l e g i t i m i z e d  b y  M a d h a v y a  thus:
Dush. [Looking at him, smiling.] Ah, w h a t  ha s 
c r i p p l e d  thee, f r i e n d  M a d h a v y a ?
Madh. Y o u  s t r i k e  m y  eye w i c h  y o u r  o w n  hand, 
a n d  then a s k  w h a t  m a k e s  it weep.
Dush. S p e a k  i n t e l l i g i b l y .  I k n o w  no t  w h a t  
y o u  mean.
Madh. L o o k  at y o n  V e t a s  tree b e n t  d o u b l e  in 
the river. Is it crooked, I pray, b y  its ow n  act, 
or b y  the f o r c e  of the stream? (W i l l i a m  J ones
M a d h a v y a  r e a s o n s  w i t h  an i r r e s i s t i b l e  s i m i l e  a p p r o p r i a t e d  
f r o m  Nature, b e c a u s e  it b l a t a n t l y  fawns u p o n  h i m  as king, in 
a d d i t i o n  to s o u n d i n g  true. T h e  j e s t e r ' s  a r g u m e n t  run s  thus: 
if it w e r e  no t  for the a l l - p o w e r f u l  w i l l  of the k i n g  that 
t h e y  r e m a i n  in the forest, he, M a d h a v y a ,  w o u l d  h a v e  g o n e  
b a c k  to the palace. H e  is p o w e r l e s s  to do a n y t h i n g  a g a i n s t
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the king, just as a tree is powerless against the stream. 
Madhavya departs from the norm--submission to the king--but 
by a witty analogy that bypasses direct aggression. His 
reasoning is comparable to that of Feste's in Twelfth Night 
or the fool in Othello in its tendentious co-opting of the 
outer shell of systems of thought. When Olivia calls Feste 
a "dry Fool" in act one of Twelfth Night, Feste answers with 
an analogy run wild:
Two faults, madonna, that drink and good counsel will 
amend. For give the dry fool drink, then is the fool 
not dry. Bid the dishonest man mend himself: if he 
mend, he is no longer dishonest; if he cannot, let the 
botcher mend him. Anything that's mended is but 
patch'd; virtue that's mended is but patch'd with sin, 
and sin that amends is but patch'd with virtue. If 
that this simple syllogism will serve, so; if it will 
not, what remedy? As there is no true cuckold but 
calamity, so beauty's a flower. The lady bade take 
away the fool; therefore, I say again, take her away. 
(Shakespeare Twelfth Night I.V.37-47)
Olivia is amply rewarded in this catechism for calling Feste 
a "dry fool," a stupid fool. Both Madhavya and Feste are 
fools playing at fools, and part of their act is to co-opt 
idealized systems, Nature for Madhavya, logic for Feste, and 
turn them inside out for tendentious purposes. Madhavya's
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intent is to push the king towards recognising the kingly 
role he plays as a role; so that he may begin to remedy its 
overreaching hold on himself as an individual.
Feste describes the quintessential comic sentence when 
he says, ,!A sentence is but a chev'ril glove to a good wit. 
How quickly the wrong side may be turn'd outward" (Twelfth 
Night III.1.11-13). Viola's rejoinder, "Nay, that's 
certain. They that dally nicely with words may quickly make 
them wanton" (Twelfth Niaht III.I.14-15) is in effect 
describing the office of the "vidushaka" or the Fool, 
etymologically, "visheshana dushayanti iti vidushaka," that 
is, "one who tampers [with words, thoughts, deeds] in a 
particular way." Jones does not preserve this deliberately 
banal pose of the jester with any accuracy in his 
translation. Not only that, but at times, he attempts to 
improve the jester's point of view. In this passage in act 
two, Madhavya tells Bhadrasena, the king's commander - in - 
chief to terminate his eulogy on hunting. The original 
Sanskrit speech Apehi re utsahahetuka! Atra bhavan prakritim 
aoanna. Tvam tavat atavitoatavim ahindamano
naranasikaloluoasva iirnarikshasva kasvapi mukhe patish_v_at.i 
(Kalidasa Collected Works 553) might be translated as "Hold 
your excitement fellow! The king has just returned to his 
senses. You may wander from forest to forest and get eaten
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by some old bear, if you want (but we are going back to the 
city)." Jones translates the exchange thus:
Away, thou false flatterer! The king, indeed, follows 
his natural bent, and is excusable; but thou, son of a 
slave girl, hast no excuse-Away to the wood!--How I 
wish thou hadst been seized by a tiger or an old bear, 
who was prowling for a skakal, like thyself! (William 
Jones Reader 100)
Jones makes Madhavya rather belligerent with the gratuitous 
curses "son of a slave girl" and "skakal," neither of which 
are present in the original prose Sanskrit text. Nor is the 
sudden, violent eruption of anger in the jester consistent 
with his character elsewhere in the play. For what 
motivates Madhavya to reproach hunting is a selfish love of 
comfort, and instead of tuning himself to this perverse 
dandyism which we already discussed as integral to the 
jester's character, Jones transforms him into a ill-tempered 
nursemaid unduly worried about the welfare of the king. But 
Jones's translation does have an internal consistency; 
earlier he makes Dushyanta refer to the jester as the 
"moralizing" Madhavya, a spurious adjective not present in 
the original. Dushyanta's Mandotsaha kritoasmi 
mriaavapavadina madhawena (Kalidasa Collected Works 552) 
might read "Madhavya's disparagement of hunting has taken
all the fun out of it for me. This is an ironic moment in
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the play when both the king and the jester get what they 
want, each by pretending to concede to the other's wish-- 
Dushyanta gains access to the hermitage, and Madhavya 
returns to the palace. As with translating the king's vow 
in act three, Jones flattens the subtle irony here as well 
when he translates the speech as "This moralizing Madhavya 
has put a stop to our recreation by forbidding the pleasures 
of the chase" (William Jones Reader 100). Madhavya is 
successful in manipulating the king precisely because he 
does not forbid he works through insinuation instead of 
direct censure.
Y e t  a n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  of the w a y  in w h i c h  J ones 
t r a n s f o r m s  the j e s t e r  int o  a c h a r a c t e r  w i t h  m o r a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o w a r d s  the k i n g  w h i c h  i m p e d e s  the k i n g ' s  
g r o w i n g  i n t r o s p e c t i o n  is in act s i x  w h e r e  M a d h a v y a  c o m m e n t s  
u p o n  a m e l a n c h o l i c  D u s h y a n t a  lost in S a k u n t a l a ' s  t h o ughts. 
K a l i d a s a ' s  text is as follows: L a n k h i t a  e s h a  b h u v o  api
Sakuntaia wadhina._Na jane kadhem chikitsiteyyQ.
bhavishvati iti (Kalidasa Collected Works 619). The 
translation might read, "This Sakuntaia-sickness has crossed 
all bounds. Don't know what will cure it." Jones 
translates the passage thus:
Madh. [aside.] This m o n a r c h  of ours is c a u g h t  a g a i n  in
the g a l e  of a f f e c t i o n ;  a n d  I h a r d l y  k n o w  a r e m e d y  for
his illness. (William Jones Reader 120)
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The metaphor "gale of affection" is rather untypical of 
Madhavya, whose speech shows a remarkable propensity towards 
gustatorial imagery. The translation is inaccurate in yet 
another respect: the clause "and I hardly know a remedy for 
his illness" gives Madhavya an inferiority and a sense of 
responsibility totally lacking in irony, which is an 
uncharacteristic pose for the jester. Because a few lines 
later we hear what is really on Madhavya's mind: "So; I must 
wait here during his meditations, and perish with hunger" 
(William Jones Reader 121).
It then follows that the greatest source of inaccuracy 
in Jones's translation, which has direct bearing on the 
relationship of the jester to the king, is its rather 
uniformly stylized diction which does not record subtle 
nuances of levels of diction in his speeches. Kalidasa's 
jester does not persuade the king by direct arguments; he 
describes himself to Dushyanta as "crooked" (William Jones 
Reader 121) and his verbal ploys follow a similar bend. He 
confronts the king's exaggerated passion, sorrow, and self- 
importance as roles and responds in kind. The jester mocks 
the kingly emotions, while genuine melancholy is undisturbed 
by jest, as in act five when Dushyanta makes the famous 
speech about Knowledge and Remembrance. Plunged into sorrow 
by the sound of a song, Dushyanta connects the experience of 
pleasure and pain to our remembrance of ideal essences.
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Jones's translation here for once captures the poignancy of 
the original:
Ah I what makes me so melancholy on hearing a mere song 
of absence, when I am not in fact separated from any 
real object of my affection?--Perhaps the sadness of 
men, otherwise happy, on seeing beautiful forms and 
listening to sweet melody, arises from some faint 
remembrance of past joys and the traces of connections 
in a former state of existence. (William Jones Reader 
114)
The king is genuinely, ironically powerless against the 
assault on his senses, and the irony deepens as he fails to 
recognize Sakuntala when she comes to his court. The jester 
who is absent in this scene (act five, scene one) is present 
in a parallel scene when Dushyanta laments over the absence 
of details in Sakuntala's portrait. Madhavya's jesting 
retort, "Why, my friend, it is only a painted bee" (William 
Jones Reader 122) once again positions him as a censor of 
external vanities, as opposed to internal knowledge.
The jester's role, in other words, straddles the 
paradoxical position of being a preceptor as well as an 
entertainer. But a definite pattern is visible under his 
random jest in which excesses of emotion and power are 
reprimanded, however obliquely. This obliquity of the 
jester is felicituous since it does not intrude upon the
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growing introspection and eventual self-realization of 
Dushyanta in a happy reconciliation of his roles both as a 
king and as an individual. The designated Fool in a 
Shakespearean play is always playing at being a Fool; Feste 
tells Olivia in Twelfth Niaht, " Lady, cucullus non facit 
monachum [The cowl does not make the monk]. That's as much 
to say as, I wear not motley in my brain" (I.V.49-51). 
Madhavya resembles Shakespeare's clowns in his self- 
conscious dismissal of authority and oblique dispensing of 
truth, but his tendentiousness is never cruel. By reducing 
the humor, the seriousness of the jester becomes a 
gratuitious tone in an already serious play about the 
confict of role and identity. He is, then, both humorous 
and tendentious and essential to the gradual humanizing of 
the king. Eliminating him from the text does considerable 
injury to its moral vision. In Kalidasa's Sakuntala 
authority is perceived as a role that alienates the one who 
possesses it from himself as well as his environment; the 
purpose of the jester's humor is to remind the king that he 
is playing a role. In Jones's translation, the jester’s 
humor does not have this pointed purpose to it. The absence 
of tendentiousness in the jester's humor reduces the play's 
serious reflection on devices that oppress the mind;
Madhavya instead of being a censor of the king's vanity
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becomes a stock, foolish character who draws attention to 
himself rather than his relation to the king.
Kipling's Kim (1901) provides another model of colonial 
humor in which humor is employed as an exalted point of view 
that sees through such devices of oppression as blind 
obedience to authority. The critical reception of Kipling's 
humor has not failed to remark on its political framework. 
Sara Suleri expands Oscar Wilde’s remark on Kipling's 
journalistic style, "From the point of view of life, he is a 
reporter who knows vulgarity better than any one has ever 
known it" (Suleri The Rhetoric of English India 7), into an 
example of historical escapism that frames Kipling's complex 
imperialist ideology. Unlike Jones who did not learn the 
vernacular, Kipling's English is well-mixed with Hindi and 
Hindustani or Urdu. He is equally sensitive to official 
speech as well as street-talk. In "The Adolescence of Kim," 
Suleri equates Kipling's sensitivity to his historical 
moment (she attributes a negative value to this awareness of 
the present in Kipling) represented through the pidgin to a 
deliberate evasion of history:
. . . imperial narratives consistently demonstrate
their discomfort with the temporal negotiation that 
allows stories to represent their situatedness within a 
chronology that roughly approximates history. , . .
implying that the precarious condition of the present
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tense is the only safe construction in which to 
articulate its tale. . . .To name the present tense of 
history is of course to turn to journalism, to its 
absorption in the moment and the concomitant 
youthfulness suggested by such exuberance of attention. 
(Suleri Rhetoric 111)
Suleri's journalistic reading of KtjQ directly impacts on its 
"idiom of jest." "Like journalism," she writes, "a jest as a 
genre accrues a certain colloquial power of contemporaneity; 
it is not required to resolve the conflictual surprise with 
which it claims closure. . . .the jest. . .confirms 
Kipling's journalistic ability to incorporate colonial 
dischronology into his tales" (Suleri Rhetoric 126). The 
relationship of colonial dischronology to imperialism, in 
other words, is similar to the relationship of humor to a 
tendentious joke. Both function to bypass or disguise an 
underlying conflict, according to Suleri. But it is 
possible to demonstrate that Kipling's immersion in the 
present and the youthful exuberance of his characters are 
deliberate devices to break the "seriousness" with which the 
masters regard the colonial enterprise. Kipling wrote an 
imperialist novel which deliberately sets out to devalue the 
ponderous flashback into the history of colonialism, 
deliberately downplaying the seriousness of the conquest, 
"the Great Game," in favor of exploring alternate methods to
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free the self from oppression brought on by such 
seriousness.
Kipling's story "The Conversion of Aurelian McGoggin," 
which Suleri distinguishes as an exemplary example of what 
she calls "colonial aphasia," shares with Kim a pointed 
critique of authority telescoped through a point of view 
that is more ironic, it seems to me, than, as Suleri argues, 
disempowering. The young British administrator McGoggin, 
known to his colleagues as "Blastoderm" for his empirical 
positivist views, is punished by God (lightning strikes him 
dumb) for doubting his existence. Kipling s k e t c h e s  G o d ' s  
relation to the infinitely regressing oionial bureaucracy 
thus:
in India, is not long enough to waste in proving 
that there is no one in particular at the head of 
affairs. For this reason. The Deputy is above the 
Assistant, the Commissioner above the Deputy, the 
Lieutenant-Governor above the Commissioner, and the 
Viceroy above all four, under the orders of the 
Secretary of State who is responsible to the Empress.
If the Empress be not responsible to her Maker--if 
there is no Maker for her to be responsible to--the 
entire system of Our administration must be wrong. 
Which is manifestly impossible. (Kipling Plain Tales
From the Hills 105).
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He experiences two sources of authority in the story-- 
McGoggin's senior officers and God. Kipling's vertiginous 
listing of one bureaucrat on top of the other is in itself a 
humorous parody of a system of hierarchy like medieval 
cosmology with its parallel apotheosis of God at the apex 
which is emulated in other systems like those of the Church 
or the State. The sudden introduction of God to a purely 
human list is a deliberate incongruity that brings the 
enumeration of such efficient, bureaucratic streamlining to 
a comical end. The result of this reasoning is McGoggin's 
disregard of authority.
Colonial administration might have believed seriously 
in God's benediction for their enterprise, but Kipling makes 
it sound as if divine blessing and leadership were a self- 
serving construct, rather than any such metaphysical given. 
It becomes an ironic critique of imperialism itself when 
Kipling’s narrator exposes the provisional nature of 
colonialism's power: "If the Empress be not responsible to 
her Maker--if there is no Maker for her to be responsible 
to--the entire system of Our administration must be wrong." 
The use of the conditional "if" leads to the creation of an 
argument in which the usual cause-effect relation is 
reversed; if there is no God one will have to be invented to 
justify human actions, here colonialism. This inverse 
relation of an effect creating a cause becomes clear in the
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following tag, "Which is manifestly imposssible," in which 
"manifest" once again points its finger to the achieved 
fact, colonialism, which is alluded to almost as an 
afterthought. McGoggin who was engaged in disproving the 
necessity of God when he was struck by lightning naturally 
is "converted"; hence the title "The Conversion of Aurelian 
McGoggin." God has been effectively manipulated to serve 
oppressive ends.
The story concludes with the image of McGoggin holding 
forth on "things Human--he doesn't seem to know as much as 
he used to about things Divine--" (Kipling Plain Tales 110), 
and we are left with an ambiguous moral in which McGoggin is 
not so much an example of "the dispossessed panic of 
youthfulness," (Plain Tales 117) as Suleri asserts; on the 
contrary, he is a convert to the new religion of imperialism 
and the story itself an allegory of colonialism. Kipling's 
irony is particularly sharp in this story: his narrator 
opens by remarking, "This . . .  is a Tract; and I am 
immensely proud of it. Making a Tract is a Feat" (Plain 
Tales 104). The emphasis on "making the tract" never flags; 
in other words, this is a story with a moral. The narrator 
introduces McGoggin's aphasia with complete control: "One 
day, the collapse came--as dramatically as if it had been 
meant to embellish a Tract" (Plain Tales 107). The 
"aphasia," in other words, is not an end in itself as
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Suleri's reading of the story implies; it is a means towards 
conformity. Only a reading that downplays Kipling's 
profound use of irony would mistake "The Conversion of 
Aurelian McGoggin" for a traumatic document about the 
suffering of British soldiers in India. Loss of memory and 
disturbed speech are repeated motifs in Kipling's other 
stories as well. In both "The Finest Story in the World" 
and "Wireless," memory and its loss are metaphors for the 
gift and loss of creative imagination, a mysterious power of 
the mind whose true nature baffled Kipling by its 
elusiveness. McGoggin1s doctor tells him as much: "I can't 
help it," said the Doctor; "there are a good many things you 
can't understand; and, by the time you have put in my length 
of service, you'll know how much a man dare call his own in 
this world" (Plain Tales 110) .
For Suleri, McGoggin's aphasia is a radical instrument 
to prove the victim status of the colonizers. Such a 
reading seems to rewrite the binary of the master-slave 
relationship with the victimization dispersed among both 
categories, but once this grid of oppressor-victim is locked 
into place, it does not seem to allow the possibility of 
other models of human relationships in colonial narratives.
Suleri's characterisation of "colonial aphasia" owes 
itself the concept of the collective historic guilt of the 
colonizers famously expounded by Edmund Burke in his "Indian
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sublime." The Indian sublime was Burke's term for the 
futility of the colonizers to categorize India correctly; 
India cannot be reduced to a list, something will elude the 
masters always. Burke used the term to denote the 
paradoxical fearfulness and horror that the colonized 
culture evoked in the colonizers, a feeling of 
incomprehensibility that promoted irrational objectification 
of the colonized. Suleri reads Burke's sublime as an 
"aestheticizing of political discourse, or as idiosyncratic 
retreats from the parameters of rationalism into the 
categorization of irrationality that the sublime signifies" 
(Rhetoric 28). Though Suleri charges Kim with "ethical and 
aesthetic ambivalence" (Rhetoric 34), she admits that Kim 
"points toward an alternative reading of what colonization 
signifies to the subcontinent., one less convinced of the 
efficacy of a Western need to chart, to map, and to evaluate 
its psychic and political geography'- (Rhetoric 35) .
Suleri's astute critique of Burke does not, however, detain 
her from imposing on Kim Burke's paradigm of the sublime 
that obscures the nature of colonial possession and 
dispossession in that novel. The greatest disadvantage 
struck by the reading of the sublime as a category of the 
irrational impacts upon Kim's relationship with the Lama, 
which Kipling develops as an alternative to his relationship 
with Colonel Creighton and colonial bureacracy. As in her
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reading of McGoggin, so in Kim's character, Suleri perceives 
random stabs of submerged melancholy that reiterate the 
victim status of the colonizer. Both the victimizations of 
self and others are recurring patterns in the literature of 
colonialism, but it is a profound misreading to accelerate 
its frequency in Kim at the expense of reducing the role of 
alternate relationships evident in the text. This reduction 
is most pronounced in the manner in which Suleri de- 
emphasizes the significance of the relationship between Kim 
and the lama.
Edward Said relegated the relationship between Kim and 
the lama to the peripheries of the main action, which for 
him, is Kim's involvement with Colonel Creighton's Great 
Game. He calls the lama's final panoramic vision of India 
"mumbo- jumbo" with some meaning in it: "The lama's 
encyclopedic vision of freedom strikingly resembles Colonol 
Creighton's Indian Survey, in which every camp and village 
is duly noted" (Kipling Kim 19). Though Said admits that 
the lama is no "confidence man" (Kim 16) he is quick to 
remind us that tne lama's presence in the novel provokes an 
ahistorical reading of Kim that we should be aware of.
The most serious charge against the lama is what Suleri 
calls his "ostensible otherwordliness" and what Said 
referred to above as the lama's tendency to provoke an 
"ahistorical" reading of Kim. Said's reading of the lama's
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function in the novel is less harsh than Suleri’s, but the 
tension surrounding the subplot with the lama receives its 
extreme censure from Suleri who sharply observes that "the 
infantilism of the lama exceeds that of his boy guide: his 
ostensible otherworldliness sheathes him from the routine 
cartography that constitutes colonial life. . .in which the 
'Middle Way' most typically represents the petty ineptitudes 
of colonial adm:nistration" (Suleri Rhetoric 120). It is a 
deliberate move on Kipling's part to depict colonial 
administration as inept; part of Aurelian McGoggin’s "fault" 
according to the narrator is that he took administering 
India too seriously. The ideological clash in Kipling's 
stories is not between those who promote colonialism and 
those who are against it. It is more accurately to be 
located between those who take colonialism seriously as 
opposed to those who regard it non-seriously. Kim's 
attitude to the demands of the ethnographic survey is almost 
as amusingly dismissive as Browne's dismissal of Aristotle. 
An ironic example of one who takes his job in India very 
seriously is the story "Thrown Away," in which a young 
British officer, very much like McGoggin, ends up killing 
himself in India because he takes his job "too seriously" 
(Kipling Plain Tales 16). In Kim the colonial systems's 
ineptitude is matched by the lightness of its hero in whom 
the "idiom of jest" contains a critique of its ideology.
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Ineptitude of the administration is the primary center 
of Kipling's jest in Kim. A clear example of the way in 
which "ineptitude" becomes an occasion for humor may be 
located in chapter 5 where Kim is captured by the Anglican 
priest Mr. Bennett and his future is discussed by the three 
religious figures, Mr. Bennett, the Catholic priest Father 
Victor, and the lama. We hear Mr.Bennett musing on the 
first conflict that delays any immediate decisions about 
Kim's future: "Between himself and the Roman Catholic 
Chaplain of the Irish contingent lay, as Bennett believed, 
an unbridgeable gulf, but it was noticeable that whenever 
the Church of England dealt with a human problem she was 
very likely to call in the church of Rome" (Kipling Kim 
133). The Catholic priests's kindness and the Anglican's 
stern meanness contrast and imply thereby a breakdown of the 
monolithic concept of colonialism. Their disagreement over 
what needs to be done with Kim results in a slow diffusion 
of the seriousness of his capture. When Bennett remarks 
that there is no need to consult the lama before dispatching 
Kim to the Masonic Orphanage, Father Victor replies: "Ah! 
That's your opinion as Secretary to the Regimental Lodge . .
. but we might as well tell the old man what we are going to 
do. He doesn't look like a villain" (Kim 13S) . Kim takes 
advantage of this competition for authority between the
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Catholic and Anglican priests to weave his summary of their 
quest:
"There is a River in this country which he [lama] 
wishes to find so verree much. It was put out by an 
Arrow which-" Kim tapped his foot impatiently as he 
translated in his own mind from the vernacular to his 
clumsy English. "Oah, it was made by our Lord God 
Buddha, you know, and if you wash there you are washed 
away from all your sins and made as white as cotton­
wool." (Kim had heard mission-talk in his time.) "I am 
his disciple, and we must find that River. It is so 
verree valuable to us." (Kim 137)
In Kim's literal translation from Urdu to Eurasian 
(Kipling's term for Indian English), faith is transformed 
into a naive superstition, the transformation made to sound 
ridiculous by an absence of commentary. The phrase "you 
know" in "Oah, it was made by our Lord God Budha, you know" 
is a feeble attempt to create a common pool of reference 
amongst all four of them. Kim tries hard to make the 
concept familiar to the priests and proceeds to do so by 
speaking what he believes to be "mission-talk"--the analogy 
"made as white as cotton-wool." Kim's reply shocks and 
infuriates the color-conscious Christians who regard it 
impudent on his part to suggest that his sins (blackness)
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could be washed away in a river and he be turned white 
(saved):
"But this is gross blasphemy!" cried the Church of 
England. "Tck! Tck!" said Father Victor 
sympathetically. "I'd give a good deal to be able to 
talk the vernacular. A river that washes away sin!" 
(Kim 137)
Father Victor's desire to learn the vernacular groups him 
with those British characters in Kipling who s;eek to build a 
bridge between the Indian and British people. Suleri 
remarks on the victimization of Indians achieved through the 
"anglicization" of India; she find Kim to belong to the 
class of "native" interpreters described by Macaulay in his 
"Minutes on Indian Education." Macaulay in his notorious 
Minutes had dismissed Indian language and culture in one 
aggressive sweep; "I have no knowledge of either Sanscrit of 
Arabic.--But I have done what I could to form a correct 
estimate of their value. . . . I am quite ready to take the
Oriental learning at the valuation of the Orientalists 
themselves. I have never found one of them who could deny 
that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the 
whole native literature of India and Arabia" (Rhetoric 33). 
Kipling sets Macaulay's serious dismissal of Indian 
languages in reverse in Kim when he makes misunderstanding
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of the vernacular tongues into an occasion for purposeful 
humor.
Kipling wrote of a time in India when the British had 
been in control for so long that some even had graves going 
back three or four generations. What we find in his stories 
are people communicating in spite of their linguistic short­
comings. In the story "The Three Musketeers" three 
subalterns, Learoyd, Mulvaney, and Ortheris of the 
Helanthami Cantonment decide to avenge their mistreatment by 
a Lord Benira Trig. The list that the subalterns use to 
describe him runs thus: "He is a Duke, or an Earl, or 
something unofficial; also a Peer; also a Globe-trotter"
(Plain Tales 70). On all three counts, Ortheris says, "'e 
didn’t deserve no consideration." Trig is further described 
as a collector, an Orientalist collecting material for his 
book Our Eastern Impediments, a potential successor to, say 
Sir William Jones. The three men plan to abduct the Lord, 
have him thrown into a lake, then rescue him all in the 
manner of a "Vic'orai Melodrama." To execute their plan of 
revenge, Mulvaney solicits the services of a "native" hekka- 
driver (a hekka is a two-wheeled carriage drawn by a pony). 
The English-Hindi pidgin used by the three subalterns mark 
them as low-class and daringly inventive in a foreign
tongue:
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I purshued a hekka, an' I sez to the dhriver-divil, I 
sez, "Ye black limb, there's a Sahib coming for this 
hekka. He wants to go iildi to the Padsahi Jhil" -- 
1twas about tu moiles away--"to shoot--chirria. You 
dhrive Jahannum ke marfik. mallum--like Hell? 'Tis no 
manner av use bukkin1 to the Sahib, bekaze he doesn't 
samiao your talk. Av he bolos anything, just you choop 
and chel. Dekker? Go arstv for the first arder-mile 
from cantonmints. Thin chel. shaitan ke marfik, an' the 
chopper you choops an' the iildier you chgls the better 
kooshv will that Sahib be; an' here's a ruppee for ye?" 
(Kim 72-73)
The vocabulary of Eurasian pidgin had functioned as a 
legitimate language of contact between the Indians and the 
British during the colonial period. Where Jones's 
translation of Sakuntala maintains the decorum of Latin 
translated into English, Kipling's ears pick up the full 
range of dialects, which is perhaps the reason why Wilde 
called him a vulgar journalist. A gloss on the above speech 
would demonstrate the extent to which English and Hindi had 
undone each other's self-sufficiency as independent 
languages and become a syncretic language with a uniquely 
flourishing communication. A translation of the Hindi words 
in the above speech shows us the extent to which the two 
languages had altered the look and sound of each other.
97
For example, Sahib=master; jildi=corruption of "jaldi" 
meaning "quick"; chirria=corruption of "chidiya" meaning 
"birds"; Jahannum ke marfik=like hell; bukking="buk" means 
"to chatter pointlessly," here pidginized by adding the 
English suffix "-ing"; samjao=to understand; bolos="bol" 
means "to talk," here pidginized by adding the English 
present tense suffix "-s"; choop=corruption of "chup" 
meaning "to shut up"; chal=to walk; Dekker=corruption of 
"Dheek Hai?" meaning "all right?"; arsty=corruption of 
"ahista" meaning "slowly"; arder=corruption of "adha" 
meaning "half"; shaitan=devil; kooshy with a soft 
"k"=corruption of "khushi" meaning "to be happy."
The locus of humor here is in the layers of linguistic 
errors--(chirriva. arder), the seamless affixing of English 
phonological and morphological features on to Hindi words 
(bolos for "says," chopper for "silently," bukkinn for 
"arguing"), the phrase-book application of Hindi idioms 
(shaitan ke marfik, iahaimum ke marfik). The root-joke of 
the entire anecdote, however, is the ineffective authority 
of Lord Benira Trig in a situation where he is 
linguistically out of control. ("Tis no manner av use 
bukkin1 to the sahib, bekaze he doesn't sarniao your talk," 
Ortheris tells the hekka-walla.)
Two important points emerge from this story: one, by 
the late 1890s there was a growing discontent among the
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British troops stationed in India, the subalterns; and two, 
by the same time there existed a shared pool of experience 
between the Indians and the British. The pidgin is a figure 
for this common pool of experience, which from Kipling's 
evidence favors the complicity between the British and the 
Indians in an enterprise that seems to be deliberately 
indifferent to the upkeep of imperialism in India. Though 
Suleri asserts to the contrary, it is impossible to find 
textual evidence in Kim to suggest that "the pragmatics of 
his [Kim's] education as a sahib severely unhinge the 
confidence of his cultural transactions" (Rhetoric 122) . On 
the contrary, we find Kipling stretching the bounds of 
possible cultural interactions between two linguistically 
and politically divided people, the elasticity often causing 
them to bounce back and hit the colonizer on his face with a 
comic boomerang.
That Kipling's characters regarded India as part of 
their natural destiny is evident when the narrator in 
"Cupid's Arrows" nostalgically admits that the events in the 
story took place in the "pre-history" of British India when 
the contacts between the British and the Indian people were 
minimal or next to nothing. The story is remarkable for its 
complete absence of Indian characters. History then, for 
Kipling, as opposed to pre-history, meant the mixing of the 
two peoples in the degree of his later works, especially
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Kim. Humor in Kim is often the result of one of the 
participants in an event or a speech not connecting with 
this shared Anglo-Indian experience. Lord Benira Trig is 
made to look ridiculous because of his inability to 
understand the plot to sabotage him when it was being 
discussed right under his nose. That Kipling was kind to 
those who made the slightest attempt to comprehend the 
colonised language is evident by Father Victor's genuinely 
bewildered but non-hostile recaption of the lama's letter. 
Like the subalterns' daring usage of Hindi the lama's letter 
in English is yet another example of the comic verbalization 
of this contact:
Sitting on wayside in grave meditation, trusting to be 
applause of present step, which recommend your Honour 
to execute for almighty God's sake. Education favored 
with your Honour's is greatest blessing if of best
sorts. Otherwise no earthly use....... confide in your
Honour's humble servant for adequate remuneration per 
hoondi [draft] per annum three hundred rupees a year to 
one expensive education St Xavier, Lucknow, and allow 
small time to forward same per hoondi sent to any part 
of India as your Honour shall address yourself. So 
going to Benares, where will find address and forward 
rupees for boy who is apple of eye, and for God 
Almighty's sake execute this education, and your
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p e t i t i o n e r  as in d u t y  b o u n d  shall eve r  a w f u l l y  pray. .
. . Please note boy is apple of eye, and rupees shall 
be sent per hoondie three hundred per annum. For God 
Almighty's sake. (Kim 152)
T h e  l a m a ' s  s c r i b e  S o b r a o  Satai, " F a i l e d  E n t r a n c e  A l l a h a b a d  
U n i v e r s i t y , " w r i t e s  in w h a t  is s e e m i n g l y  a legal s t y l e  b u t  
it is m e r e l y  E n g l i s h  t r a n s p o s e d  o nto the n a t u r a l  s y n t a x  of 
H i n d i  w i t h  g r e a t  strain. F o r  a n a t i v e  s p e a k e r  of E n g l i s h  
the r h y t h m  of this p a s s a g e  is comical, as it is w i t h  F a t h e r  
Vict o r ,  w i t h  its s u p p r e s s i o n  of the subject, articles, 
c o n n e c t i v e s  a n d  in w h i c h  the a c t i o n  is in a p e r p e t u a l  
p r e s e n t  t e n s e - -" s i t t i n g , " " c o n d e s c e n d i n g , "  " b l e s s i n g , "  
" g o ing." Fo r  all of the lama's n a i v e t y  that Suleri 
d i s a p p r o v e s  of, h e  is r e m a r k a b l y  shrewd, a n d  it is this 
s h r e w d n e s s  that e x a l t s  h i m  in F a t h e r  V i c t o r ' s  eyes. H e  is 
w i l l i n g  to p a y  for K i m ' s  e d u c a t i o n  b e c a u s e  e d u c a t i o n  is 
u s e l e s s  u n l e s s  it is of the b e s t  sort. T h o u g h  the B r i t i s h  
r e g i m e n t  c l a i m s  m o n o p o l y  to t e a c h  Kim, K i p l i n g  m a k e s  K i m ' s  
e d u c a t i o n  t h e r e  incomplete, b r o k e n  w i t h  p e r i o d s  of 
e l o p e m e n t ,  a n d  s e c o n d a r y  to the p e r i p a t e t i c  t e a c h i n g s  of the 
lam a  a n d  M a h b u b  Ali. K i p l i n g  i n t e r p r e t s  the i n t e n t  of 
c o l o n i a l  e d u c a t i o n  r i g h t l y  for w h a t  it i s - - a  tool to s e r v e  
the empire. Bu t  it is a l s o  this i m p e r i a l i s t  e d u c a t i o n  that 
c r e a t e s  the s t r i f e  or the g r o u n d  of c o n f l i c t  in K i m ' s  m i n d  
w h i c h  K i p l i n g  a r t f u l l y  turns into a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  quest.
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When we separate the various thematic threads weaving 
the story we find that Kipling leaves the effects of 
imperialist indoctrination open-ended--will Kim go with the 
lama or Colonel Creighton? This ambiguity once again 
directs our attention to the subjectivity of the main 
characters --Kim, the lama, and Colonel Creighton --and the 
experiential component of the novel--so that rather than a 
flat, didactic approbation or censure of imperialism, we get 
a more complex resolution of the dialectic of strife. Kim 
at the end of his adventure with the lama is a significantly 
altered character --one who begins to question his identity 
rather than blindly submit to an external definition of his 
selfhood.
The lama's letter, in Suleri's reading, becomes the 
greatest piece of evidence incriminating him in Creighton's 
Great Game. "There are no quests that live a charmed life 
outside the confines of colonial desire," writes Suleri 
connecting the lama's "utilitarianism" to "Kim's . . .
tyrannical status of a Macaulayan interpreter” {Suleri 
Rhetoric 122). Said glosses the phrase "Great Game" as a 
term from chess thought to have originated in the writing of 
a B e n g a l  cavalry officer named Arthur Connolly, who in his
Narrative of $n Overland Journey to the North of.India
(1 8 3 8 ) u s e d  he phrase to signify the diplomatic maneuvers 
followed by India and Russia in their struggle for political
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ascendency in western Asia in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In Kim Kipling uses the trope of Game 
generally to describe British activities in India and more 
specifically the espionage subplot which takes the lama and 
Kim to the Himalayas. Said describes the relation of the 
Game to the deeper, deceitful, aggressive reality of 
colonialism:
. . .the confluence between Creighton's Great Game and 
Kim's inexhaustibly renewed capacity for disguises and 
adventure; Kipling keeps the two things tightly 
connected. The first is the device of political 
surveillance and control; the second, at a much deeper 
and more interesting level, is the wish-fantasy of 
someone who would like to think that everything is 
possible, that one can go anywhere and be anything.
(Kim 44)
The teleological approach of both Said and Suleri isolate 
the Great Game as the logical end of Kipling's jest. They 
bracket Kim's apprenticeship to the lama as a decoy 
deliberately thrown in to reduce the seriousness of the 
novel's ultimate position on imperialism. This bracketing 
points less to Kipling's ambivalence towards the empire than 
to our own contemporary anxiety when confronted with an 
apparent dissolution of the master-slave dialectic. Suleri,
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for instance, finds Kim to be an image of the "absent other" 
in the conclusion:
. . . the concluding sentence of the text, which once 
again images Kim in a magnificent moment of uncontrol:
"[The lama] crossed his ha^do on his lap and smiled, as 
a man may who has won Salvation for himself and his 
beloved". . . Here, Kim is envisioned as the absent 
other that indicates the silence of classical Urdu 
poetry, in which the beloved has no voice at all. 
(Rhetoric 131)
Though Suleri alludes to it as a potential disqualification, 
the comparison of Kim to the "beloved" in Urdu poetry is 
both felicitous and paradoxical as it brings to light the 
nature of authority and submission in the master-disciple 
(or lover-beloved relationships) which is an alternative to 
the master-slave dialectic that dominates the political 
framework in Kim. Like his elegant counterpart in Urdu 
poetry, Kim is an ideal to the lama: according to the lama 
he is "Temperate, kindly, wise, of ungrudging disposition, a 
merry heart upon the road, never forgetting, learned, 
truthful, courteous" (Kim 332). Like the "beloved" he is 
also a paradoxical authority figure to the lama: despite 
Suleri's efforts to establish that "[Kim] either possesses 
the lama or is possessed by him" (Rhetoric 118) , the 
ambiguity in the narrative may be located in the lama's
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inability to possess him completely. The inability to 
possess the object of desire completely situates Kim in a 
middle category of a text that is a study in such desiring 
rather than a "study of cultural possession and 
dispossession" as Suleri proposes in her reading of Kim 
(Rhetoric 117).
We find an example of Kipling's daring takes on 
defining identity within the master-slave framework in Kim's 
conversation with the Pathan horse-dealer Mahbub Ali.
Mahbub Ali's response to Kim's question, "What am I? 
Mussalman, Hindu, Jain, or Budhist?" (Kim 191) brings the 
metaphysical question to earth:
This matter of creeds is like horseflesh. The wise man 
knows horses are good--that there is a profit to be 
made from all; and for myself--but that I am a good 
Sunni and hate the men of Tirah--I could believe the 
same of all the Faiths. Now manifestly a Kathiawar mare 
taken from the sands of her birthplace and removed to 
the west of Bengal founders --nor is even a Balkh 
stallion (and there are no better horses than those of 
Balkh, were they not so heavy in the shoulder) of any 
account in the great Northern deserts beside the snow- 
camels I have seen. Therefore I say in my heart the 
Faiths are like the horses. Each has merit in its own 
country. (Kim 191-92)
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The point of Mahbub Ali's humorous analogy lies in the fact 
that it is evasive: he does not respond to Kim's question 
directly. Kim's question is not answered. Instead he is 
presented with a comparison of faith to horse-flesh, a low, 
incongruous analogy which deflates the emotional weight of 
Kim's question, "What am I?" Mahbub Ali seems to say that 
in faith as in horse business the crucial factor is profit. 
This claim seems to involve an exclusive definition of 
profit, but in further comparisons of the relative merits of 
a Kathiawar mare, a Balkh stallion and a northern snow-camel 
Mahbub Ali proves that profit is always relative to the 
place and purpose which they serve. The snow-camel, 
however, seems to be an inappropriate addition to the list 
which was originally begun with horses. The digression on 
the Balkh stallion pulls the analogy further away from faith 
with the aside "and there are no better horses than those of 
Balkh, were they not so heavy in the shoulder" that throws 
off the rhythm of the passage in a mildly comic manner. This 
digression is intentional and tendentious. Not having his 
question answered, in other words, failure to appropriate a 
definite identity for himself, makes Kim a suitable 
alternative to the violence of fixed and inflexible creeds; 
his vagabondage becomes more than what Said classifies as 
"fantasy." Kim's disguises and wanderings challenge the 
notion of fixed definitions of identity and power. Hence
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Kipling's repeated fascination with make-up, disguises, 
masks, ventriloquism, and reincarnation--all of which 
challenge the notion of selfhood as a fixed and unchangeable 
entity,
Kipling's skepticism of fixed notions of identity is 
once again hinted at in Mahbub Ali's ironic parting 
conversation with the lama. To the lama's suggestion, "Why 
not follow the Way thyself, and so accompany the boy?"
Mahbub Ali reacts thus: "Mahbub stared stupified at the 
magnificent insolence of the demand, which across the Border 
he would have paid with more than a blow" (Kim 335). For 
the lama and for Kim identity is fluid. As in his response 
to Kim, here too Mahbub Ali underreacts to the situation, 
and his subtle bewilderment mirrors his awareness of his 
difference from the lama. Mahbub Ali is fixed and 
unchanging selfhood while the lama is the ever expanding 
one.
K i m ' s  d e s i r e  for an i d e n t i t y  (which is f o r e v e r  
i r r e l e v a n t  as long as h e  w o r k s  for C r e i g h t o n ) , a n d  the 
la m a ' s  lack of n e e d  for o n e  is the b o n d  that b r i n g s  t h e m  
together. K i m ' s  d i s c o m f o r t  at his e s p i o n a g e  r o l e  is e v i d e n t  
in the g r e a t  h a s t e  h e  d i s p l a y s  to ge t  ri d  of the p a p e r s  
c o n f i s c a t e d  f r o m  the R u s s i a n  spies: "He h a d  b e e n  a n n o y e d  out 
of all r e a s o n  b y  the k n o w l e d g e  that they lay b e l o w  h i m  
t h r o u g h  the s i c k  idl e  d a y s - - a  b u r d e n  i n c o m m u n i c a b l e "  (K i m
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327 -28) . Kim's need for the lama, on the other hand, is 
self-motivated. He asks Mahbub Ali, "If I do not see him, 
and if he is taken from me, I will go out of that madrissah 
in Nucklao and, and--once gone, who is to find me again?" 
(Kim 192) Kipling makes the lama "lose" Kim to the British 
officers for the sake of education which immerses Kim in the 
dialectic of masters and slaves. The purposeful 
significance of the master-disciple bond becomes apparent 
when the lama eventually "finds" Kim by his self-propelled 
comeback from the oblivion of Buddhist Nirvana. The master- 
disciple bond, or the lover-beloved bond, in other words, 
become a refuge inside the ubiquitous hold of the master- 
slave relationship of colonialism.
In Said's a n d  S u l e r i ' s  r e d u c t i o n s  of the s i g n i f i c a n c e  
of the m a s  t e r - d i s c i p l e  r e l a t i o n  in K i m  w e  m a y  o b s e r v e  a 
s e c u l a r i z i n g  m i s s i o n  that e x a g g e r a t e s  the p o t e n t i a l  d a n g e r  
p o s e d  to the r e a d e r  b y  the s p i r i t u a l  d i r e c t i o n  in the novel. 
K i p l i n g  p o r t r a y s  this r e l a t i o n s h i p  as a t w o - w a y  need; in the 
la m a ' s  d e c i s i o n  to c o m e  b a c k  f r o m  d e a t h  to take c a r e  of Kim, 
K i p l i n g  m a k e s  a h a r m o n i o u s  i n v e r s i o n  of the roles p l a y e d  b y  
K i m  a n d  the lama in the J a t a k a  tale, an i n v e r s i o n  that 
d e f i n e s  the n a t u r e  of K im's p o s s e s s i o n  b y  the lama a n d  v i c e  
versa, n o t  as an i m p r i s o n m e n t  as Suleri suggests, b u t  as an 
e x a m p l e  of a n e e d  a n d  an answer. In the J a t a k a  tale, a n  o l d  
e l e p h a n t  i m p r i s o n e d  b y  the k i n g ' s  g u a r d s  is m o v e d  to f o r g e t
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his own bondage and to protect an orphaned, new-born 
elephant calf. The calf who reaches adulthood under the 
protection of the old elephant finally breaks open the 
imprisoned elephant's leg-irons and frees him.
In a scene which Suleri shockingly misreads as that of a 
crime of passion, Kipling makes the political framework of 
the text secondary to the growing bond between the lama and 
Kim. According to Suleri, in the "chilling conclusion" to 
the story, "The narrator knows that Kim must be killed. He 
hands the deed over to the otherworldly lama, however, with 
whom he remains in perpetual contestation for Kim's love" 
(Rhetoric 130). Kim's love for the lama is the only 
uncontested relation in the novel. Here the narrator's 
point of view alluded to by Suleri is quite obviously that 
of Kipling the imperialist, but the manner in which the 
camera focuses on Kim and the lama at this point in the 
story is far from framing a threatening chiaroscuro for a 
murder plot. Kim sees the lama as "the cross-legged figure, 
outlined jet-black against the lemon-coloured drift of 
light. So does the stone Eodhisat sit who looks down upon 
the patent self - registering turnstiles of the Lahore Museum" 
(Kim. 336) . The "wheel" of time reappears here in the image 
of the turnstiles at the Museum where the lama and Kim had 
their first encounter; it becomes the index of the mystical
freedom that the lama and Kim find in each other and has
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more to do with Buddhist mysticism and not with surveys and 
agriculture, as Suleri dismisses it so patronisingly in her 
reading.
Ultimately the challenge for our reading Kim is not 
merely to expose the fantastic devices of colonialism which 
are fairly obvious. Rather it is to resensitize the reader 
towards an ambiguous definition of possession itself, which 
Kipling explores in an idiom that self-consciously 
negotiates a middle path between the potentially alienating 
extremes of cultural possession and dispossession. In this 
respect one narrative function of the "idiom of jest" in Kim 
is not so much to gloss over the issue of victimizing power 
as Said suggests, or render the conflict between loyalties 
"irresolvable" as David Bromwich's reading of Kim concludes, 
but to force the reader to move beyond the details of the 
foreground in still another direction and listen to the 
manner in which the idiom of jest throws into relief the 
growing m.aster-disciple/lover-beloved bond that situates 
itself as an alternative to the master-slave relationship. 
The lama's naivety and Kim's ebullience never lack self- 
awareness; they provide deliberate points of view that 
Kipling self-consciously experiments with in order to right 
the unequal and ultimately unfair historical relation 
between the colonizer and the colonized. The lama's and 
Kim's partial involvement in the Great Game with all its
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accompanying dangers is thus a felicitous framework for 
Kipling's experiment. But Kipling attempts to create his 
own system rather than follow the favorite fiction of 
colonizers. Like Browne who dismantled the cherished 
opposition between God and the Devil, by creating the lover- 
beloved bond between the lama and Kim, Kipling attempts to 
merge love of the spirit with the love of material life, no 
small task in itself, since it calls for an exact evaluation 
of the importance of material life for the life of the 
spirit. Contrary to Suleri's claim that the sublime flees 
into irrationality, the sense of freedom that Kim and the 
lama experience is the product of a carefully reasoned 
stance. The lama tells Kim, "Son of my Soul, I have 
wrenched my Soul back from the Threshold of Freedom to free 
thee from all sin" (Kim 338). The lama here pronounces 
Kim's involvement with the Great Game a "sin" with great 
simplicity and no deception. This is the inevitable ground 
of good humor, which acknowledges the conflict and then
seeks to rise above it.
CHAPTER FOUR
I Don't Feel Funny Today: Dorothy Parker and the 
Melancholy of Humor
Both Sir Thomas Browne and Rudyard Kipling demonstrated 
for us that the best strategy to avoid lacerating the self 
from the inside or the outside in a situation of conflict 
was to act upon the principle of equal love. In both of 
these writers, humor became the protective persona, or 
Kierkegaard's incognito, of a non-aggressive, loving 
dialectic. But in the stories of Dorothy Parker, romantic 
love becomes the ground upon which strife develops between 
two individuals. Love as war challenges us with the 
necessity to expand our strategies to contend new and 
subtler methods of oppression.
Though Parker's stories provide us with the problem of 
hostility between men and women in the area of romantic 
love, Parker is primarily known for the withering wit 
characteristic of her reviews and poems. As a reviewer 
Parker was equally aggressive towards men and women and 
cauterized the lowest kind of social pretensions with her 
tendentious laughter. In her review of Upton Sinclair's
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Money Writes Parker chastised Sinclair for unleashing his 
socialist indignation on Joseph Hergesheimer, a petty 
bourgeois writer of little distinction. Parker wrote "There 
is a certain lack of proportion in bringing heavy artillery 
to bear on Joseph Hergesheimer for so innocuous a work as 
From an Qld House"(The Portable Dorothy Parker 470) . it is 
ironic that Parker would blame Sinclair for overreacting to 
trifles, because except for an occasional review of a 
Hemingway novel, Parker herself reviewed little known, 
innocuous, and dull books. A random list would include the 
genres of pulp fiction, etiquette books, anatomy texts, 
self-help books and autobiographies of movie stars.
But Parker's stories exemplify the fiction of women 
who love too much and men who love too little, women who are 
from Venus and men who are from Mars, and other myths of 
hetero-sexual romance. Love is not the answer to the 
struggles in her stories; indeed we often sense that her 
women use love as a figure of speech to reveal or obliquely 
conceal the hostile dynamics of their relations with men.
The aggressive wit in her reviews turns inward in her 
fiction taking us into the minds of her characters, allowing 
us to eavesdrop while they commit embarrassing revelations 
about their insecurities, their need for male company, and 
articulate the existence of a poignant state of melancholy
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which is, apparently, the ocher half of romance. Parker's 
stories have been called sentimental and her humor self- 
deprecating. In this chapter I will argue for a more 
generous interpretation of both of these traits--sentiment 
and self-deprecation. I shall attempt to demonstrate how 
Parker uses both of these characteristics in her characters 
as self-conscious and self-aware devices to defend herself 
against the hostile dynamics of hetero- sexual romance.
Parker's wit in her stories echoes that of her reviews. 
A typical example of the aggressive mode for which she is 
well-praised is her review of William Lyon Phelps's 
Happiness - -"a volume about six inches tall, perhaps four 
inches across, and something less than a half inch thick,"
(Portable 461). What is most obvious about Parker's style 
is its tendentious wit:
Anyway, there is this to be said for a volume such as 
Professor Phelps’s Happiness. It is second only to a 
rubber duck as an ideal bathtub companion. It may be 
held in the hand without causing muscular fatigue or 
nerve strain, it may be neatly balanced back of the 
faucets, and it may be read through before the water 
has cooled. And if it slips down the drain pipe, all 
right, it slips down the drain pipe. (Portable 462) 
This aggressive tone is maintained throughout the review 
with slight internal variations resulting from the relative
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relaxation and intensification of irony. For instance, 
after a relatively innocuous passage where she lists a few 
of the Professor's moral adages, she concludes the review 
thus:
Happiness concludes with a pretty tribute to what the 
Professor calls the American cow. The cow, he points 
out, does not have to brush her teeth, bob her hair, 
select garments, light her fire and cook her food. She 
is not passionate about the income tax or the League of 
Nations; she has none of the thoughts that inflict 
distress and torture. "I have observed many cows," 
says the Professor, in an interesting glimpse of 
autobiography, "and there is in their beautiful eyes no 
perplexity; they are never even bored." He paints a 
picture of so sweet, so placid, so carefree an 
existence, that you could curse your parents for not 
being Holsteins. (Portable 463)
Although the particular details of a cow's life that she 
chooses to include are in themselves comical already-- 
bobbing hair, selecting garments, brushing teeth etc.,--the 
passage gains an additional tendentious twist when she 
suddenly forces us to look at the professor instead of the 
cows. That her real target is the author is clear in the 
sudden, but calculated switch in perspective located in the
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editorial "in an interesting glimpse of autobiography." It 
is a cruel subtle put-down.
Parker's reputation rests mainly on such witticisms.
An example is Mervyn Border's anthology of "black diamonds 
of her wit" in which he picks and chooses among Parker's 
destructive, but comic, put-downs of other people. Joan 
Acocella, in a 1993 New Yorker retrospective on Parker 
describes her Constant Reader columns as "standup-comedy 
routines" primarily on the basis of the witty personae that 
she created for her audience in one installment after the 
other. Acocella describes Parker as dominated by one idea: 
"the interlocking of vulnerability and cruelty. . . .how as 
Lillian Heilman described it, Parker "embraced and flattered 
a man or woman, only to turn, when they had left the room, 
to say in [her] soft, pleasant, clear voice, 'Did you ever 
meet such a shit?'" (Acocella 78-79). The characteristic 
features of Parker's humor, in other words, are concealment, 
deception and aggressiveness.
Acocella is correct in identifying aggressiveness as 
characterizing Parker's conspicuous persona but as any 
cursory reading of Parker's stories would show us this 
explanation is not all-inclusive. Accocella herself 
observes that the most significant difference between 
Parker's reviews and her stories (she doesn't discuss
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Parker's poems at any length) is that "basically, she is 
held back from wit . . . something curious happens to her 
vulnerability-cruelty formula. Instead of deploying the two 
forces sequentially--buildup, chen letdown--she works them 
simultaneously. Her heroiner are all vulnerability. . ." 
(Acocella 79). Acocella's reading exposes a paradox at the 
heart of all gender-linked definitions of humor. Gender- 
based definitions of humor account largely for two groups of 
aggressive humor--against oneself or ones own gender, in 
other words, self-deprecating, or directed against the other 
gender, hostile. In Acocella's reading Parker's humor is 
made to swing within this restricted circuit--as a reviewer 
she is the aggressor and as a story-teller she is the 
victim.
To substantiate her reading, Acocella scrutinizes 
Parker's relentless fascination with the theme of the 
dependency of women on men, *which she asserts is her "only 
true subject" (Acocella 80). She finds an economic basis 
for this emotional dependency:
If in the o l d  days w o m e n  w e r e  e n s l a v e d  b y  men, t hey 
n e v e r t h e l e s s  h a d  legal cl a i m s  on them. N o w  t h e y  h a d  no 
legal claims, so all the f o r c e  of their d e p e n d e n c y  w a s  
s h i f t e d  to an e m o t i o n a l  cla i m - - l o v e ,  a m a t t e r  that m e n  
viewed, a n d  still view, d i f f e r e n t l y  f r o m  women. H e n c e
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Parker's heroines, waiting by the phone, weeping, 
begging, hating themselves for begging. (Acocella 81) 
The relationship between the emotional cathexis of the ego 
in love to its economic status might involve more complex 
variables than this simple scheme of an arbitrary leap in 
time against which Acocella pins it. Furthermore, it is 
possible to demonstrate that Acocella's polarization of 
aggressor and victim as two clean-cut extremes is at the 
expense of down-playing Parker's tendentious use of irony in 
most of her stories. Parker for all her gloomy self-mockery 
was never naive, as this poem entitled "Thought for a 
Sunshiny Morning" makes clear:
It cost me never a stab or a squirm 
To tread by chance upon a worm 
"Aha, my little dear," I say,
"Your clan will pay me back one day." (Portable 226)
As an alternative to Acocella's portrait of Parker's 
victimized women, Nina Miller in an essay entitled "Making 
Love Modern: Dorothy Parker and Her Public" (1992), 
identifies this ironic, uplifting function of Parker's self- 
deprecating humor. She argues that Parker, though "bound up 
with her persona as a loser - in-love was an alternative . . .
model of self-other relations" (Miller 763). Drawing 
examples primarily from Parker's poetry, Miller argues that 
Parker uses humor to undercut the conventional
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objectification of women in love-poetry. Parker's rhetorical 
technique in her poetry is for her new, sophisticated 
heroine to establish a better relationship with her audience 
than with any of her men or women characters. She writes:
. . . Parker undercuts her own ascension to "muse" or 
loved object through her irony, a stance built into her 
Round Table imperative to perform as a humorist. . . . 
sacrificing the high seriousness of romantic love to 
humor, she breaks up the loving dyad of male and female 
through the implied intervention of her audience, for 
whom the joke is staged . . . Thus "triangulated" . . 
humor about love . . . has the power to rupture the
magic circle of intersubjectivity by constructing its 
audience as a complicituous third party to the ridicule 
of one lover (the man) by the other (the woman).
(Miller 769)
Miller's above three-part schema--subject, object, audience- 
-brings us back to Freud's three-part structure of a 
tendentious joke developed in Jokes and Their Relation in 
the Unconscious. In his analysis of smut (zote), Freud 
discovered that smut or verbal aggression against women by a 
group of men acts as a substitute for the sexual act and 
that it may take place independently of the presence of 
women. Since the presence of women is not a chief requisite
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for the expression of zote. Freud argues that the 
requirements for the genre of zote is a teller (usually 
male) and his audience (usually male). Miller likewise 
observes that Parker's literary persona displaced the all- 
consuming intersubjectivity of traditional heterosexual love 
as represented in lyric poetry "and instead [made] the 
poem's audience the site of her primary psychological 
investment" (Miller 772), The public Parker imagined for 
herself. Miller observes, "drew variously on family 
relations and New York urban culture" and ideally defined "a 
culture and in relation to which a woman love poet could 
define herself, as against the definition imposed on her in 
the private world of love" (Miller 772). In other words, 
Parker's poems force us to view two separate levels of 
discourse about love at the same time: one, which speaks in 
the conventional language of love as suffering from the 
point of view of the woman, and two, a sudden opening 
outwards of love's secret tyrannies onto a public mode that 
is more akin to dialogue than confession. In "Theory"
Parker substitutes the intimacy of romantic suffering and 
soul-searching in private, with making herself into an 
illustration of a general paradigm:
Into love and out again,
Thus I went, and thus I go.
Spare your voice, and hold your pen--
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Well and bitterly I know 
All the songs were ever sung,
All the words were ever said;
Could it be, when I was young,
Some one dropped me on my head?
Here, Parker makes romantic love a derivative emotion 
constructed out of popular songs and popular poems, 
deliberately replacing the subjectivity of suffering with 
all that she has read and heard about love. With 
subjectivity cleverly pushed out of the way, Parker's self- 
deprecating line "Could it be, when I was young,/ Some one 
dropped me on my head?" becomes less self-debasing; it might 
even appear to be a somewhat exalted point of view. 
Everything popular culture says about love should ideally 
have prevented her from falling in love, but she persisted 
in believing in love, an act of some daring. Parker's 
persona situates itself in the public sphere than within an 
intimate rei.tionshir witr a lev.;:.:. She expresses her grief 
or disappointment not in the privacy of an intimate session 
of suffering for one or two; rather she makes herself an 
illustration for the popular theory about love. She is a 
loser, but she is not alone.
Miller sees this displacement of affect from the lover 
to the community by the woman in essentially the same terms,
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b u t  r e v e r s i n g  the gender, that F r e u d  d e s c r i b e d  the d y n a m i c s  
of z o t e :
Implicit in this schema was a fantasy of escape from 
sexualized embodiment, underwritten by an emotional and 
aesthetic investment in the community for its own sake: 
relations between the Parker persona and the 
communities she evoked often carried the affective 
charge which would otherwise have been confined to the 
male lover. (Miller 772)
M i l l e r ' s  a n a l y s i s  of P a r k e r ' s  p o e m s  thus p r o v i d e s  us w i t h  an  
a l t e r n a t e  p a r a d i g m  for P a r k e r  than the i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y  
a g g r e s s i v e  one in h e r  r e v i e w s  that A c o c e l l a  end o r s e s .  T h e  
P a r k e r  p e r s o n a  in h e r  p o e t r y  m o v e s  on e  step b e y o n d  the 
p r o v i n c e  of m e r e  a t t a c k  or m e r e  self-pity, b u t  p e r s u a d e s  us 
of "the p o s i t i v e  m o t i v a t i o n  for r e j e c t i n g  h e r  w o u l d - b e  
lover" a g a i n s t  a b a c k g r o u n d  of c u l t u r a l  r e f e r e n c e s  a n d  in 
t u r n  a p p e a l i n g  to us to j u d g e  h e r  c a s e  in h e r  favor. T h e  
w i t  in h e r  p o e t r y  is guarded, bu t  it does no t  d o w n g r a d e  h e r  
s e n s e  of s e l f - worth, h e r  ego.
T h e  t e n d e n t i o u s  u s e  of c o m p l i c i t y  w i t h  the a u d i e n c e  in 
P a r k e r ' s  p o e m s  e x p o s e s  the s u b t l e  i n e q u a l i t i e s  in the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  m o d e l  of h e t e r o s e x u a l  r o m a n c e - - t h e  d o m i n a n t  m a n  
a n d  the s u b m i s s i v e  woman. In h e r  stories, w h e r e  this 
t a n g e n t i a l  d i a l o g u e  w i t h  the a u d i e n c e  is s e l d o m  p r e s e n t ,  w e  
se e  the d e g r e e  of h o s t i l i t y  b e t w e e n  m e n  a n d  w o m e n  r a i s e d  to
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an almost total breakdown of romance. Parker's characters 
in her stories are decidedly single (but not self-sufficient 
emotionally), even when they are united, leaving the effect 
of a pervasive melancholy. Glimpses of this melancholy are 
visible even in the witty, self-deprecations in her book 
reviews. An example is a 1928 review of "a book culled The 
Technique of the Love Affair, by one who signs herself 'A 
Gentlewoman' (Portable 522). Parker writes:
You know what you ought to be with men? You should 
always be aloof, you should never let them know that 
you like them, you must on no account let them feel 
that they are of any importance to you, you must be 
wrapped up in your own concerns, you must never let 
them lose sight of the fact that you are superior, you 
must be, in short, a regular stuffed chemise. And if 
you could see what I've been doing! (Portable 522)
The passage is simultaneously aggressive against men, 
against the social norms of courtship, and against herself. 
It is as much a public confession as a private one in that 
she is replaying back to her audience what her audience had 
told her she should do in matters of romance--she is 
remembering the cultural hints women receive on the right 
technique of the love affair. Clearly Parker has not been 
following these rules to heart; we hear the note of
123
melancholy in the fading wistfulness of the tag "And if you 
could see what I've been doing!" Any imaginative reading of 
this self-deprecating sigh would show that it is intended to 
provoke our moral indignation at precisely what it pretends 
to endorse--men's courtship expectations of women. Though 
she mocks herself here, she acknowledges the conflict 
between men and women in the arena of romance. What we 
would like to see happening here in addition is for the wit 
to prevent her ego from collapsing into the conflict.
The "fade-out" or the incomplete ending, in which we 
hear a voice still muttering to itself with no audience but 
the reader (incidentally, its ideal audience), is a favorite 
device with Parker to suggest the atmosphere of helplessness 
and powerlessness that surrounds the women in her stories.
In the story "Too Bad," the anatomy of a marriage on the 
brink of break-up is presented in a style of similar 
inconclusiveness and repetition. An example of this 
purposeful fade-out is the scene where the Mr. and Mrs. 
Weldon are eating dinner at home. Parker uses a limited 
vocabulary with repetition of words to suggest a moment of 
conversational bottle-neck:
"Like your pie, Ernie?" she asked vivaciously 
"Why, I don't know," he said, thinking it over, 
"I'm not so crazy about rhubarb, I don't think. Are 
you? "
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"Mo, I'm not so awfully crazy about it," she 
answered. "But then, I'm not really crazy about any 
kind of pie."
"Aren't you really?" he said, politely surprised. 
"I like pie pretty well some kinds of pie."
"Do you?" The polite surprise was hers now.
"Why, yes," he said. "I like a nice huckleberry 
pie or a nice lemon meringue pie, or a--" He lost 
interest in the thing himself, and his voice died away. 
(Portable 179)
This conversation aoout something that they both are not 
sure that they like, "pie," ends characteristically in 
another fade-out. Parker's stories regularly employ the 
technique of fading-out to suggest the inadequacy of 
language to rescue people from silence. In Parker's stories 
repetition, fade-outs and incomplete endings suggest the 
ground of conflict between characters, a melancholic 
stagnation which results in a subtle violence that her women 
characters direct inwardly into themselves. The 
internalization of this violence results in representations 
of painful neurosis as in the short stories "The Lovely 
Leave," or "A Telephone Call." Self-deprecating humor is an 
inevitable idiom for the expression of this neurosis:
I think he must still like me a little. He couldn't 
have called me "darling" twice today, if he didn't
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still like me a little. It isn't all gone, if he still 
likes me a little, little bit. (Portable 121)
What introduces an element of painful laughter in us as we 
read this is its ability to convey the neurotic anxiety in 
the speaker made concrete in the exact detail "called me 
'darling' twice today" in a sentence that is otherwise 
rambling and repetitious. We feel sympathy as we laugh, but 
the voice of the character does nothing to empower itself.
It illustrates self-deprecating humor where the self is at 
its lowest level of strife with what oppresses it.
The fade-out as a rhetorical strategy can also blur the 
roles of aggressor and victim within a potential conflict. 
Used ironically it can highlight the conflictual framework 
itself, making the particular example subsidiary to the 
general pattern. Dorothy Shay, a prefeminist comedienne and 
musician used this strategy to great effect in her 1946 song 
"Efficiency." Shay's persona is a character like "Rosie the 
Riveter" in the song of the same name written during World 
War II to glamorize, honor and patronize working women.
Shay presents the new pattern of exploitation of women in 
the changed social context thus:
You've heard of Rosie the Riveter,
Well, she’s got nothing on me,
’Cause long before her time,
I had a job in Tennessee.
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I turned a knob with just one hand.
And I was satisfied
And then one day I looked up,
And the Foreman was by my side
He said your motor's running 
And your rhythm is quite smart.
But there’s one hand you're not using.
Use it here to push this part 
The sexual innuendos are unmistakable if unstated. Other 
verses continue to the same effect until the speaker is made 
to move all her various limbs, and ends up with a broom tied 
to her waist. Shay ends the song in a fade-out:
So I can turn, and push, and sweep sweep sweep sweep 
sweep sweep sweep sweep sweep. . .
The song leaves us with the picture of the woman tied to the 
broom sweeping away to eternity. That the song is meant to 
be witty is obvious from the pervasive use of double­
entendre surrounding every aspect of the machine's movement. 
The real subject, or object, is the woman, rather than the 
machine. Self-deprecating humor here does not resolve the 
conflict, except perhaps to transform the humiliation 
experienced by the woman being used by her employer into 
some form of pleasure. This transformation, however, is at
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the cost of great humiliation to her personhood; it is the 
transference of this sense of humiliation onto the reader 
that makes us regard self-deprecating humor as a weak 
defense strategy. But unlike the character in "A Telephone 
Call" we hear an ironic revelation of the woman's exploited 
relation with the man; though weak and self-deprecating, 
here humor does have an edge.
Parker published her last story "The Banquet of Crow" 
in the New Yorker in 1957 which antedates her career, like 
Shay's, in relation to the Feminist Movement of the 1960s. 
Much of the current dissatisfaction with Parker's humor 
arises out of the historically altered vision of what 
feminist humor ought to be. For instance, Acocella's cold 
patronizing of Parker in her New Yorker retrospective, a sad 
irony in itself since Parker was one of the founding voices 
of The New Yorker. Acccella writes, "Female shame is a big 
subject, and for its sake Parker should have been bigger, 
but she is what we have, and it's not nothing" (81).
Defining the two types of women's humor, Nancy Walker 
distinguishes between subversive and overt feminist humor: 
One, operating subversively within the cultural system 
of subjugation, acknowledges woi n’s subordination 
while protesting it in subtle and not - so - subtle ways, 
thus performing the necessary step of calling attention
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to "the actual position of women in American culture"; 
the other explores the fundamental absurdity of that 
system and calls for different ways of conceptualizing 
gender definition. (Walker A Very Serious Thing 147) 
For Walker the difference between the two groups lay in the 
role they played in the political emanicipation of women. 
Subversive humor recorded women1s problems with life in a 
sexist culture, whereas "overt feminist humor speaks 
directly to such issues as economic dependency, lack of 
political power, and open discrimination . . . .  this humor 
challenges the assumptions that underlie that culture and 
reveals their fundamental absurdity. For this reason, the 
humor frequently takes the form of satire or parody, both of 
which work to revise social realities rather than simply 
establishing their existence" (A Very Serious Thing 149). 
Defined in these terms, Parker is clearly a misfit among 
the more overt feminist humorists. Parker's ironic humor 
subverts the oppressive framework of patriarchy from the 
inside; it does not topple institutions or offer challenges 
in a loud manner. Parker, moreover, endangers her position 
among future feminist humorists by her self-deprecating 
laughter. Though Walker's distinction between subversive 
and overt humor, or Kaufman's female humor and feminist 
humor are useful as thematic categories to a certain extent, 
they are ultimately non-divisive in their demonstration of
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the set of relations that women divide with men within the 
structure of patriarchy. Overt feminist laughter in the 
above classification is outwardly directed, its target 
usually men, whereas the direction of subversive laughter is 
not so clearly mapped. We detect this hesitation to name 
the enemy in Parker. For Parker the solutions to women's 
problems in a sexist culture were not so clearly predicated 
on the ousting of men from the social and emotional lives of 
women. Her stories, consequently, tend to handle conflict 
between men and women in indirect ways.
More than the thematic division that Walker pronounces 
as the dividing factors between female and feminist 
humorists, we might argue that it is the formal 
representation that differentiates the laughter of a 
revolutionary from the laughter of a slave. Quiet 
demonstration may be as powerful a weapon as loud laughter 
and might turn a slave into possesing the self-control of a 
master. Parker's genius is that of demonstration; we 
already discussed Parker's purposeful use of fade-outs, 
incomplete endings, and repetitions to suggest the hostile 
dynamics between men and women. These are quiet tactics to 
demonstrate resistance to violence.
In Parker's stories the demand for women's speech 
primarily to be entertaining when they are in the company of 
men is the ground upon which the conflict is predicated that
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undoes the man-woman relationship. In "Too Bad" for 
instance, Parker presents the disintegration of the Weldon 
marriage exclusively in terms of disintegrating speech.
Mr.and Mrs.Weldon can talk well enough to other people but 
their speech with each other is stilted, forced and 
artificial. Parker writes:
Both men and women found her attractive to listen to; 
not brilliant, not particularly funny, but still 
amusing and agreeable. She was never at a loss for 
something to say, never conscious of groping around for 
a topic. She had a good memory for bits of gossip and 
a knack of telling them entertainingly. Things people 
said to her stimulated her to quick replies, and more 
amusing narratives. (Portable 177)
The narrative of "Too Bad" tracks the breakdown of 
Mrs.Weldon's attempts to make "amusing narratives." The 
larger narrative of the story, structured around the 
duration of one evening, is punctuated at almost equal 
intervals with Mrs.Weldon's failed attempts to make amusing 
conversation with her husband. The narrative is divided 
between direct narration and short spurts of dialogue. The 
dialogue which starts off unhinged from the rest of the text 
is, however, not dramatic in effect; it merely verbalizes 
the tedium that has already been narrated. Parker's 
strategy is to draw out the extent of their suffering by a
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conversational style that is at once repetitious and inane, 
like the example of the pie discussed above. In yet another 
example from the same story, we hear the same self-consuming 
disintegration of speech whose primary narrative function is 
to mark the duration of time rather than prolong the 
conversation:
She was waiting, cheerful and bright, courteously 
refraining from beginning her soup, when he took his 
place at the table.
"Oh, tomato soup, eh?" he said.
"Yes, " she answered, "You like it, don't you?"
"Who--me?" he said. "Oh, yes. Yes, indeed."
She smiled at him.
"Y p s , I thou g h t  y o u  l i k e d  it," she said.
"You like it, too, don't you?" he inquired.
"Oh, yes," she assured him. "Yes, I like it ever 
so much. I'm awfully fond of tomato soup."
"Yes," he said, "there's nothing much better than 
tomato soup on a cold night."
She nodded.
"I think it's nice, too," she confided. (Portable
176)
Speaking of Ben Jonson's theory of "the humors," Northrop 
Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism (1957) observes that "the 
principle of the humour is the principle that unincremental
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repetition, the literary imitation of ritual bondage, is 
funny. . . Repetition overdone or not going anywhere belongs 
to comedy . . (168). Frye's example is the repetition of
deaths in Synge's Riders to t-.he Sea--he observes that 
instead of the three deaths, an endless repetition of deaths 
would have turned the play from a tragedy into a comedy.
But in "Too Bad" the quality or quantity of speech in the 
scenes does not change or increase in any manner, it is 
unincremental repetition, but the effect is far from being 
funny. It makes us acutely aware of the deeper melancholy of 
repetition, as in the plays of Samuel Beckett, putting 
Frye's observation on Synge's drama in reverse.
So it is ironic that what Parker's repetitions reveal 
is an aspect of a personality, a mannerism, a quirk, the 
dominance of a melancholic humor. Repetition in Parker's 
stories does not advance the plot; like a needle stuck in a 
groove it reminds us of the lack of continuity in the 
narrative, a sudden narrative disjunction that does not 
offer options of narrative movement. This incrementally 
undifferentiated repetition of dialogue creates the effect 
of static time, ponderous atmosphere, and tired characters. 
In the above example, the narrative possibilities suggested 
by the introduction of a new topic, "cold night," in the 
man's remark, "Yes . . . there’s nothing much better than
tomato soup on a cold night," is not carried over by the
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woman. The narrative closes when she "confides," "I think 
it's nice, too," the word "confide," almost comic in its 
incongruous understatement for the context, once again 
turning our attention to Parker’s tendentious use of their 
conversation. We are left without an explanation of why 
this conversation is going the way it is, or where it is 
going, but merely a scene which breaks the conventional 
optimism of linear narratives.
The night ends thus: "Mr.Weldon turned a page, and 
yawned aloud. Wah-huh-huh-huh-huh, he went, on a descending 
scale. He yawned again, and this time climbed the scale"
(Portable 180). Like their conversation, even the 
verbalization of his yawn, which is a common comic device 
like the verbalization of other aspects of bodily functions, 
and perhaps tendentious in this context as it is the only 
sound that breaks the silence that surrounds the Weldons, 
and thus underscores the whole gamut of their life which 
sounds severely tedious and limited and which threatens to 
end in a scream. Parker's women cannot make amusing 
conversation and their anxiety over not being amusing masks 
a deeper anxiety of not being loved. Absence of humor, in 
these stories, is an index of the total vulnerability of 
their inner selves to any form of violence inflicted from
the outside or inside.
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In both "The Lovely Leave" and "Sentiment," the 
experience of the duration of time by the women characters 
is directly related to their inability to have fun. In the 
ironically titled "The Lovely Leave," a young wife waits for 
her soldier husband to come home to her for twenty-four 
hours and spends the entire time apologizing to him for not 
being gay and charming enough. In "Sentiment" a young woman 
reflects on her lover ditching her for being too 
"sentimental." The young woman's monologue runs thus:
Yes, that's the way it goes. And it's right, it's so 
right. What is it to me what I wear? Go and buy 
yourself a big red hat with poppies on it--that ought 
to cheer you up. Yes--go buy it and loathe it. How am 
I to go on, sitting and staring and buying big red hats 
and hating them, and then sitting and staring again-- 
day upon day upon day upon day? Tomorrow and tomorrow 
and tomorrow. How am I to drag through them like this? 
(Portable 357)
Parker uses a drive through the city in a taxi-cab as a 
trope for the perambulations of the narrative. In the 
opening sentence the young woman tells the cab-driver, "Oh, 
anywhere, driver, anywhere--it doesn't matter. Just keep 
driving" (Portable 354). The narrative is punctuated by the 
woman remarking on the landmarks--all are places that she
associates with her lover--so that both the movement of the
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narrative as well as the movement of the car converge to 
create the effect of stasis--the trip has no specific goal, 
and the narrative similarly does not edge towards a 
satisfactory closure. Parker uses the device of fading-out 
once again to suggest this lack of narrative closure:
But where's the tree? Can they have cut down our tree- 
-our tree? And where's the apartment house? And 
where's the florist's shop? And where--oh, where's our 
house, where's- -
Driver, what street is this? Sixty-Fifth?
Oh. No, nothing, thank you. I--I thought it was 
Sixty-Third. . . . (Portable 359)
Parker was an artist who painted the the painfully 
incongruous image well; like the young woman in "A Telephone 
Call” recalling the precise number of times that her 
boyfriend had called her "darling" (twice in one day), the 
young woman in "Sentiment" pulls us into all the misery in 
her situation by the precise evocation of her attempts to 
cheer herself up--buy yourself a big red hat with poppies on 
it. Parker's cheerless women are as much in search of humor 
as they are for love. In the search for humor by these 
cheerless women, we recognize Freud's observation that humor 
is the loftiest of mind's defensive devices.
There is a curious paradox in Parker's treatment of the 
relationship between women and humor in her stories. On the
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one hand, the Parker personae in her reviews and her poems 
use aggressive wit variously as offensive weapons against 
men or defensive cocoons to hide their vulnerability in 
their relationship with men. In her stories, however, her 
women characters actively resist being funny. For most of 
her women characters humor is a thing of their past; we hear 
it referred to only as an image that the men have of them.
In Parker's saddest story, "Big Blonde" (1929), Hazel Morse 
accounts for her immense popularity with men thus; "Men like 
you because you were fun, and when they liked you they took 
you out, and there you were. So, and successfully, she was 
fun. She was a good sport. Men liked a good sport"
(Portable 187). Parker's strategy in this story is to strip 
humor of its power to amuse. She begins by making it non- 
performative. All allusions to humor, jokes and fun, are 
narrated as reports or factual observations as in the above 
passage; Parker does not give any of her characters a single 
joke or funny line. What is verbalized is the gradual 
erosion of fun from the Morse's lives. Herbie Morse, for 
instance, tells Hazel, "Ah, for God's sake," he would say. 
"Crabbing again. All right, sit here and crab your head 
off. I'm going out" (Portable 190). Art, her lover, tells 
her right before her suicide attempt, "See if you can't 
sleep yourself out of it. I'll see you Thursday. For God’s 
sake, try and cheer up by then, will you?" (Portable 204)
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In a story that is otherwise narrated by a detached 
point of view with minimal or no narratorial intrusion, the 
one instance where we hear something like verbal irony on 
the part of the narrator is when we are introduced to the 
character of Mrs, Martin and her "Boys." Here, Parker 
brings to the surface her suppressed disapproval of fun.
She writes:
Mrs. Martin had no visible spouse; you were left to 
decide for yourself whether he was or was not dead. She 
had an admirer, Joe, who came to see her almost 
nightly. Often he brought several friends with him-- 
"The Boys," they were called. The Boys were big, red, 
good-humored men, perhaps forty-five, perhaps fifty. 
(Portable 193)
The devices used here, the ironic understatement of "visible 
spouse," "admirer," and "The Boys," can be potentially 
humorous. Other devices, primarily images that can be 
construed as humorous, are scattered throughout the story. 
When Hazel cries, "the drops slipped rhythmically over her 
plump cheeks," Hazel and Herbie "resume friendly relations" 
after they have a fight; drinking alcohol "kept her fat." 
Even the title of the story "Big Blonde" with the literal 
adjective "big" evoking Hazel's appearance is ultimately an 
image that is in the realm of the comic--the big, boisterous 
blonde holding court in a bar. Comedy colors this image of
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the doctor checking Hazel to see if she was dead after her 
suicide attempt:
The doctor looked sharply at her, then plunged his 
thumbs into the lidded pits above her eyeballs and 
threw his weight upon them. . . . Mrs. Morse gave no
sign under the pressure. Abruptly the doctor abandoned 
it, and with one quick movement swept the covers down 
to the foot of the bed. With another he flung her 
nightgown back and lifted the thick, white legs, cross- 
hatched with blocks of tiny, iris-colored veins. He 
pinched them repeatedly, with long, cruel nips, back of 
the knees. She did not awaken. (Portable 207)
The scene evokes what might have been comic, the pattern 
Bergson described as "something mechanical encrusted on the 
living" (Comedy 84) In his essay on laughter, Bergson 
observed that "the attitudes, gestures and movements of the 
human body are laughable in exact proportion as that body 
reminds us of a mere machine . . . any incident is comic 
that calls our attention to the physical in a person, when 
it is the moral side that is concerned" (Comedy 79). Parker 
does make Hazel's cataleptic body the focus of our attention 
instead of the more morally demanding fact of her suicide. 
The image of Hazel's robotic lifelessness, however, is 
prevented from amusing us by Parker' s construction of the
doctor's attitude to Hazel's body. The doctor's responses
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are quick, hard, unexplained. The words used to describe 
his movements are "sharply," "plunged," "abruptly," 
"abandoned," and "cruel"--words that stop us from 
identifying this scene as a comic scene however familiar the 
pattern might seem.
In a way, Hazel's comeback from suicide itself is a 
conventional trope of comedy--no one dies in the end. The 
comeback could still be comic if Hazel's thoughts were in 
any way inappropriate to the context in the manner of 
Kafka's The Metamorphosis in which the horror of the 
fantastic premise--human being transformed into a giant 
vermin--is described with an eye for precise naturalistic 
details. Gregor’s thoughts on discovering that he had been 
turned into an insect are totally contrary to our 
expectations. Kafka writes:
Gregor's eyes turned next to the window, and the 
overcast sky--one could hear raindrops beating on the 
window gutter--made him quite melancholy. What about 
sleeping a little longer and forgetting all this 
nonsense he thought, but it could not be done. for he 
was accustomed to sleep on his right side and in his 
present condition he could not turn himself over. 
(Metamorphosis and Other stories 9)
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Hazel's last thoughts as she lies in bed after swallowing a 
bottle of sleeping pills similarly contradicts our 
expectations. Parker writes:
She stretched her arms high and gave a vast yawn.
"Guess I'll go to bed,” she said, "Gee, I'm nearly 
dead."
That struck her as comic, and she turned out the 
bathroom light and went in and laid herelf down in her 
bed, chuckling softly all the time.
"Gee, I'm nearly dead," she quoted. "That's a hot 
one!" (Portable 205)
What complicates reading this scene as totally comic is its 
tone of detached observation, quite Kafkesque, most 
pointedly present in the use of the word "quoted." It is a 
quotation only in so far as it repeats itself, and is used 
not to augment the movement of the plot, but to dilate a 
stasis that has already set in. No irony breaks through the 
bleak, solipsistic cocoon which Hazel has spun around her in 
her alcoholic daze. Hazel's laughter and use of the term 
"comic" to describe her condition of near-death, however, 
shows an element of control still existing in her dazed 
mind. At this point, her laughter is not self-deprecating 
and neither is it directed against anyone else. It seems to 
belong to the kind of tendentious laughter that Freud 
described as "cynical or blasphemous," but here the irony is
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not directed against any religious or moral idea but the 
transience of life itself, Hazel's knowledge that she has 
the power to put an end to her life.
"Big Blonde" ends with a variation of the fade-out that 
Parker uses in stories like "From New York to Detroit" and 
"Sentiment"--a closure that comes too close at the heels of 
a long delayed conflict. There is a resultant lag in the 
rhythm of the story that not only resists our efforts to 
determine a satisfactory closure but also resists 
interpretation of meaning at the level of plot and action. 
The ambiguity resulting from such an open-ended closure has 
been reframed as a question of ideology--feminism--and the 
ultimate purpose of women's awareness of their subordination 
and suffering in a sexist society. Nancy Walker, for 
instance, finds Parker severely handicapped in deploying her 
awareness of women's problems in a pragmatic manner. 
Contrasting "Big Blonde" with the nineteenth century female 
humorist Marietta Holley, who created the socially and 
politically abrasive satirist persona of Samantha Allen, 
Walker writes:
By presenting the results of women's cultural 
conditioning and subordination, America's female 
humorists implicitly address the sources of women's 
self-doubt, dependence, and isolation from the 
mainstream of American life. Whereas Holley's Samantha
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Allan overtly attacks discrimination against women in 
both the political and personal realm, most of the 
personae in women's humor are less aware than their 
creators of the reasons for the inherent craziness of 
their lives. Hazel Morse, in Dorothy Parker's story 
"Big Blonde," is a poignant example of this 
unawareness. (A Very Serious Thing 30)
Walker grants Parker the awareness that she denies Hazel.
But on a closer reading, does Parker make Hazel so totally 
unaware of what it happening to her? The unconcluded ending 
and the absence of an overt, politically positive act does 
not make "Big Blonde" redundant as a feminist text. 
Especially since Parker invests Hazel with a surprisingly 
raw interiority whose revelation does not transform us into 
voyeurs on the prowl for a sight to release our scornful 
laughter, but as witnesses to the melancholic surfacing of 
an emotionally drained but hesitantly self-aware ego. This 
interiority of Hazel is quite different from the aggressive 
public put-downs that Parker's persona in her poems do. 
Walker . dirui that "the woman in Parker's sketch "A 
Telephone Call," abjectly awaiting her lover's call, is more 
typical in women's literature that in Parker's "Indian 
Summer," which ends with the line "To hell, my love with 
you!" (A Very Serious Thing 28). The ground of conflict 
between men and women and the resultant pain that seems to
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find Parker's women, are carefully disguised and liberated 
as aggressive laughter in her poems and reviews. But in 
"Big Blonde" we find this ground of pain exposed for our 
scrutiny, and more so, to Hazel's own scrutiny, without the 
protection of wit, cheer, or bravado. This experience of 
recognizing the conflict alone makes Hazel a more "aware" 
character than her peers in Parker's poems.
Walker finds Hazel to be an emblem of the exploitative 
stereotype of the "dumb blonde," a sister to Lorelei Lee in 
Anita Loos's Gentlemen Prefer Blondes:
The ironic distance of the author's voice in "Big 
Blonde" allows Parker to provide a double view of 
Hazel: that of the objective narrator who understands 
how Hazel is viewed by those around her, and that of 
Hazel herself, whose understanding is severely limited. 
. . . Parker presents . . . Hazel’s perspective in
language that testifies to the limitations of her 
perceptions. . . . Parker consistently emphasizes the 
extent to which Hazel is the product of others'- - 
primarily men's--requirements. . . . Because Hazel is 
expected to react rather than to think, she does 
precisely that, and the only action she plans entirely 
for herself is her abortive attempt at suicide. (A 
very Serious Thing 94-95)
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But is Hazel Morse that "severely limited"? In no other 
stories of hers does Parker attempt the kind of elegantly 
controlled tone, and ruthless emotional vivisection that she 
practices on Hazel, which alone should confer on "Big 
Blonde" and Parker a prominent place in women's literature 
for all time. The disparity between what is expected of 
Hazel--to be a sport--and her emotional state after her 
abortive suicide attempt converges towards a poignant 
commentary on what may be the cause for the absence of a 
sense of humor in women. We see Hazel the morning after the 
suicide attempt in the act of reading a postcard from Art: 
Mrs. Morse had to cover one eye with her hand, in 
order to read the message; her eyes were not yet 
focusing correctly.
It was from Art. On the back of a view of the
Detroit Athletic Club he had written "Greetings and 
salutations. Hope you have lost that gloom. Cheer up and 
don't take any rubber nickels. See you on Thursday." 
(Portable 209)
This naive optimism of a "feel-good" groupee is juxtaposed 
with Hazel's reaction that goes one step beyond mere ironic 
detachment; here the detached point of view of the narrative 
narrows and personalizes itself taking us into Hazel's 
consciousness. Unlike Kafka's hero who is amusing with his
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incongruous reactions on being turned into a vermin, Hazel's 
post-suicide thoughts are appropriately miserable:
She dropped the card to the floor. Misery crushed her 
as if she were between great smooth stones. There 
passed before her a slow, slow pageant of days spent 
lying in her flat, of evenings at Jimmy's being a good 
sport, making herself laugh and coo at Art and other 
Arts; she saw a long parade of weary horses and 
shivering beggars and all beaten, driven, stumbling 
things. Her feet throbbed as if she had crammed them 
into the stubby champagne-colored slippers. Her heart 
seemed to swell and harden. (Portable 209)
It is the prospect of humor that hardens Hazel's heart, a 
glib wellness that disguises despair, like the image of 
smooth stone crushing her. Other images of constriction 
and imprisonment--feet crammed into slippers, weary horses, 
shivering beggars, all beaten, driven, stumbling things-- 
form a sequence that signifies the dominant mood of "Big 
Blonde" which is that of despair, and a certain amount of 
defiance indicated by the action of heart swelling and 
hardening.
Is Hazel's defiance self-directed? There is a certain 
ironic posturing in Hazel's last words, but it is a pose 
struck to deceive others and not herself. Hazel prays:
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. . . without addressing a God, without knowing a God.
Oh, please, please, let her be able to get drunk, 
please keep her always drunk.
She lifted the glass.
"Thanks, Nettie," she said. "Here's mud in 
your eye."
The maid giggled. "That's the way, Mis'
Morse," she said. "You cheer up, now."
"Yeah," said Mrs. Morse. "Sure." (Portable
210)
By the end of the story Hazel is once again the cypher that 
she has been to the men in her life, her humorous 
nonchalance a dissimulating pose. If Hazel laughs at the 
men's jokes and presents herself as a good sport, it is not 
because she thinks those jokes are funny or because she 
enjoys being a good sport. Even her last word "Sure" is in 
the category of that ambiguous laughter. What Parker takes 
on in "Big Blonde" is patriarchy's expectation that women be 
passive, amusing, sporting creatures; Parker's counterpoint 
is to show them as "beaten, driven, stumbling things." The 
humor in this story is certainly self-deprecating, but the 
ironic detachment in the point of view makes it difficult to 
validate Walker's claim that Hazel is a victim.
In its emphatic gloom and elevation of a seemingly 
unexplained fondness for sentiment "Big Blonde" is almost a
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cautionary tale for patriarchy on why women are not laughing 
with them all the time. Parker's artfulness in this story 
lies in the manner in which she reversed the use of what she 
knew best--smug laughter-- for non-humorous purposes. It is 
this conscious choice to write a story about women not 
wanting to be funny or amusing for the sake of men that 
distinguishes "Big Blonde" from being a lot more than merely 
"a record of female shame" as Acocella described it so 
dismissively in her New Yorker article on Parker. Parker's 
primarily ironic art, especially "The Big Blonde," is a 
record of a quiet rebellion, a melancholic self- 
preservation, despite its obvious tone of self-deprecation, 
since Parker creatively avoids prescribing the neuroses of 
self-deception to her women characters. Humor in "The Big 
Blonde" is the awareness we hear in Hazel, after her 
comeback from suicide, of the violence done to her life; it 
is a quiet, silent, melancholic antidote to the blind 
striving for love that had taken her from one callous man to 
another. Of all her sentimental women who are in search of 
laughter and love, Hazel comes closest to possessing an 
understanding of laughter that has finally become a 
meaningful sound in her life. It is an ironic laughter 
since it is the laughter of a slave whose best part of life 
had been wasted within oppressive systems, but it is
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nevertheless a liberating laughter since it opens up a 
right, inner understanding of the self's relation to that 
system.
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form of the humorous challenge offered by the Firesign 
Theatre may indeed be located in Pseudodoxia; like 
Pseudodoxia. these radioplays are encyclopedic compendiums 
of popular and erudite learning and folklore. Like 
Pseudodoxia positioned at the watershed between the pre- 
scientific and the post - scientific worlds, these plays feed 
themselves on the benefits of two different but related 
technologies--radio and television. Like Browne's self- 
confident championing of seventeenth century empirical 
science, these plays exalt the value of their medium--the 
radio--to us. Like Browne who demonstrates the flaws in 
medieval learning, these plays demonstrate the sureal power 
of the technology of television to endlessly create and 
recreate versions of truth and reality. These radioplays, 
moreover, capture the intention of televison in the sense in 
which Walter Benjamin defined it in his theory of 
translation. Like the translation that exalts the original, 
these plays raise the technology of television to visionary 
heights, though the ultimate goal of this creative 
projection is to subvert the monopoly of television to 
represent reality. The tendentiousness of their humor is 
definitely value-based and it is ethically determined, but 
the master-slave dialectic is made to self-destruct rather 
than be destroyed from the outside. The emphasis is on two 
forms confronting each other--radio and television--and the
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unequivocal victory of the one--radio--over the other-- 
television.
The Firesign Theatre was an improvisatory theatre based 
in Los Angeles during the sixties. Philip Proctor, Philip 
Austin, Peter Bergman and David Ossman all brought their 
backgrounds in theatre, literature, and radio together to 
create plays that are terrifically funny, but also 
appropriately and meaningfully so. What is distinctive 
about the humor of the Firesign Theatre is that they do not 
give us any kind of safety valves that would absorb conflict 
for us. In this respect they are radically different from 
the standard tradition of humor in America. Humor in 
America, both written and performative, is traditionally 
grounded on a persona with identifiable characteristics.
Constance Rourke's Amgric.an,..Humgr; A Study...Q.f.t.hg Mat.ip.nal
Character (1931), observes that humor has always been a 
fundamental aspect of American character, indeed the 
American world-view. Rourke notes that "there is scarecly 
an aspect of the American character to which humor is not 
related, few in which in some sense it has not governed" 
(American Humor 9). Rourke's historical survey locates two 
clearly defined characteristics in American humor, one that 
of exaggeration, and the other, of understatement. Rourke 
finds in them the representation of two distinct strains in
the national character:
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The comic upset has often relaxed rigidities which 
might have been significant if taut . . .the solvent of 
humor has often become a jaded formula, the comic 
rebound automaticlaff that off"--so that only the 
uneasy habit of laughter appears, with an acute 
sensitivity and insecurity beneath it as though too 
much had been laughed away. Whole phases of comedy 
have become empty . . . But a characteristic humor has 
emerged, quiet, explosive, competitive, often grounded 
in good humor, still theatrical at bottom and full of 
large fantasy . . . with all the explosions its key has 
often remained low; this tradition has shown an effect 
of reserve, as if in immediate expression and in its 
large elements something were withheld, to be drawn 
upon again. It has produced two major patterns, the 
rhapsodic and the understated, whose outlines may be 
traced through the many sequences of popular comedy and 
through American literature; regional at first, they 
have passed far beyond the regional . . .(American 
Humor 232-33)
Rourke's prediction that American humor will continue to be 
grounded on a distinct persona and that it will transcend 
the regional turns out to be astute. Adam Gopnik in a 1994 
retrospective piece on James Thurber reiterated the same 
point: "The main accomplishment of Thurber and White in
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their early work was to turn down the volume, and end the 
hysteria, of American humorous writing and satire. They 
managed--and the achievement really is comparable to that of 
Addison and Steele--to find for American prose a mixed, 
middle style and, in so doing, to deprovincialize it"
(Gopnik 173). Gopnik's category of humor with its volume 
turned down brings us to Rourke's category of understated 
humor. Turning down the volume in American humorous writing 
was primarily a stylistic change rather than a new choice of 
themes. Gopnik observes that what is distinctive about 
Thurber is the "perfect record of the faint, tuneless music 
of the mind. This music, more than the famous little man 
attitude, is what is startling and still fresh in Thurber. 
There are very few jokes or setups in the pieces, and almost 
no movement. What there is instead is an uncanny flow of 
accurate psychological representation. . ." (Gopnik 172). 
"The faint, tuneless music of the mind," "the deadpan 
sentence" spoken with the volume turned way down by the 
perplexed little man with the small dog and the big wife, or 
the naive country-dweller in the city, such a persona has 
continued to be a staple of most American humorous writing.
Rourke's rhapsodic humor--loud instead of muted--may be 
located in the popular Hollywood comedies of the thirties. 
Ted Sennett in his study of movie comedy Laughing in the
Dark (1992) observes that though the W. C. Fields comic
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persona was that of the little man badgered and intimidated 
by life, one who might remind us of Thurber's meek Walter 
Mitty, but Harold Bissonette (It's a Gift. 1934) or Ambrose 
Wolfinger (The Man on the Flying Trapeze, 1935) inhabited a 
world that was significantly different from the silent 
comedies of Charlie Chaplin or Buster Keaton:
Fields's outlook is imbued with a deep-seated malice 
and hostility, rather than the basic kindness and the 
generosity of his comedy peers from the silent era. In 
the world of Its a Gift, the blind person is not a 
sweet flower girl, as in City Lights, but an ornery 
codger who destroys things with his cane. A dog is not 
a devoted pal as in any number of silent comedies, but 
a nuisance who reduces his master's pillow to shreds. 
(Laughing 28)
The jokes and visual gags in Fields's movies are pointedly 
aggressive, evident in this example quoted by Sennett: in 
The Man on the Flving Trapeze. Ambrose tells his boss that 
his mother-in-law has died from drinking "bad liquor." "It 
must be hard to lose your mother-in-law," the sympathetic 
boss tells him. "Yes, it is," Ambrose replies, "very hard. 
Almost impossible" (Laughing 29). While Fields' jokes are 
funny, their tendentiousness sounds unmotivated, leading us 
to question the limits of civilized humor, whether the 
unnamed institutions mocked deserve the cruelty thrust upon
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them, a debate central to the philosophical discussion of 
humor from Plato to Freud. Fields's victims are the 
ordinary, stereotypical victims of middle-class domestic 
drama, in-laws, relatives, customers, insurance salesmen 
etc, leaving us sometimes to wonder about the legitimacy of 
the humorous put-down. The emphasis in these films is on W. 
C. Fields; the plot is merely a vehicle for Fields to 
indulge his comic persona. We don't find any real social 
vision in these films, like we do in the plays of the 
Firesign Theatre.
The significant leap in American humor brought about by 
the Firesign Theatre might be made more visible if we 
contrast their engagement with social issues with the always 
popular, legitimately famous comedies of the Marx Brothers. 
Their humor is equally loud, boisterous and more 
rambunctious than the Field scenarios and the targets of 
their humor are different. Their humor, at once whacky and 
audacious may be seen to be focused on the public arena 
rather than the domestic one, bearing down upon such 
institutions as bourgeois entrepreneurship in Cocoanuts 
(1929), academe (Horsefeathers 1932), government (Duck Soup 
1933) , cultural pretensions (A Night at the Opera 1935) .
The jokes in these movies are pitched at a loud level. 
Groucho's puns and non-sequiturs, Chico's forced Italian 
accent and even Harpo's harp solos provoke, what we might
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call loud laughter. In these movies, moreover, we find a 
genuine engagement, though short of a real social vision, on 
the part of the comedians to topple pretentious social 
institutions. Their irreverence starts to sound rightfully 
tendentious, as opposed to the lingering doubt we feel at 
laughing at mother-in-law jokes. Moreover, we see comedians 
as champions of the common men, initiating such a point of 
view from scratch. Their subject matter is lowly, but they 
are in loud form.
A significant example of their self-conscious, common 
man's point of view mocking the elite is the climactic scene 
in A Night at the Opera where Groucho Marx replaces the 
bombastic manager of the New York Opera Company, Gottlieb, 
and delivers an audacious opening-night speech to the 
audience: "I am sure the familiar strains of Verdi's music 
will come back to you tonight. And Mrs. Claypool's checks 
will come back to you in the morning." The comic subversion 
here comes into effect through two strategies. First, word 
play or punning with the verb "come back," with the hint 
that Mrs. Claypool has taken everyone for a ride. The butt 
of the joke here is primarily Mrs. Claypool, who in order to 
endear herself to the cultural circle has been talked into 
donating a huge sum of money to the opera by Mr. Driftwood, 
Groucho's persona. This joke is ambiguously tendentious; we 
laugh at Dumont because she is unable to retaliate to
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Groucho who has conned her. We laugh at her pretensions 
though we are not sure why they are to be ridiculed. Like 
the stock characters in the commedia dell'arte Margaret 
Dumont plays a variety of characters along the lines of Mrs. 
C'laypool [Mrs. Potter in Cocoanuts. Mrs. Firefly in 
Ducksoup, Mrs. Upjohn in A Dav at the Races! who function as 
a kind of foil or straightman for Groucho's witticisms to 
bounce off, an underdog who is passive at best, and 
ridiculous at worst. The site of the opera is dissolved 
into a farcical bedlam by the incongruous juxtaposition of 
"Take Me Out to the Ballgame" into Verdi's overture. When 
the music starts we see the three brothers playing baseball 
in the orchestra pit. Chico pitches, Harpo bats and Groucho 
sells peanuts. This incongruous juxtaposition creates a 
comic point of view whose purpose is to make the elite look 
ridiculous, in other words, to create tendentious humor. 
Harpo releases the wrong backdrops so that the gypsy in II 
Trovatore sings before a railroad depot, a battleship, and a 
fruit stand, instead of the period set.
The above example might be taken as exemplary of the 
comedy of the Marx brothers both in its delight in comic 
word play and surreal juxtaposition aimed at producing comic 
effects. They helped popularize a strain of intellectual 
comedy that found its material in the public sphere, their 
specific parody reserved to attack sales-talk and show
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business. But as with W. C. Fields, where we start to feel 
doubtful about the purpose of their humor is when we realize 
that even at their most tendentious moment they refrain from 
completely identifying the victim of their humorous attack. 
The Fields joke about the mother-in-law gets more and more 
pointedly aggressive; Groucho1s joke dissolve itself in a 
welter of word-play. The purpose of the word-play, we 
discover, is to project the personae of the players, and not 
to challenge or transform the social problem which we 
realize was merely an occasion for the actors to indulge 
themselves. The dramatic range of their characters is about 
as fixed as that of the fool in classical theater.
They begin with what we might identify as particular 
characters, Mrs. Claypool or Hammer, for instance, who 
represent particular institutions. They are characters only 
in an attenuated form, generalized as personae to play parts 
in a stylized comedy. Groucho is always the intellectual 
prankster, Chico is always the delightful con man, and 
Harpo, the least aggressive of them all, the silent source 
of artful physical comedy. Consequently characterization 
does not much occupy the foreground, nor is it as developed 
through a persona, as for example it is necessarily in 
Dorothy Parker's stories.
With character development taking a subsidiary role, 
what is most striking about these films is their attempt to
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develop a strain of comedy almost totally dependent on 
conceptual shifts. The Marx Brothers’ most conspicuous 
contribution to comedy may be the scripting in of 
literariness into their comic texts, expanding the 
boundaries of comedy in self-conscious experiments with 
linguistic and conceptual displacements. An example is 
Hammer's (Groucho's) auctioneer's speech to a group of naive 
investors in Cocoanuts;
Florida, folks--Sunshine--perpetual sunshine--all year 
around. Let's get the action started before we get a 
tornado. Right this way. Step forward. Step forward 
everybody. Friends, you are now in Cocoanut Manor, one 
of the finest cities in Florida. Of course, we still 
need a few finishing touches. But who doesn't? This is 
the heart of the residential district. Every lot is a 
stone's throw from the station. As soon as they throw 
enough stones, we're going to build a station. Eight 
hundred beautiful residences will be built right here. 
Why they are as good as up. You can have any kind of 
home you want to. You can even get stucco--Oh, how you 
can get stucco. Now is the time to buy while the new 
boom is on. Remember that old saying, a new boom sweeps 
clean? And don't forget the guarantee--my personal 
guarantee. If these lots don't double in value in a 
year, I don't know what you can do about it. Now we'll
l u O
take lot #20--twentah--right at the corner of De Sota 
Avenue. Of course, you all know who De Sota was? He 
discovered a body of water. You've heard of the water 
they named after him. De Sota water. (Why a Duck 45)
We may identify six characteristic comic repartees in 
Hammer's speech. They are all in couplet form:
1. Of course, we still need a few finishing touches. But 
who doesn't?
The comic shift resides in the ambiguous sense in which the 
pronoun "we" is used. In "we still need a few finishing 
touches," "we" is used in the collective sense of the real- 
estate brokers or the estate itself, as in the buildings 
could do with some more last-minute paint jobs etc. The 
rejoinder "But who doesn't?" takes us out of the first 
context, selling real estate, and puts us into one which 
could be read as a philosophical statement about the general 
human condition. It makes us laugh because we recognize it 
as a cop-out.
2. Every lot is a stone's throw from the station. As soon 
as they throw enough stones, we're going to build a station. 
We experience a straining of our expectations here. The 
first statement leads us to believe that the station exists. 
But the second statement contradicts that expectation-- the 
station is yet to be built. What makes the relation between 
the two statements comical is the double sense in which
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"stone’s throw" is used. In the first instance, "stone's 
throw" is used figuratively as an idiom for a short 
distance. in the second instance, "throw" is used in its 
literal sense. We laugh because we perceive a sudden 
unconscious connection between the two meanings.
3. You can even get stucco*-Oh, how you Cc.i. get stucco.
We shift our understanding of the word "stucco" from its 
first contex where it signifies a material to the second 
context where it is a pun. "You can even get stucco" is not 
comic in itself. It could be spoken by anyone without 
inciting the slightest comic laughter. The rejoinder, "Oh, 
how you can get stucco" with the pun on "stucco" (as in 
"this is a sticky deal" or "you are going to get stuck") 
however, amuses us. We are amused because we perceive an 
connection between the two contexts throught the agency of 
the one word.
4. Now is the time to buy while the new boom is still on. 
Remember that old saying, a new boom sweeps clean?
The two statements fit with each other cleanly to make a 
comic couplet pivoted on the double entendre surrounding the 
tern "boom." in the seond statement "boom" is superimposed 
on "broom" with the latent broom still visible underneath. 
The allusion creates a comic effect.
Statements (5) and (6) work together.
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5. Of course, you all know who DeSota was? He discovered a 
body of water.
6. You've heard of the water they named after him. De Sota 
water.
"DeSota" stands for both the name of the explorer as well as 
for carbonated water--soda water. We are amused by the 
relative ease with which the two words "DeSota" and "soda 
water" combine to create two sets of relation that mean two 
completely different things.
The jokes are clever intellectual exercises. In all of 
the above six examples, we find that the jokes work only 
when taken as couplets. The crank that turns the jokes on 
lies in the gap between the first statement and its 
rejoinder and to access the joke we have to cross that gap 
by making a small conceptual leap. Individual couplets may 
or may not be comical--we combined statements (5) and (6) to 
discover the comic relation between the two. In all cases 
the comic spring is attached to a word that pops up like a 
jack-in-a box in both appropriate and inappropriate 
contexts. The comedy of the Marx Brothers is the 
elaboration of disparity. The comic persona of the Marx 
Brothers builds itself on such yoking of disparate terms, or 
disparate actions (an embrace ending in a prolonged 
untangling of a false beard), or disparate juxtapositions as 
in the opera scene we discussed earlier from A Night at the
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Qlierâ . Groucho composes his speeches out of such strings of 
comic couplets whose function is to lampoon his adversary, 
or metaphorically speaking, bomb him or her with no chance 
to retaliate and to survive. The original social setting 
recedes into the background as the characters move upfront.
The characteristic Groucho comic scenario, like that of 
W, C.Fields, seldom lifts itself to a confrontation between 
equals. Though the characters Groucho, Chico and Harpo play 
are impoverished, the representation of the inequality in 
social status favors the powerful one in most Marx brothers 
comedies, leading one to agree with George Santayana's 
understatement, "Fun is a good thing, but only when it 
spoils nothing better" (The Sense of Beauty 249). In the 
Marx Brothers comedies, the powerful institutions and their 
representatives who are the ostensible objects of parody and 
satire remain uncorrected while the underdogs' satirical 
point of view which created the initial comic tension in the 
movie gives way to that of the establishment. Groucho 
parodies opera, real estate, academe, but the parody never 
sharpens into satire. Parody itself is a conceptual of 
formal shift towards a reduction in seriousness, a 
degradation directed against persons and objects that 
command serious attention. The result is that comic attacks 
on the institutions end up as faint attacks that pose no 
real threats to the institutions in question, as another
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example from A Night at the Opera would make clear. In A 
Might at the Opera, the social institutions satirized are, 
one, the cultural pretensions of the elite circle to which 
Mrs. Claypool is an aspirant and, two, the trials and 
tribulations experienced by immigrants. The three 
immigrants played by Chico, Harpo, and Allan Jones reach 
America as stowaways hiding inside Groucho's trunk. The 
plot to release them inside the country results in dressing 
them up as famed Russian aviators and attempting to procure 
them a public welcome in the city of New York. Indeed the 
arenas that Groucho picks to stage his subversions are all 
conspicuously public, auctions, operas, and here a city- 
welcome. In A Niaht at the Opera, during the welcome, in a 
mixed-up pandemonium, the three immigrants lose their 
disguises as Russian aviators leading to their public 
exposure as frauds. The mayor and the policemen are exposed 
as ridiculous figures as well when they fall prey to Chico's 
and Harpo's comic antics, but their social roles as 
authority figures remain unchallenged. Groucho does not 
make the authority figures retaliate against the three 
stowaways in any forceful manner which would have made them 
hateful, and liable to incite some kind of moral indignation 
in us. instead the weak ones in the tug of war gradually 
expose themselves as phonies, seemingly without any force 
put upon them by those in power. It is a clever strategy to
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protect the staus-quo of the master-slave dialectic by 
making the masters unthreatening and kind, while the slaves 
make themselves look ridiculous. The rehabilitation of 
immigrants is a worthy social problem but the Marx Brothers 
retreats from making any manner of critical comment upon the 
situation beyond demonstrating its existence. But even this 
demonstration is not without a certain ideological desire 
for the position of the masters. In other words, comedy 
proffers no real threat to the social status-quo of power in 
the social structure. The immigrants give in to the mayor 
and the city hall.
In Cocoanuts. however, in a variant of the comic 
persona, Groucho's character Hammer contained the 
paradoxical union of both participant and observer, outsider 
and insider, or aggressor and victim by extension. The 
paradox acts as a safety valve to keep out any real 
tendentious take on the institutions in question which are 
salesmen and selling. The result is non-tendentious comedy 
that seems to be subversive but without the accompanying 
threat to challenge or change in any significant manner the 
target of its attack. A Night at the Opera is similarly 
non-tendentious since the status-quo of power is left 
unchallenged. The highly stylized and predictable comic 
personae of the Marx Brothers furthermore act as barriers 
between us and the staged social problem of these scripts.
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Let us turn to another example from Duck Souq. In this 
exchange between Firefly (Groucho Marx) and Mrs. Teasdale 
(Margaret Dumont) we hear elements of aggression in the role 
of absolute authority played by Groucho's character and that 
of acquiesence in the seemingly vulnerable role played by 
Margaret Dumont. Dumont's inability to retaliate puts her 
in a ridiculous position. But a lack of affect rules this 
exchange. We respond to the puns and conceptual shifts 
foregrounded in their conversation rather than react to it 
as a text of conflict.
Mrs. T: As chairwoman of the reception committee, I 
welcome you with open arms.
Firefly: Is that so? How late do you stay open?
(Whv a Duck 143)
"Open" refers obviously to the above-board friendliness of 
"welcoming with open arms" as well as the lewd suggestion of 
"being (sexually) available." Like the comic couplets of 
his soliloquies, here too, the two statements independently 
are innocent. They are normal statements that we might say 
to each other without inciting any kind of comic or 
tendentious laughter. But in its relation to Dumont's 
statement, it is definitely tendentious. Groucho co-opts his 
opponent's words and gives it a smutty twist leading to the 
sexual innuendo. Note how Mrs. Teasdale is unable to 
retaliate to this comic put-d^wn, thus prolonging her
167
ridiculous position for us. Instead she is made to trigger 
another set of couplets for Groucho. "Freedonia" is the 
trigger here:
Mrs. T: I've sponsored your appointment because I 
feel you are the most able statesman in all Freedonia.
Firefly: Well, that covers a lot of ground. Say, 
you cover a lot of ground yourself. You better beat it. 
I hear they're going to tear you down and put up an 
office building where you're standing. You can leave in 
a taxi. If you can't get a taxi you can leave in a 
huff. If that's too soon, you can leave in a minute and 
a huff. You know you haven't stopped talking since I 
came here? You must have been vaccinated with a 
phonograph needle. (Whv a Duck 143)
Though Groucho intends it as a put-down to Dumont of Mrs. 
Teasdale, the complicated figure of speech "vaccinated with 
a phonograph needle" encompasses Groucho's act more than her 
dumb-struck helplessness. All the jokes in this exchange 
revolve around punning based on similarity of sound-- leave, 
taxi, huff, minute and a huff etc. Freud gives credit to 
puns by grouping them with the category of joke techniques 
such as condensation, multiple uses of the same word, 
allusion, and double meaning , all of which revolve around 
similarity in sounds and words. Though puns might appear to 
be innocent since they are usually created on the word-
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level, they can be as cruel and tendentious as any 
complicated, conceptual joke. Groucho's purpose here is 
once again an unmotivated aggresr' .1 against Dumont, in 
watching the films of the Marx brothers we are forced to 
withdraw our affect from the social problems or even the 
obvious framework of the master-slave relation as in any 
exchange between Groucho and Dumont and discharge it as 
laughter at a clever conceptual or linguistic invention.
The films of the Marx brothers stop short of a real social 
vision.
Linguistic inventions might make their presence felt in 
humor, but they are more predictable in comedy. Certainly 
Firefly's utterances are closer to comedy than they are to 
humor, if we take Freud's distinction that humor presupposes 
the existence of a potentially painful state of mind whose 
pain the humorous displacement confronts and transforms into 
a source of pleasure thus escaping the neuroses of 
repression. Unlike Aristotle, who stated that the comic 
mask is essentially painless, Plato was aware of this 
element of pain that might intrude into seemingly innocent 
cases of laughter and his solution was not to laugh at all. 
What ultimately reduces the films of the Marx brothers to 
aggression with no real constructive purpose informing it is 
their deliberate evasion of any ground of pain that might 
spring up in the relations that make up their social system.
169
In Firefly's speeches, as indeed in any other Marx Brothers' 
script, this inner ground of pain or conflict is concealed, 
an absence which allows us to identify them as excellent 
examples of the laughter produced by comedy, not humor. The 
comedy of the Marx Brothers provides us with a comparative 
norm to understand the working of humor in the radio plays 
of the Firesign Theatre. The plays of the Firesign Theatre 
may properly be called examples of humor in the sense that 
Freud intended it--"loftiest of these defense functions" 
(Collected Papers 78).
What is distinctive about the humor of the Firesign 
Theatre is that they do not give us any kind of safety valve 
that would absorb conflict for us in their overtly political 
plays. The result i~ i t we are forced to confront 
unfinished business at regular intervals. Their dialogues 
are not composed of clean couplets. Unlike the Marx 
Brothers scripts, which for all their wild, wayward, 
carnival pretensions, follow a plot, the plays of the 
Firesign Theatre may be described in Pauline Kael1s phrase 
as "one-damn-thing-after-another serial" (For Keeps 105). 
These plays show a healthy disregard of any demand we might 
have about our audience expec *tions. Befitting the medium 
of the radio on which these plays were aired, they create 
all the accoutrements of drama like character, setting, and 
time through voices and noises. A plot exists only in the
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most attenuated form. Humor is not an ingredient of 
character, since character is not the focus of these plays; 
nor is humor the trademark of a persona, since star-value is 
not the prime focus either.
A typical Firesign humorous scenario incorporates a 
medley of voices, some distinct, some blurred, some over­
lapping with each other, some finishing each other's 
sentences against a background of clicks, static, droning of 
generators and often organ music. Much of the action in 
Waiting for the Electrician or Someone Like Him (1967) is 
set in a prison, thus focusing our attention on an 
ubiquitous atmosphere of suffering. A character named P is 
in a neutral country called "Enroute" where he is 
deliberately harrassed, detained and thrown into prison. In 
their collective author's preface, the writers tell us that 
they named the character P partly in homage to Philip 
Proctor who played the part and partly after Kafka's 
character Josef K. in The Trial. But instead of following 
in the footsteps of Kafka's K, P refuses to suffer in 
prison. If Dorothy Parker's heroines seek pleasure inside 
their suffering, P repudiates suffering. In other words, 
imposition of force by the master cannot turn P into a 
slave. P seeks assistance from his fellow inmates:
P [Calling]: Guard! Guard! I want to see my
Ambassador!
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French Prisoner: Easily done! He's in the next
cell!
Scandinavian Prisoner: Use de telephone . . .
P: I don't have a dime!
Old Jim: Here, use one of the pages of me novel.
Sound: He dials the phone only to get a Fred 
Astaire dance routine over the wire.
P: It's no good, they're tapping the lines! If I 
could only speak to someone. If I could only tell my 
story! (The Firesian Theatre's Big Book of Plavs 31)
In the above exchange, we note two characteristic devices 
employed to diffuse potential aggression. One, a sense of 
ubiquitous aggression dispersed in rising gradations from 
the relation between underdogs or slaves, to the relation 
between slave and master, to the relation between masters. 
This is a strategy very much similar to Browne's in 
Pseudodoxia. Turning oppression into an ubiquitous 
phenomenon does not become an occasion to evade conflict; 
instead, its ubiquity directs our attention to the 
overarching oppressive framework subsuming the particular 
examples collectively under its umbrella. Within this 
ubiquitous framework different relations give rise to 
different degrees of humor. For instance, the exchange 
between P and Old Jim, both prisoners, is humorous in a non- 
aggressive manner:
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P: I don't have a dime!
Old Jim: Here, use one of the pages of me novel.
(Firesiqn Theatre's Big Book 30)
In order to access this joke, and the one following 
immediately after, we have to enter a surreal world where we 
must willingly suspend our ordinary systems of belief. The 
surreal technique of dialing the phone with a page from a 
dime novel introduces a note of levity in a context whose 
potential implications are oppressive. But the atmosphere 
inside the cell is communally fearless. P's "dime" produces 
Old Jim's pun on the word "dime" as in "dime novel" or pulp 
fiction. When P accepts the "dime" to dial the phone, like 
Alice in wonderland drinking the glass that said "Drink me" 
and growing small or tall, we enter without warning into 
another world. P accepts the page of Old Jim's pulp fiction 
and uses it to dial the phone. He gets through to hear a 
Fred Astaire dance routine. P listens to the phone and 
exclaims, "It's no good, they're tapping the lines!" and we 
hear the sound of tapping, presumably Astaire tap-dancing. 
Though it is subtle, the effect of this exchange and the 
purpose of the pun on "dime" are to underscore for us the 
threatening situation that P and his fellow prisoners are 
in. P's reaction to the threat conveys his sense of 
disbelief and despair ("If I could only speak to someone.
If I could only tell my story!"), but to get to P's despair,
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we have to fumble across the surreal fact that he dialed the 
phone using a page from a dime novel. We experience a 
tension inside us between laughter and concern. But these 
moments of concern in us are fenced around by acts and 
phrases of a complete absence of sentimentality, rebellion, 
and sense of play in the face of suffering. We hear this 
deliberate underplaying of the fact of suffering in the 
French prisoner's reply to P's enquiry about his Ambassador: 
"Easily done! He's in the next cell!"
Another device to reduce the effect of suffering is to 
exaggerate it. We hear hyperbole's power to reduce 
seriousness in Old Jim's description of his Great Prison 
Novel:
I was imprisoned by a faceless people for a crime of 
which I had no knowledge and certainly did not commit 
But what of that? In me spare time, I have been 
pursuing me ’obby, which is writin' a Great Prison 
Novel. In the beginning, I wrote with an ink composed 
of parts of me own blood. However, this would not make 
an acceptable carbon, so I acquired an electric 
typewriter.
(Firesign Theatre’s Big_,Bggk 30)
The effect of the hyperbolic phrases "Great Prison Novel," 
and "ink composed cf parts of me own blood" is humorous, 
precisely because they are exaggerations, the Great Prison
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Novel suggesting the ready-made genre to us rather than the 
condition of the prisoner who wrote it. The purpose of 
hyperbole here is two - fold--one, to expose the painful 
circumstances of prison-life, and, two, indirectly to reduce 
its power to tyrannize the prisoners. Like the earlier 
example of using a dime to dial the phone, we are faced with 
a similar bizarre hyperbole here, writing with one's own 
blood, but lest this should introduce an element of 
sentimentality that would force us to pity Old Jim, an 
element of contrast is introduced in the form of an 
alternate instrument of composition, the typewriter, to 
reduce its effect on us. The ego's unflinching stance is 
further elaborated in Jim's rationale for procuring the 
typewriter-- since writing in blood would not make an 
acceptable carbon. Statements like Old Jim's function like 
the bars of the prison through which we can look in and out, 
but the fact of the bar, the suffering, remains. Unlike 
Parker who might react to the same situation in a self- 
deprecating manner, thereby minimising the worth of her ego, 
or the Marx Brothers who might dissolve the implications of 
the threatening situation either by transforming it into 
farce or by identifying with the masters, the Firesign 
Theatre holds us face to face with the situation without 
making us distort our reactions to it. Their jesting 
reaction to suffering (which is transferred to us), neither
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reduces their sense ot self-worth; in other words, their 
humor is not self-deprecating, nor does it exaggerate their 
self-importance by being aggressive towards others; in other 
words, it is not hostile. The relation of the prisoners to 
authority is one of rebellious unconcern, but it does not 
distort the status of the prisoners as prisoners. They 
resist suffering as much as they can from wherever they are.
If tendentious jokes swing between an amplitude of 
self-deprecating humor on one end to hostile jokes on the 
other, we would find that the humor of the Firesign Theatre 
does not fit this gamut. Old Jim's speech, for instance, 
parodies the purple style of pulp fiction, in the same 
manner in which Groucho's speech parodies the style of 
auctioneers. Groucho's parody demonstrates that it is a 
parody and eventually disappoints us by collapsing into a 
self-serving appropriation of the form. The appropriation 
is often for the purpose of self-aggrandisement, usually at 
the expense of a weaker character. Old Jim's speech, 
however, reinforces the fact of parody to us through 
repetition, until the form ridicules itself. For instance, 
a few lines after Old Jim first introduces us to "the first 
edition of me saga of eternal torment [profusely 
illustrated] titled 'Leather Thighs'I" we are reintroduced 
to the same novel, in a new advertisement: "Perhaps you 
would like to 'ear an excerpt from me Great Prison Novel of
176
Eternal T o r m e n t I n  Cold Leather' " (Firesian Theatre's Big 
BO-Ok 31) . That the play is parodying the form is evident in 
the subtle variation given to the title, from "Leather 
Thighs" to "In Cold Leather" both carrying suggestions of 
popular sexual fantasies, not necessarily about prison life.
Even when the relation between prisoners leads to 
tendentious humor, there is no attempt to turn the jest into 
an occasion for the characters to claim our sympathy or 
hostility, as we do with Dumont and Groucho in the Marx 
brothers's films. For example:
P: I'm not afraid of Justice! I know these bars 
are here for a good reason. Prisons are for the 
guilty.
Prisoner: String him up!
Another Prisoner: Anybody got a string?
(Firesign Theafcxals_Big_b.qqK 31)
Here, P tries to separate himself from the rest of the 
prisoners. "Prisons are for the guilty" is his way of 
saying that he is not guilty, but that everybody else is. 
This is a potential source of conflict and it is revealed as 
such. But the tendentiousness in the prisoner's remark 
"String him up" is drained with the rejoinder "Anybody got 
any string?" The jest technique is similar to other 
instances of word-play ( a paradigm change from the 
figurative use of "string up" to its literal use) we have
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identified in the Marx Brothers scripts but its effect here 
is very different. Its purpose is to make fun of oppression 
by making it so ubiquitous that even prisoners are planning 
to oppress each other. This is not a humorous situation by 
any means. In fact it could turn into the very opposite of 
a humorous situation. But it becomes humorous when the 
prisoners make it sound rebellious ("String him up!" the 
powerful imperative used in a weak way by a powerless 
figure) in an incongrous manner rather than make it sound 
like a rationalised plot to murder P. The form repeats 
itself when P shouts to the prisoners:
P: No, no, no! don't you guys see? The system is 
here for your protection! I'm not afraid! All I want 
is a chance to clear my name! Look, we live and 
operate under the Due Process of Law. The innocent 
have nothing to fear. Only the guilty will suffer!
Prisoner: Lynch him!
Another Prisoner: Anybody got a lynch? (Firesian 
Theatre's Big Book 31)
"Lynch" is used in the same manner as "string him up" and 
works as a jest in a similar manner. But by repeating it a 
second time it is drained of content and we concentrate on 
the form. It reduces the effect of the conflict between the 
prisoners, after having revealed it. The Firesign Theatre
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parodies a form to demonstrate the form that it parodies and 
waits for the form to consume itself.
There is no attempt made in these plays to conceal the 
oppressive grounds of a public problem. Concentrating on 
the subjectivity of characters while they undergo suffering 
produces sympathy or ridicule in us; absence of such a 
subjective point of view, however, does not reduce the 
seriousness of the suffering in these plays. Their 
rebellion demonstrates it as a method to contain the 
suffering. We never forget for a moment that the characters 
are in prison, what is new about the treatment of 
oppression by the Firesign Theatre is that we encounter 
characters who contend authority by allowing ubiquitous 
authority to destruct itself from the inside, draining it 
off its power to affect us in a painful or sympathetic 
manner by parodying its form.
Don't Crush That Dwarf Hand Me the Pliers (1970) is a 
similar appeal to watch out for the continuous presence of 
the master-slave dialectic in contemporary life, done in a 
form that parodies most forms of master-discourses, 
primarily religion, politics, and the military. The form 
that they choose to expose through parody is the meta-form 
of all forms of oppressive discourses television. in the 
preface to the play, David Ossman described their effort
thus:
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The latest album is about Multiple-Identity--going 
through changes here and now. we are dealing with 
television: What the TV set gives you is the ability to 
plug in at any time. You can get any old movie, 
something from every bit of time . . . it's a life in 
the day of a man who looks at himself on television, 
metaphorically speaking . . . you can see yourself on 
TV, any one of those people can be you . . .  we make 
records of our time. We made this one at the time of 
the Kent State murders, so naturally we wrote about 
schools . . . (Firesian Theatre's Big Book 59)
The interactive element which formats the play-- talking to 
the television, television talking back to us--is not an 
impossibility nowadays with TV call-in talk shows, and 
computer chat lines that provide us anything from a simple 
bibliographic references to matrimonial possibilities.
Though there is nothing inherently humorous about such 
advanced technology, the Dwarf has touched upon a trickster 
aspect of television-- its formal ability to transform itself 
endlessly in as many guises as possible--and turned this 
discovery into an occasion for a tendentious critique of the 
media.
Non-duration and discontinuity, two characteristic 
states of our relation to television, combine to create the 
form of the play. The skimpy plot follows the life of
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George Tirebiter revealed to him all in the span of one day 
on television. Tirebiter grasping his own history through 
the medium of television takes place on the level of 
demonstration; we follow George Tirebiter as he tries to 
retrieve his past from a jumble of soundbites; but as in a 
dream we are made to witness events organized with their own 
inner logic with no explanation or preparation.
In their collective preface to Dwarf the authors 
disclose that Dwarf evolved out of a radio show called "A 
Life in the Day," doubtless a tendentious reversal of The 
Beatles' song title "A Day in the Life" from Sat Pepper's 
Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967):
In January, 1968, we wrote the last script in a series 
of half-hour plays which we were performing on AM 
radio. It departed from the more absurd character - 
comedies we had been doing, being based on a day's 
television programming. Beginning with the morning's 
first show, "Today's Day Today," it continued (with 
commercial interruptions) with the day's broadcasts of 
"Sailor Bill," "The End of the World," "Ozzie Knows 
Father," The Evening News (including an item about a 
man-made baby1), "The Golden Hind," and a Western called 
"Garbanza!" Late in the evening, the TV channels were 
changed, switching through several bits of programs, 
including an Italian movie and the Ralph Spoilsport-
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sponsored Late Late show, "Babes in Khaki." At last, 
after a prayer and the National anthem, the station and 
the set were turned off for the day.
(Firesign Theatre’s Big Book 59)
The above list of programs --dangerously crass, exaggerated, 
sensational, a parody of real TV--is a catalogue for channel 
switching which has brought with it its own way of creating 
all kinds of bizarre plots and perceptual leaps within the 
minds of the viewers. Dwarf exploits these leaps that we 
make in our minds for the purpose of challenging and 
disproving television's authority to disperse truth.
The play starts with a miracle. An unidentified voice 
says, "Well! My iron lung is working again. . . ," an 
opening appropriate for the atmosphere of disbelief and its 
gradual demystification that are the real issues of the 
play. The turning on of the power switch with which the 
play opens is a tendentious moment since it charts out the 
distribution of power relations in the play. A janitor 
switches on power while talking to an unspecified mass 
audience who are apparently anxiously waiting for the power 
to come on:
Janitor: You people got trouble here? Well, I don't 
know why you people seem to think this is magic. It's 
just this little chromium switch here . . . [click] My,
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you people are so superstitious . . . (Firesicm 
Theatre's Big Book 61)
A radio comes on and we internalize the division created 
between the audience and the programs, or audience versus 
authority by extension, since they seem to be mesmerised by 
the whole act. An element of menace to the audience, or the 
young, is also introduced immediately following the turning 
on of power, which brings us back to Ossman's comment about 
the Kent State murders. We hear a policeman say, "Bob, this 
is Mobile Security Patrol One. There seems to be a young- 
type person in the audience with a Negro radio. Would you 
check that out please?" (61) . The ridiculous circumloction 
of "young-type person" parodies the language of law- 
enforcement with great accuracy.
The m e s m e r i z e d  a u d i e n c e  is p r e s e n t e d  as l i s t e n i n g  to 
a r e v i v a l i s t  m e e t i n g  at the P o w e r h o u s e  C h u r c h  of the 
P r e s u m p t u o u s  A s s u m p t i o n  w a i t i n g  for t heir P a s t o r  F l a s h  w h o  
is u p  in an a i r p l a n e  to c o m e  down. T h e  p l a y ' s  u n r e p r e s s e d  
c r i t i q u e  of the m e d i a  for f e e d i n g  us e n d l e s s  f a l s e h o o d s  m a y  
b e  f o u n d  in the v a r i a t i o n s  that the m o t i f  of h u n g e r  t akes on 
in the play, first i n t r o d u c e d  w h e n  P a s t o r  F l a s h  c r a s h l a n d s  
hi s  a i r p l a n e  a n d  t o u c h e s  g r o u n d  e x c l a i m i n g  loudly:
I ' m  down! T h a n k  you, D e a r  Friends, I ' m  down, I ' m  
gr o u n d e d ,  saf e  a n d  sound, t r a i l i n g  c l o u d s  of glory, I ' m  
down. A n d  I ' m  m a r c h i n g !  Yes, D e a r  Friends, I ' m  m a r c h i n g
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to dinner! 'Cause Godamighty, I'm hungry! Yes! I'm 
hungry! Safe and sound and hungry! (Firesian Theatre's 
Big Book 63)
Pastor Flash and George Tirebiter who we hear watching the 
show meet on the topic of hunger. That the motif of hunger 
is intended to carry the motif of menace becomes evident 
when we hear Pastor Flash's exhortations to eat ("We must 
^at of our friends the birds, of our friends the cows, of 
our friends the pigs. Yes, its good to eat a friend, my 
friend") merge into an advertisement for an unidentified 
edible product described as ". . .urreunded by a thin, thin 
16 millimeter shell. And inside it's delicious!" (65). The 
play here parodies the rhythm of advertisements for the 
purpose of condemning the television for something that 
sounds vaguely like homicide: an artillery weapon is hinted 
in the description "thin, thin 16 millimeter shell" which 
follows on the foot of cannibalism first hinted in Flash's 
statement, "Yes, it's good to eat a friend, my friend."
Both statements confirm for us that what the television 
proposes to feed you is morally suspect from this point 
onwards. The motif of hunger and its variant cannibalism 
(killing), moreover, anticipates Tirebiter's role in his 
war-film and Peorgie's court-martial in yet another movie 
H i a h s c h o o l  Madness where the elements of aggression are more 
o p e n l y  d i s p l a y e d .
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The advertisements, newscasts, and interviews spawned 
by television create a similar menacing lisc that denies us 
any glimpse of coherence. For instance, the list of 
headlines before a news show parody the form of headlines. 
Their function is to sound almost violently cryptic:
This is the Hour of the Wolf News. Big Light Slated to 
Appear in East. Sonic Booms Scare Minority Groups in 
Sector B. And there's Hamburger All Over The Highway 
in Mystic, Connecticut. (Firesian Theatre's Big Book 
66)
Like the earlier image of the 16 millimeter shell 
surrounding something delicious to eet, we have another 
vaguely threatening list here, non-explicit as to its 
references, but menacing just the same. Even when the list 
sounds detailed and explicit, it is coded as in "Sonic Booms 
Scare Minority Groups in Sector B." The image of shelling 
and blowxng-up of body-parts from the 16 mm image is 
continued in "And There's Hamburger All Over The Highway in 
Mystic Connecticut."
The list form with its non-interpretive syntax is thus 
used by the Firesign Theatre to keep their humor on the 
level of demonstration and let the parody destroy its target 
by itself. Lists like the Headline list above or the 
following are good examples of this form of peculiarly 
unpredictable tendentiousness. In other words, we are
185
unable tc extrapolate a rule regarding the ridiculous, or 
the object of laughter, since it might be any word, any 
sound, anything at all. The result of this unpredictability 
is that once again we are sensitized to the possibility that 
oppression, not suffering, is ubiquitous. The question we 
are left with then is, how are we to react to ubiquitous 
oppression? Television commercials are used pointedly by 
the group to draw our attention to the pervasiveness of a 
particularly rampant form of public exploitation. Their 
strategy of contention is to let the absurdity of the form 
destroy itself through repetition:
1. Ocelots. Paupers. Pipe-nipples, Polombras, Pizzas! 
Armenian Gardens. . .Hank's Juggernaut. . .New 
Leviathan. . .Nick's Swell. (Firesian Theatre's Big 
Book 66)
George mutters this list as he thumbs through the telephone 
directory looking for a pizza delivery. This list with its 
meaningful words (ocelot, paupers, pizza) and combination 
meaningless words (pipe-nipples, polombras, Armenian 
gardens, Hank's juggernaut, new Leviathan, Nick’s swell) are 
absurd since most of them sound out-of-place in the Yellow 
Pages section. Their purpose is to add to the surreal 
environment that surrounds George.
2. . . .I've got an envelope that'll clean your car while 
you’re driving it home to work. Well, George, believe
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me this time, because this one isn't like the Austrian 
self - sharpening razors. No, friends, no overheating 
like the tropical fishes. No zizzing and dripping like 
with the dike. . . (68)
Bob Baseline, a television host for commercials, sells 
these products. The marvellous phrase "this one isn't like 
the. . ." reverses the effect of the elaborate list with 
great economy so that we regard the strange, dangerous 
products like Austrian self - sharpening razors, overheated 
tropical fishes, and the dike that zizzes and drips with a 
skeptical eye. The purpose of the list is to underscore the 
incomprehensibility and latent menace of television 
programming.
3. You promise to covet property, propriety, plurality, 
surety, security, and not hurt the State? Say "what"? 
(89)
The Bailiff who swears in Mudhead for his trial says these 
words, evidently to confuse him and us as we are led to 
imagine a society where that is the oath. If we superimpose 
this list on top of the original oath where we are to tell 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the whole truth, 
we will hear the tendentious shift in values and priorities 
that rule this list.
4. Right Jack! So far, a complete broken set of color bars 
for Mrs. P's new home, some levelled mountain skis and
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water - rollers for that funfilled open season, an 
unattached Grid-Five Stand-Up Reheater with a smoke 
window, and now. . . .Three hundred full pounds of Chef 
Antoines's Southern Fried Glimps, toasted to golden 
perfection, cubed, reheated, and returned to water 
before you're ready, Mrs. P. And the inside? Well, 
look at that! Close the door and the light stays on! 
(85)
This list of ostensibly highly desirable household products, 
broken set of color bars, fried glimps, etc belong to Danny 
Dollars and Bob, the hosts for television's Hawaiaian Sell- 
Out game-show. The purpose of the list is to underscore 
tendentiously the total incomprehensibility and scam of 
advertisements.
What makes these lists humorous is once again an aspect 
of hyperbole or exaggeration, what we might call a 
dangerously unaware loudness, often tipping over into the 
realm of the nonsense or the absurd, that makes it 
vulnerable to ridicule. Oppressive authority represented as 
a loud form constitutes the device of parody in Dwarf. It 
is as if the latent aggression is extracted out of all 
tyrannical situations and fed through a megaphone where it 
is loud enough for anyone to hear it for what it is. We
hear this loudness in everything Pastor Flash says; we hear
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it in George Tirebiter’s speech to the nation where he asks 
for their votes:
• . . not in any way want to put myself in a 
confrontatory position either with the United Snakes, 
or with Them. And you can believe me, because I never 
lie and I'm always right. So wake up! [slap and baby 
crying] And take a look at your only logical choice.
Me. George Tirebiter. (Firesian Theatre's Big Book 69) 
Instead of an outside authority confirming his worth as a 
political candidate, the tautology "I never lie and I'm 
always right" makes his argument unexpectedly self- 
referential, making us see his authority in no uncertain but 
unverified terms. The authority is thrust upon us 
aggressively; hence the slap to the baby.
The same loudness characterizes the speech of Sailor 
Bill, another television host, this time for a children's 
program:
Ok, kids! And we have another letter here from our 
Happy Birthday Gu-gu-gu- gumdropper in Sector R. It's 
little Sally I. Chink--er--uh--Ching! And she's 12 
years old today. Well, that's wonderful, Sally! You're 
going to start menstruating soon, huh? Don't you think 
you ought to be . . . (76)
The seeming innocence of radio announcers, used to disguise 
actual aggression, is parodied here. Sailor Bill is both
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racist ("Sally I. Chink--er--uh--Ching") as well as inclined 
to sexually titillating conversation, hinted in his apparent 
interest in the girl's menstruation.
In both of the examples above, we find that the 
tendentiousness of the parody is legitimate and within the 
bounds of civilized humor. Both targets are summoned only 
for the shortest possible time, they are not allowed to 
develop any kind of relation between themselves and other 
characters which would fix them into a role. The exact 
nature of their aggression is identified and exaggerated in 
a dynamic that does not require them to have a victim, or a 
ridiculed target. We are in doubt for a moment that the 
parody has a target, but in the tendentious dynamic that we 
encounter here the oppressive form is drained of its 
specific content and made visible to us in pure form. But, 
like in the hearing of a smutty joke, we understand who the 
targets are and what the purpose of the joke is. Both 
Tirebiter and Sailor Bill represent a form of aggressive 
authority and it is that form that the play satirises so 
effectively.
When both the master and the slave are present at 
the scene of conflict, there is no attempt made to conceal 
the conflict and its exact nature in the manner of the Marx 
Brothers reducing the seriousness of the problem of 
immigration in A Niaht at the Opera. For example, in the
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scene where Tirebiter/Mudhead, like P, is prosecuted for an 
unspecified crime, the military is held responsible:
Lt. Tirebiter: Surrogate General Klein, sir. When 
I signed my contract with you, I fully intended to 
fulfill its terms with honor, sir. But you never told 
me I had to go out there and kill anybody. I. . .
Klein: [banging gavel]: Lieutenant, we will not 
tolerate the use of prohibited language in this court- 
martials. The accursed will be advised of the absence 
of his rights under the Secret Code of Military 
Toughness and will accordingly. (87)
Authority is mocked (though the form of submission is 
observed) from the very moment of apostrophe onwards: 
"Surrogate General Klein, sir," an imposter obviously, 
unless it is a legitimate title in the society that is 
portrayed. The title thus becomes a pointed comment on the 
society itself. Tirebiter's statement "But you never told 
me I had to go out there and kill anybody" intensifies the 
paranoid prohibition on the word "kill" that we hear 
enforced in an earlier exchange between Tirebiter and Pico 
and Alvarado:
Lt. Tirebiter: Make a clean sweep. Flush out the 
enemy and ki-ki-ki-um . . .
Sgt. M: What's that, sir?
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Alvarado: Sir? Lieutenant, excuse me, sir, what 
are we gonna do, man?
Pico: Yeah, after we flush 'em out?
Lt. Tirebiter: We're gonna lock and load, Private, 
and we're gonna go out there and ki . . . (79)
Tirebiter's inability to say the word "kill" purposefully 
highlights the menace it embodies. This is a breakthrough 
moment in Dwarf where a word, representation of reality in 
language, acquires a mysteriously poetic authenticity that 
we are, for once, absolutely certain as to what it means.
The play achieves this authenticity through the simple 
process of repetition, which brings out its melancholy 
menace, rather than turn it comical, putting Frye's 
observation about the comic form of repetition once again in 
reverse.
Pico: What'll we do when we lock and load?
Lt. Tirebiter: We're gonna ki-ki-ki . . .
Sgt. M: Take it easy. It's not your fault, 
Peorgie! Come on, Peorgie!
Lt. Tirebiter: ki-ki-ki . . . (79)
Klein's reply also follows the form of official reprimand, 
but it is full of nonsense that makes him sound ridiculous, 
but rightfully so, since even here, his nonsense is 
aggressive nonsense: telling the truth is termed "the use of 
prohibited language," the accused becomes "the accursed,"
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who will be informed of "the absence of his rights," under 
due process of Law which becomes "the Secret Code of 
Military Toughness." Authority undoes its credibility 
itself.
The repetition of prohibited words, double entendres 
and allusions surrounding every word, and absurd titles like 
the above Surrogate Klein create a visible gap between the 
absurd society represented by the play and our society. But 
ultimately the absurd world of television in Dwarf is a 
tendentious critique of our society since we are the 
producers and consumers of this nonsense; we play absurd 
roles to amuse ourselves. But even when trapped inside the 
mindless amusement park of television/society, Dwarf allows 
authentic existential moments to break through, as in 
Tirebiter's inability to pronounce the word "kill" or 
Tirebiter's panicked comment "Oh, no, that woman's trying to 
kill me!" on seeing his old co-star from Peorgie and Mudhead 
movies, "the original 'Bottles,' Mudhead's crazy, hopped-up 
girlfriend" who "drops right through the Celebrity Trap 
Door" (68). These unpredictable and incongruous moments 
contain the play's attempt to invest or derive meaning from 
the seemingly mindless surface of life portrayed by the 
television. Dwarf's approach to the television is one of 
absolute control; they reveal the absurdity of television, 
not through any external agents, but by imitating its form
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almost word for word in certain cases, and allowing the form 
to gradually destroy its credibility. But inspite of this 
tendentious expose of its absurdity, Dwarf exalts the 
technology when George is made to piece together certain 
authentic moments from his life from amongst the random 
soundbites of advertisements, movies, news shows and 
commercials. This mixture of censure and approbation is 
what excludes Dwarf from the extreme categories of McLuhan- 
like enthusiasm as well as the overwrought paranoia and 
pessimism of technology to be found in critics like Jean 
Baudrillard of the modern media. Dwarf shows us television 
for what it is--entertainment without beginning or end or 
pause--but it is a purposeful revelation; they show us that 
this permanent presence is directed towards homogenizing all 
kinds of disasters ubiquitous and of the same degree and 
kind. This homogenization of different aspects of our 
phenomenal world into products for our amusement is 
television's singular and particular form of oppression. 
Dwarf's contribution to our intellectual discourse about 
technology is its perceptive articulation of television's 
ideology to homogenize oppression so that unless we learn to 
see television as a product it will render our reactions to 
it incapable of dissent. They emphasize the product-form of 
television by breaking its linear, seamless continuity and 
replacing it with rapid channel- switching that scrambles the
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superficial control of television rendering it 
discontinuous, non-linear, and nonsensical.
In We Are All Bozos on This Bus (1972) we find an even 
clearer demonstration of systems demolishing themselves from 
within. Here, the central object of satire is modern 
technology. A Tirebiter-like figure, who is now called 
Clem, a computer operator rather than a film director, finds 
himself at the Wall of Science with his seat-mate Barney 
(the group tells us that the ur-form for Bozo was a 
children's play realized only in bits and pieces) while on a 
tour of the archetypal techno-theme park, the Future Fair 
Tour Bus. Clem, for reasons of his own, enters the 
electronic system and tries to reprogram it so it would 
answer his question, "Why does the porridge bird lay his egg 
in the air?" Clem finds himself in the hologram mode and 
decides to clone himself. Once again, we hear the exact 
appropriation of the form of modern technological discourse 
in Clem's conversations with the machine:
Clem: Prepare, shift, simulfax for hue and form.
Prepare for mirror clone . . .
Barney: What are you doing?
Clem: Clone me!
Mac: Password. Illegal entry.
Clem: Clone me, Dr. Memory?
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Mac: Thank you. (Firesian Theatre's Big Book
We note that the machine is clearly the one in control here. 
Clem has to modify his imperative command "Clone me!" to a 
more submissive form, "Clone me, Dr. Memory?"
Clem/Clone duality attempts to conduct a conversation with 
the machine:
Clem/Clone: I have a question for Dr. Ah . . .
Dr. M: UHHHHHHHHH . . .
Clem/Clone: For Dr. Ah . . .
Mac 1: Ah-vocado . . .
Mac 2: . . .  aguacatl, nahuatl, chocolotl, ocelotl
Mac 3: Aligator Pear, crocagator pair, dat's why 
dey's so mean . . .
Clem/Clone: No, no, no!
Mac 1: Nos. Many nos. Or . . .
Mac 2: . . .knows as in HE SHE IT knows . . .
Mac 3: SHE . . .  IT (Firesian Theatre's Big Book
125)
The electronic system in on its way to a total breakdown as 
we hear it latch on to any sound that Clem/Clone makes and 
tries to give information about it. Like the nonsense 
substituted in Surrogate General Klein's speech, the 
breakdown of the machine produces an absurd list of sounds,
125)
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the sound "A" leading to Avocado, aguacatl (spawning its own 
series of what sounds like Mayan names but are English words 
made to sound Indian--chocolotl, ocelotl), and Clem's 
frustrated interjection "No, no, no," giving rise to the 
"Many nos" leading to "knows" which brings us to 
scatological stop in "SHE. . .IT." The disintegration
increases in tempo when Clem asks the machine his question:
Clem/Clone: All right, Doc--this is it! Gird your 
grid for a big one! Why does the porridge bird lay his 
egg in the air?
Dr M: N000000000000000 . . .
Mac 2: White dust 'n' perished birds leaves its hex 
in the air?
Dr M: N000000000000000 . . .
Mac 3: Wise doves 'n' parish bards lazy leg in the
Eire?
Dr. M: NOOOOOOOOOOOOOO . . .
Mac 2: Wise ass the poor rich Bar 
[Honk]
Mac 3: DELAY . . .
Mac 2: . . .lazer's edge in the Fair? (129)
The system's inability to answer Clem's question and its 
disintegration from within is demonstrated in the form of an 
electrical short circuit that finally shuts the machine
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down. This atmosphere of disintegration is carnival - like, 
especially with the honking sounds in the background.
The rebellion displayed by the powerless in these plays 
confronts oppressive authority by downplaying its effect on 
the voices or the charaoces. The society that these 
characters inhabit are chaotic, menacing as well as absurd. 
The defense strategy to counter this ubiquitous oppression 
is to allow it to destroy itself. The political 
implications of this plan of attack is inwardly directed as 
well. The characters demonstrate for us the way in which 
humor can be used as a subversive, distancing tool from the 
framework of aggression, which, however, does not signify 
inaction on the part of the characters. They display a 
tenacity to defend their sense of equality in the face of 
conflict through an unequivocal rebellion towards that which 
oppresses them. Freud observed that the best instance of 
humor serves an illusion, but he added that humor is 
precisely a demonstration of an attitude of mind towards 
suffering that repudiates the fact of suffering without 
quitting the grounds of mental sanity that other forms of 
repression might bring. It has a peculiarly fine and 
liberating effect to it since it does not belittle the ego. 
It is this self-conscious triumph of the ego in the face of 
conflict that is the most important contribution of the 
Firesign Theatre to the philosophy of humor.
CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion: Towards Non-tendentious Humor and Non-violent
Rebellion
Thomas Leary's translation of the ancient Chinese document 
on military strategy, The Art of War, compiled over two 
thousand years ago by Sun Tzu, opens with a parable:
According to an old story, a lord of ancient China 
once asked his physician, a member of a family of 
healers, which of them was the most skilled in the art.
The physician, whose reputation was such that his 
name became synonymous with medical science in China, 
replied, "My eldest brother sees the spirit of sickness 
and removes it before it takes shape, so his name does 
not get out of the house.
"My elder brother cures sickness when it is still 
extremely minute, so his name does not get out of the 
neighborhood.
"As for me, I puncture veins, prescribe potions, 
and massage skin, so from time to time my name gets out 




As this story illustrates medical science and military 
strategy have one factor in common: both serve pain. Both 
are necessary to relieve suffering but the less we need them 
the better would be the quality of our lives. This is the 
reason why the physician exalts his eldest brother as the 
perfect healer--the one who has the power to stop the 
disease while it is still in its spirit. But in the 
imperfect world we live in it is altogether impossible to 
access the underlying causes of afflictions before they take 
shape and preventative arts start their work by dealing with 
symptoms.
Humor operates quietly like the physician's eldest 
brother who did not win any fame because he could kill the 
sickness while it was still in its spirit form. All the 
texts that we have looked at--those of Browne, Kipling, 
Parker, The Firesign Theatre-- exemplify this quest for a 
quiet manner to defeat aggression. The quest took many 
forms; we found that it is virtually impossible to faze 
Browne and Kipling from the outside because of their exalted 
sense of themselves. We found that Parker developed a 
melancholy awareness that protected her from self-deception. 
Her prolonged suffering and ruthlessness to herself have a 
monastic quality to it because it brings with it self- 
awareness. The plays of the Firesign Theatre demonstrated 
how loud laughter and aggression eventually have to die down
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spontaneously if the rest of us vaccinate ourselves against 
it by a good dose of rebellion. The strategies to confront 
aggression in a quiet manner are different, but they all 
have a common denominator: they self-consciously avoid 
attacking their adversaries directly and instead defeat the 
enemy in an indirect, non-violent manner. The non-violence 
is not the sign of passivity or weakness; it is the sign of 
a shrewd mind. The humorous point of view exemplifies what 
Sun Tzu termed "remembering danger":
So the rule of military operations is not to count 
on opponents not coming, but to rely on having ways of 
dealing with them; not to count on opponents not 
attacking, but to rely on having what cannot be 
attacked. (The Art of War 65)
The humorous perspective demonstrated by these texts is one 
that sets out to create "what cannot be attacked." It is an 
internal quality grounded in introspection. Aggression is 
an ubiquitous dialectic, a continual strife; then what has 
the power to offer a paradoxical relief from this strife is 
to be alert to the existence of conflict. Our goal is to 
posit the existence of a liberating laughter borne of a 
sense of humor that accepts its political and social
responsibility.
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